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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment is the sixth in a series of annual efforts by the Law Re-
view to present in a concise manner the important developments in the field
of labor relations.' The object of the comment is to report those decisions
which significantly add substance to, or depart from, prior policy in the
application of the Labor Management Relations Act, and to analyze in
detail those cases which are the most significant. The subject matter com-
prises, for the most part, decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the
lower federal courts, and the National Labor Relations Board reported during
the Survey year ending March 1, 1967. In addition, state court decisions of
significance are included, and some cases which were decided after the end of
the Survey year are reported because of their relevance to decisions which
were given during the Survey year.
IL BOARD AND COURT JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdictional Standards of the NLRB
The Supreme Court has held that Congress, in passing the NLRA, has
given the Board the maximum jurisdiction to regulate labor relations avail-
able to a federal agency under the interstate commerce clause of the Con-
stitution.' The determining factor for the Board, in deciding if jurisdiction
should be asserted, is whether the "immediate situation is representative of
many others throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left
unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce." 2
 How-
ever, early in the history of the NLRA, it was established that when the dollar
volume of the company's business was so small as to be de minimis, the
Board should reject jurisdiction over that company's labor disputes.'
Actually, the widest extent of the Board's jurisdiction is but the outer-
most of three concentric circles, the next of which bounds those cases over
which the Board should assert jurisdiction, and the smallest circle enclosing
that quantum of cases over which the Board, limited by its physical capabili-
1
 The prior comments arc: 1965-1966 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 7
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 909 (1966); 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law,
6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 815 (1965) ; Recent Developments in Labor Law, 5 B.C.
& Corn. L. Rev. 629 (1964); Recent Developments in Labor Law, 4 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 661 (1963) ; Labor's New Frontier: The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C.
Ind, & Com. L. Rev. 487 (1962).
1
 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306
U.S. 601 (1939).
2 Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
3
 NLRB v. Fainblatt, supra note 1, at 607.
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ties, can effectively assert jurisdiction. Therefore the Board has had to exer-
cise its discretion in choosing which cases of those presented to it were most
deserving of its efforts. 4 Until 1950 the Board exercised this discretion
on a case-by-case basis.
But early in the 1951 fiscal year, after a long study of the pattern
emerging from past decisions, the Board issued a series of unani-
mous decisions setting forth more precisely the standards to govern
its future exercise of jurisdiction in the 48 States. In doing so, the
Board declared: "The time has come, we believe, when experience
warrants the establishment and announcement of certain standards
which will better clarify and define where the difficult line can best
be drawn."' (Footnotes omitted.)
In 19540 and again in 19587 these standards were revised. Labor disputes
involving businesses whose dollar volume of revenue fell below these stan-
dards would not be heard by the NLRB.
Thus, when the Supreme Court announced, in Guss v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 8 that a state agency may assume jurisdiction over a case within
the permissive legal jurisdiction of the LMRA only where the Board has
made a formal cession of jurisdiction to the state agency," a "no-man's land"
4 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, supra note 1.
5
 16 NLRB Ann. Rep. 15 (1951).
21 NLRB Ann. Rep. 7-28 (1956).
7 23 NLRB Ann. Rep. 8-12 (1958). On October 2, 1958, the Board announced its
latest standards, which are as follows:
I. Nonrctail: $50,000 outflow or inflow, direct or indirect.
2. Office buildings: Gross revenue of $100,000, of which $25,000 or more
is derived from organizations which meet any of the new standards.
3. Retail concerns: $500,000 gross volume of business.
4. Instrumentalities, links, and channels of interstate commerce: $50,000
from interstate (or linkage) part of enterprise, or from services performed
for employers in commerce.
5. Public utilities: $250,000 gross volume, or meet standard 1 (non-
retail),
6. Transit systems: $250,000 gross volume. (Except taxicabs, to which
the retail test ($500,000 gross volume of business) shall apply.)
7. Newspaper and communication systems: Radio, television, telegraph,
and telephone: $100,000 gross volume.
8. National defense: Substantial impact on national defense.
9. Business in the Territories and District of Columbia:
D.C.—Plenary,
Territories—Standards apply.
10. Associations: Regarded as single employer.
These arc the standards currently in force.
8 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
LMRA § 10(a), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964), provides that
the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices
shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided,
That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or
Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
. • even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce,
unless [there are laws in the state which are inconsistent with the LMRA]. . . .
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was created. Here were the cases over which the NLRB might have asserted
jurisdiction but had not, and had also failed to grant jurisdiction to an
appropriate state agency through a formal agreement.
As a result of this obvious deficiency, Congress passed sections I4(c) (1)
and (2). 1° The first section gave the Board full discretion to decline juris-
diction over any labor dispute provided "that the Board shall not decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdic-
tion under the standards prevailing upon August 1, I959."" Complementing
this, section 14(c) (2) provides that "nothing in this subchapter shall be
deemed to prevent ... any State [agency] ... from assuming and asserting
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines ... to assert
jurisdiction."12
 Although section 10(a) was not deleted or amended by the
1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments, the addition of section 14(c) (2) did
eliminate the necessity of the section 10(a) agreement with a state agency
before that agency could assert jurisdiction over a labor dispute. Now,
once the Board has refused jurisdiction, a state agency may hear the case;
the Board may also make a formal agreement as to a category of cases, as
provided in section 10(a). As a result, the "no-man's land" created by
the decision in Gussu became less of a problem—a party wishing a forum
to settle a labor dispute need only petition the NLRB and then, if
jurisdiction is declined, the state agency. Also, since the Board announced
that "it will . .. apply the revised jurisdictional standards to all future
. . . cases,"14
 a state agency may consider a company whose business falls
below these standards as prospectively rejected by the NLRB, and subse-
quently assert jurisdiction over the company's labor disputes. 15
Yet it is not always clear whether the Board would assert jurisdiction
under its standards. Realizing that there are cases which, because of their
proximity to the Board's jurisdictional lines of demarcation, place a state
agency in a position of uncertainty as to the propriety of assuming jurisdic-
tion over a labor dispute, the Board promulgated regulations providing for
advisory opinions on jurisdiction. 16
 These regulations provide that any party
to a proceeding before any state agency, who is in doubt as to whether the
Board would assert jurisdiction, may file a petition with the Board for
an advisory opinion. They also provide that any state court or agency which
is in doubt may petition the Board for a like advisory opinion. These peti-
tions must contain, inter alia, the commerce data relating to the operations
of the business involved in the proceedings.
10
 Added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 164(c)(1), (2) (1964).
11 Added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1964).
12 Added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2) (1964).
16
 Supra note 8.
14
 Siemons Mailing Serv,, 122 N,L.R.B. 81, 84, 43 L.R,R.M. 1056, 1058 (1958).
15
 The Supreme Court has never affirmatively sanctioned this procedure. Rather,
in reversing assertions of jurisdiction by state courts because they had improperly de-
termined that the business involved in the labor dispute fell without the NLRB's juris-
dictional standards, the Supreme Court has implied that it is proper for the state court
to make the determination in the first instance. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians
Local 1264, IBEW v. Broadcast Serv., Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965); Hattiesburg Bldg. &
Trades Co.uncil v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964).
16
 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.39-.43, 102.98-.110 (1967).
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Given the relevant commercial data on the company involved in the
labor dispute, it would seem that the dollars-and-cents yardstick used by
the NLRB would provide a clear measure of jurisdiction. Precision in this
area is most important, for the number of cases within the judicial
"no-man's land" is a function of the clarity of the demarcation line which
dichotomizes NLRB and state jurisdiction. The less distinct the line, the
more cases will be rejected by state courts and refused by the NLRB. This
is, of course, precisely the reason that the advisory-opinion procedure of
the Board was created. For, where it is unclear whether or not the Board
would assert jurisdiction, and a state agency decides that the NLRB would
take jurisdiction and therefore the state must not, there exists too great
a possibility that the NLRB, making an independent determination of
jurisdiction, would also reject the case and leave the parties involved without
a forum.
In Cox's Food Center v. Retail Clerks,17 the Supreme Court of Idaho,
wary of this type of situation, reversed a lower court which had made an
independent determination that the Board would assert jurisdiction. The
lower court had felt that the employer's business was large enough to make
NLRB jurisdiction mandatory under section 14(c) (1). The state supreme
court held that it was error for the lower, court not to petition the NLRB
for an advisory opinion on the jurisdictional question before dismissing the
case.
Although the state supreme court found the lower court's ruling on
NLRB jurisdiction to be in concert with the practice of the Board as it
appeared, the court stated that primary concern should be attached to the
possibility that the Board might not assert jurisdiction after the state re-
fused. The facts in Cox's Food Center were deemed to present a problem
close enough to merit a Board advisory opinion, which would guarantee
that there would not be a failure of both state and NLRB jurisdiction. The
closeness of the jurisdictional issue arose from the fluctuation in the em-
ployer's revenue. During the year in which the dispute arose (1961), Cox's
had a dollar volume of $538,000, which clearly fell within the Board's
$500,000 jurisdictional limit."$ But during the year following the initiation
of the dispute, which year also preceded the litigation, Cox's had a $168,000
volume. The argument in support of state jurisdiction was, of course,
that the dollar volume of the 12 months preceding the litigation was deter-
minative. The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out the fallacy of this contention
by first citing Jos. McSweeney & Sons," for the proposition that the year
preceding the start of the dispute was the determinative one. Secondly,
the court pointed out that the NLRB did not intend the $500,000 to be a
hard and fast rule, devoid of consideration of the surrounding circumstances.
Specifically, the court noted Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of
Carpenters," in which the NLRB asserted jurisdiction over a retail corn-
17 420 P.2d 645, 64 L.R.R.M. 2042 (Idaho 1966).
18 Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88, 43 L.R.R.M. 1060 (1958). See
note 7 supra.
119 N.L.R.E. 1399, 41 L.R.R.M. 1309 (1958).
20 95 N.L.R.B. 969, 28 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1951).
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pany which had less than $500,000 volume in the year preceding the dispute,
because the Board found that the company would have done much more
business but for a strike which was part of the dispute.
The important aspect of the case is, however, the court's reluctance to
independently determine whether there would be NLRB preemption of
jurisdiction where there is the slightest chance that the NLRB will not assert
jurisdiction and where the relevant NLRB jurisdictional standard is
not susceptible of mechanical application. Where an element of discretion
and/or expertise is needed, the cautious attitude exhibited by the Cox's
court is proper. A labor-management problem without a forum should be
avoided at all reasonable costs.
An example of the deference afforded the NLRB's exercise of discretion
and expertise in jurisdictional matters"' is provided by NLRB v. Harrah's
Club.22
 When the Board petitioned the Ninth Circuit to enforce a cease-and-
desist order issued to a gambling casino because of its unfair labor practices,
the casino objected on jurisdictional grounds. The casino claimed that the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.
At the heart of the casino's argument lay the Board's failure to exercise
jurisdiction over the racetrack industry, qua industry. From this it was
argued that, because the Board's reasons for not asserting jurisdiction over
racetracks were equally applicable to casinos, the Board was arbitrary and
abusive of its discretion in this case. The Board had articulated the reasons
for its refusal to assert jurisdiction over the racetrack industry in Hialeah
Race Course, Inc.23
 First, the Board considered the racetrack industry as
essentially local in character, and therefore a labor dispute therein would
not be likely substantially to disrupt interstate commerce. 24 Secondly, race-
tracks are subject to detailed state regulation which, in the absence of
Board regulation, may, and probably will, be extended to include labor
The court in Harrah's Club noted that the Board denied that the ratio-
nale for refusing jurisdiction over racetracks was equally applicable to
gambling casinos. The Board contended that the two "industries" were
factually distinguishable. Furthermore, the Board contended that the exis-
tence of state regulation would not, per se, bar Board jurisdiction, but rather
that the federal preemption doctrine would contro1.26 Consequently, whether
or not there was equal state regulation of both industries was not controlling.
From this point, the court had little trouble with the case. Clearly the
Board had statutory jurisdiction under section 10(a), 27 and this was not
21
 The discretion is of course legally bounded by § 14(c)(2), since that section
gives an absolute criterion. But there are areas not covered by § 14(c) (2), namely, those
companies in an industry or type of business not included in the standards promulgated
in 1958, See note 7 supra.
22 362 F.2d 425, 62 L.R.R.M. 2507 (9th Cir. 1966).
21 125 N.L.R.B. 388, 45 L.R.R.M. 1106 (1959).
24 Id. at 391, 45 L.R.R.M. at 1108.
25 Ibid.
2 ° 1
 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carman, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
27
 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
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disputed. This being so, the court found "the exercise of that jurisdiction
is subject to review only on the question of whether, under the circumstances,
unjust discrimination will result."28 (Emphasis added.) The court reasoned
that an arbitrary distinction between racetracks and gambling casinos is
not conclusive of "unjust" discrimination. The gambling casino involved in
the case had not alleged any harmful results obtaining from the NLRB's
assertion of jurisdiction in the one instance and rejection in the other.
Nor could the court assume any unjust discrimination inherent in the situa-
tion. Therefore, even admitting that the 'distinction made by the Board was
arbitrary—which the court did not do—the casino had not made a case.
Beyond the constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction and the mandate
of section 14(c) (1), the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction, according to this
court, is circumscribed only by a prohibition of arbitrary distinctions which
result in unjust discrimination.
Section 14(c) (1) 29 was a congressional imprimatur on the Board's
preexisting policy of refusing jurisdiction over any class or category of
employers whose labor dispute had an impact on commerce not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of Board jurisdiction." But there is a
proviso to this section which prohibits the Board from declining jurisdiction
"over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the
standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.' 1 ' This means that the Board
can reduce jurisdictional standards, but cannot raise them above the 1959
levels. However, this leaves the NLRB free to make reasonable adjustments
in its assessment of a particular business as properly falling within one
category or another, and the Board did make such an adjustment in Athens
T.V. Cable, Inc. 32
In this case the Board was concerned with a new industry—community
television antennas—in which a company is formed which offers to a local
public the services of a television antenna that has great reception capabili-
ties. Each customer of the community-antenna company pays a fee to have
his television connected by cable to the community antenna. Previous to
Athens T.V., the Board had considered this type of business as falling
within the retail-industry category."" Under the standards applicable to that
industry, a community-antenna company would have to do $500,000 gross
volume in order to be subject to Board jurisdiction. 34 However, in Athens
T.V., the Board announced that henceforth such companies would be con-
sidered in the communications category. Consequently, community-antenna
companies need only do $100,000 gross volume to be within NLRB juris-
diction. 35
28 362 F.2d at 427, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2508.
29 Added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964).
:0 See 16 NLRB Ann. Rep. 15 (1951).
31 LMRA § 14(c)(1), added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1964).
32 160 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 63 L.R.R.M. 1111 (1966).
33 Warren Television Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 1, 46 L.R.R.M. 1248 (1960).
34 Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., supra note 18. Sec also note 7 supra.
'5 Raritan Valley Broadcasting Co., 122 N.L.R.13, 90, 43 L.R.R.M. 1062 (1958).
See note 7 supra.
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B. District Court Jurisdiction over NLRB Proceedings
Normally, election proceedings conducted by the NLRB are reviewable
by a court only if there is a later unfair-labor-practice determination by the
Board in which a refusal to bargain is prompted by the conduct of the rep-
resentation proceedings. In such a case, the record of the representation
proceeding accompanies the unfair-labor-practice record to be reviewed by
the circuit court under section 9(d) of the LMRA. 1 But in rare instances, a
federal district court will accept jurisdiction over a petition to vacate a Board
election. There were three noteworthy cases of this type in the Survey year:
Bullard Co. v. NLRB; 2 Uyeda v. Brooks; 3 and Big Y Supermkts., Inc. v.
McCulloch .4
Section 10(f) of the LMRA 5
 provides that "any person aggrieved by
a final order of the Board ... may obtain a review of such order. . . ."
In American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB,8 the Supreme Court held that an
election certification by the NLRB under section 9 of the LMRA 7 is not a
"final order" within the meaning of section 10(f) and is, therefore, not
independently reviewable by a federal court. The Court stated that only
where the NLRB has issued an order, predicated upon the results of an
election, does the NLRA provide for court policing of the election proceed-
ing.
In 1958, however, the Supreme Court, in Leedom v. Kyne, 8 upheld the
decision of a federal district court which had vacated a Board certification
of an election result. The Supreme Court reasoned that the district court
was not "reviewing" the election proceedings in the section 10(f) sense of
review, but rather that it was enforcing the "statutory commands" which
Congress had written into the LMRA. The Board had certified a bargaining
unit which, by the Board's own admission, included professional and non-
professional employees, without obtaining a polled consent of the profes-
sional employees. It was undisputed that such an action by the Board was
in excess of its statutory powers .° The Court's decision was that "a Federal
District Court has jurisdiction of an original suit to vacate [the] . • .
determination of the Board [when the Board acts] . . . in excess of its
powers."° In the course of its opinion, the Court announced the controlling
principle: "If the absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts meant a
sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress had created, the inference
1
 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1964).
2
 253 F. Supp. 391, 61 L.R.R.M. 2670 (D.D.C. 1966).
3 365 F.2d 326, 62 L.R.R.M. 2831 (6th Cir. 1966).
4
 263 F. Supp. 175, 64 L.R.R.M. 2227 (D. Mass. 1967).
6 61 Stat. 148 (1947), as amended, 72 Stat. 946 (1958), 29 	 § 160(f) (1964).
e 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
7
 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
8 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
9
 LMRA § 9(b) (1), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1964), provides
that the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for [the purposes of
collective bargaining] . . . if such unit includes both professional employees and em-
ployees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional em-
ployees vote for inclusion in such unit,"
10
 358 U.S. at 185.
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would be strong that Congress intended the statutory provisions governing
the general jurisdiction of the courts to control.""
In Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 12
 the Supreme Court again ruled on district
court jurisdiction to police NLRB activity. In Boire, the Court went to great
pains to make it clear that the Kyne exception for judicial review of Board
election proceedings was a very narrow one. It was emphasized therein that
a federal district court may only accept jurisdiction to determine the validity
of Board election proceedings where it is alleged that the Board has acted in
contravention of a statutory mandate, that is, where the Board has made
a mistake of law. But where it appears that the Board has made a mistake
of fact, even though such mistake leads to a conclusion which does not
comport with the law, a federal court must not disturb the election results.
Of no small weight in the Kyne Court's deliberations was the fact that,
apart from district court jurisdiction to vacate the Board determination,
the professional employees would have had no means of protecting their
statutory right to be segregated, for collective-bargaining purposes, from
nonprofessional employees. Although the certification of a bargaining unit
which integrated professional and nonprofessional employees may have later
been overruled by a court of appeals, the professional employees would
have had no control over such a court review. They would have had to depend
upon the employer's choosing not to bargain with the union representing that
bargaining unit; the employer would also have had to claim that his refusal to
bargain was justified because the bargaining unit as certified was inappro-
priate, in order for the professional employees' complaint to be aired.
However, in Bullard Co. v. NLRB," a district court applied the Kyne
exception to a fact situation markedly different from Kyne. In this case,
the employer was standing in the position of the professional employees in
Kyne, claiming that the Board had violated a statutory mandate when it
certified the results of an election. It is immediately apparent that this case
lacks the basic reason for the Kyne exception, namely, the necessity of
providing a forum for the aggrieved party, because, as seen above, the em-
ployer in Bullard could have placed his complaint before an appellate court
by refusing to bargain with the union which had been certified following the
election. Yet the district court in Bullard rejected this distinction.
The union in Bullard had lost an NLRB-conducted election and sub-
sequently had objected to the Board's certification of the results, claiming
irregularities in the conduct of that election. After hearing the union's objec-
tions, the Board held that
the objections relate to alleged irregularities by the Board agent
conducting the election. Although ... the Board agent did not in
fact engage in any irregularities, there is a possibility that some of
his conduct may erroneously have given such an appearance. The
mere appearance of irregularity in a Board agent's conduct of an
11 Id. at 190, quoting Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297,
300 (1943).
12 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
13 Supra note 2.
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election departs from the standards the Board seeks to maintain
in assuring the integrity and secrecy of its elections and constitutes
a basis for setting aside the election.'' (Emphasis added by district
court.)
Accordingly, the NLRB ordered a second election. In the instant case, the
employer sought to enjoin the second election on the basis of section
9(e) (2) 15 and to compel certification of the first election on the basis of
section 9(e) ( I ).' 6
The district court first directed itself to the contention that an employer
cannot avail itself of the Leedom v. Kyne remedy for errors in an NLRB
election proceeding. The NLRB had presented cases to the court supporting
the proposition that an employer had no standing to pursue a Leedom v.
Kyne remedy." However, the Bullard court read a much narrower holding
into these cases, because it found that the employer in each case had failed
to allege that the NLRB had not complied with a specific statutory command.
The court found further authority for the position that employers are not
per se barred from a Leedom v. Kyne remedy in Boire v. Greyhound Corp."
The Bullard court noted that the Boire case could have been easily disposed
of by holding that employers are barred from a Leedom v. Kyne remedy,
but the Supreme Court chose instead to decide the case on different grounds.
In the Bullard court's analysis of Leedom v. Kyne, it noted the possi-
bility that the Board's election proceedings would have been reviewed by
a court of appeals in an unfair-labor-practice case at the initiation of the
union. By the Bullard court's reasoning, the union could have refused to
bargain on behalf of the nonprofessional employees; this would have been
an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b) (3). 1 " The Bullard court
felt this route of appeal to be a rebuttal of the contended distinction between
a union or employee seeking relief from a federal district court and an em-
ployer doing so. That the employer can seek a remedy for the Board's error
by obtaining review of a finding of an unfair labor practice is, then, not
controlling according to the court, because the union in Leedom v. Kyne
could also have done so.
It is submitted that the Bullard court's hypothetical section 8(b) (3)
violation is of tenuous substance—section 8(b) (3) seems to embrace only
14 Id. at 392, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2671, quoting from the Board decision.
15 61 Stat. 145 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (1964). This section
provides: "No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in any bargaining
unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid
election shall have been held."
16 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1964). This section
provides, inter alia, that "upon [proper showing of interest] . . the Board shall take
a secret ballot of the employees in such unit and certify the results thereof. .
17 The cases cited by the Board included: Kingsport Press, Inc. v. McCulloch, 336
F.2d	 753, 56 L.R.R.M. 2561
	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 1964) ; General Cable Corp. v. Leedom, 278
F.2d	 237, 45	 L.R.R.M.	 3005	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 1960) ;	 Norris v. NLRB, 177 F.2d	 26,	 24
L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
18 Supra note 12.
19 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(3) (1964). This section declares that
it shall be an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse to bargain- collectively with
an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees. . . ."
780
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
a union's refusal to bargain with an employer, not a union's refusal to bar-
gain for any class of employees represented by it. Further, whether or not
the union's refusal to bargain for nonprofessional employees would be a
section 8(b) (3) violation, this would not aid a professional employee who
sought to be represented as part of a segregated bargaining unit. There is
no unfair labor practice that an employee or a group of employees could
commit which would eventually result in a review of the appropriateness of
the bargaining unit. Thus the Bullard court seems to have been incorrect in
rejecting the alleged distinction between Kyne and the case before it.
Once the court had disposed of the issue of the standing of an employer
to contest NLRB election proceedings, there remained the legal issue of
whether the NLRB had acted in excess of its powers by failing to certify
the first election and by scheduling the second election. The court stated
that, if the first election was valid, the Board had acted in excess of its
powers, because, as seen above, the statute requires the Board to certify
such elections. The court assumed the election was valid because of what it
considered to be the Board's own admission to that effect. 2° This closed
the issue. It is submitted that the court was too quick to conclude that the
election was valid, and specifically it is submitted that nowhere does the
Board admit the election was valid. What the Board declared was that the
agent did not act irregularly. 21 It was the court, not the Board, which con-
cluded that, because the irregularity was of appearance only, the election
was valid. The LMRA does not enumerate specifically the requisites of a
valid election. Rather, such a determination is within the ambit of the Board's
discretion, and discretionary action by the Board is not properly within the
Leedom v. Kyne exception. The Bullard decision seems clearly wrong, and
the result in this case should not be permitted to stand.
In the two other cases, Uyeda v. Brooksn and Big Y Supermkts., Inc.
v. McCidloch,23 the narrowness of the Leedom v. Kyne remedy was main-
tained. In Uyeda, an employee sought injunctive relief from a district court,
asking that the regional director be compelled to cancel the certification of
an election and to count the complaining employee's ballot, redetermining
the results of the election on that basis. In an unreported summary judgment
by the district court, the regional director was ordered to cancel the certifi-
cation of the election. On appeal, the district court was reversed. 24
The regional director had voided the ballots of the plaintiff and his
brother because both were brothers of the employer. The regional director
noted that although section 2(3) 25 specifically excludes only the parents or
spouse of the employer from the definition of employee, it does not follow
that only these relationships are valid grounds for disallowing a vote. The
29 253 F. Supp. at 395, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2674.
21 Sec text accompanying note 14 supra.
22 Supra note 3.
23 Supra note 4.
24 The instant case involves the second appeal by the regional director from the
district court decision in this case. In the first appeal the court of appeals ruled that the
issues had not become moot by reason of the regional director's compliance with the
district court order. 348 F.2d 633, 59 L.R.R.M. 2850 (6th Cir. 1965).
25 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
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court agreed that the Board, in its discretion, might determine that other
relationships are sufficient to exclude a person from a bargaining unit, and
thereby render him ineligible to vote, if such a relationship visits a special
status upon the employee which distinguishes his interests from those of the
other employees. 20
 Since the record supported the finding of such a special
relationship, the court ruled that it had not been shown that the NLRB
had acted in excess of its delegated powers or in contravention of a specific
provision of the LMRA.
In Big Y Supermkts., Inc. v. McCulloch," the employer brought an ac-
tion in a district court to enjoin the NLRB from conducting elections in
two of the employer's four supermarkets on the grounds that it was contrary
to section 9(c) (5) . 28 The court easily reached the conclusion that to enter-
tain such an action would by necessity involve a review of the Board's dis-
cretion in determining appropriate units. This is clearly not within the
Leedom v. Kyne exception, which is limited to mistakes of law, not of fact.
When the Supreme Court first sanctioned the original jurisdiction of a
federal district court to assure that the specific statutory commands of the
NLRA were not violated by the Board, there was a strong dissent, the thrust
of which was a floodgate argument—even a narrowly drawn exception to
the review of NLRB election proceedings will result in a spate of charges
before district courts which, even though dismissed,'would retard the Board's
workings.29
 It is submitted that none of the reported cases should have ever
been entertained by a district court, let alone result in an injunction as in
Bullard. For example, in Uyeda the issues discussed had been in litigation
since 1963, and it was not until 1966 that they were finally settled. The
Board should not be subjected to this harassment unless there is clear
evidence not only that a statutory mandate has been transgressed, but also that
the complaining party has been harmed in some substantial fashion, the
redress of which would not exist but for a district court injunction. This is
the holding of Leedom v. Kyne, yet district courts continue to entertain
such suits for far less compelling reasons.
C. State Court Jurisdiction over Acts of Violence
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmonl is the definitive opinion on
federal preemption of labor-relations regulation. The question before the
Court was whether certain state laws were properly applied to peaceful union
activity. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether
a state "had [legislative] jurisdiction to award damages arising out of peace-
26
 365 F.2d at 329, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2832, citing Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 349 F.2d
1001, 59 L.R.R.M. 3016 (6th Cir. 1965).
27 Supra note 4.
28
 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1964). This section provides: "In
determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b)
of this section the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling."
29
 "Unless drastically limited, time-consuming court procedures would seriously
threaten to frustrate the basic national policy of preventing industrial strife and achieving
industrial peace by promoting collective bargaining." Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
191 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1
 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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ful union activity which it could not enjoin."2
 It was held that the state
court had improperly applied state law, because regulation of the activity in
question had been preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The rule
handed down by the Court in Garman was:
when . . . the activities which a State purports to regulate are pro-
tected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an
unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enact-
ment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. 3
The Court added that the protection or prohibition of the activity in
question need not be a certainty, but rather state jurisdiction would be
barred if the federal regulation was even "arguably" applicable to the facts
of the case. So long as the activity in question was "arguably" within
federal exclusive jurisdiction, state assertion of jurisdiction would only be
tolerated, the Court indicated, where the federally regulated conduct "touched
interests so deeply rooted in local feelings and responsibility that, in the
absence of compelling congressional direction," deprivation of state juris-
diction would run contrary to our scheme of federalism. 4 Indeed, the Court
had sanctioned state jurisdiction in previous cases only where the conduct in
question was marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order.5
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs," the Supreme Court once again em-
phasized the importance of maintaining the dichotomy between state and
federal jurisdiction. The case evolved from a rivalry between the .UMW
and the Southern Labor Union over representation of employees in the
Appalachian coal fields. A mining company had shut down an old mine,
laying off one hundred members of Local 5881, UMW, and shortly thereafter
attempted to open a new mine, near the old, under the auspices of a wholly
owned subsidiary. Because the new mine was to be worked by members of
the Southern Labor Union, the members of Local 5881 engaged in two days
of violent activity and nine months of picketing at the new mine site in an
attempt to secure the working positions for its members. The plaintiff in
this suit, Gibbs, had been hired by the wholly owned subsidiary to organize
and superintend the opening of the new mine. Included with this employment
was a contract for haulage of the mine's product to the railroad loading
station. Gibbs brought suit against the UMW, alleging that the union had
acted in concert against him, and that it had been responsible for his loss
of the superintendent's job and of the haulage contract through the violent
activity and the picketing by the members of Local 5881. Plaintiff claimed
that these allegations supported not only a section 303 suit under the LMRA, 7
2
 Id. at 239. "Legislative jurisdiction" is the power of a sovereign to assert its
laws over a certain transaction. It is to be distinguished from the power a court has to
assert jurisdiction over parties before it.
3 Id. at 244.
4 Ibid.
5
 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
6
 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
7 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
This section provides that activity in violation of § 8(b) (4) of the act is unlawful, and
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but also a suit sounding in tort under Tennessee common law. 8 It should be
noted here that Gibbs did not bring any action against Local 5881 or its
members, but rather only against the UMW International, as the principal
responsible for the acts of its agents, namely the local and its members.
There were three major issues before the Court. First, the section•303
suit had been dismissed by the trial court," and this raised the problem of
pendent jurisdiction: that is, was the state claim properly before a federal
tribunal.i° The Supreme Court found that the district court was not in
error in hearing the state claim even though the federal claim had been
dismissed, because, although it was a separate cause of action, the state
claim was parallel to and arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts
as did the section 303 suit. The second issue, the only one necessary to the
decision, was whether the strict proof requirements of Section 6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act had been adhered to by the court below in finding
the International liable for the acts of the individual members of Local
5881." The Court found that these standards were not properly articulated
by the trial court in its instructions to the jury. The Court then found that
if the proper standards of proof were applied to the facts as presented, the
requisite showing of possible authorization of or participation in the violence
at issue was not made by the plaintiff. On that ground the Court reversed
the case and held for the defendant union.
But it is the third issue, preemption, which is of concern here: whether
the application of state law was properly confined to those areas allowable
that any person whose business or property is injured by such activity may sue in any
federal district court to recover both the damages sustained and the cost of the suit.
Section 8(b) (4) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964), makes it an unfair labor practice for any labor organi-
zation or its agents to boycott, or cause to be boycotted, any entity engaged in commerce
when the purpose is secondary to the legitimate interests of the labor organization.
8 As alleged, the tort was "conspiracy . . to maliciously, wantonly and willfully
interfere with [plaintiff's] . . . contract of employment and . . . contract of haulage."
383 U.S. at 720. For examples of cases construing the Tennessee common-law tort of
conspiracy, see Dukes v. Brotherhood of Painters, Local 437, 191 Tenn. 495, 235
S.W.2d 7 (1950); Brumley v. Chattanooga Speedway & Motordrome Co., 138 Tenn. 534,
198 S.W. 775 (1917).
9
 220 F. Supp. 871, 54 L.R.R.M. 2080 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
19
 Pendent jurisdiction is a concept which cannot be easily explained. Addressing
itself to this concept, the Court summarized in the following manner:
The Court held in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, that state law .claims are
appropriate for federal court determination if they form a separate but parallel
ground for relief also sought in a substantial claim based on federal law. The
Court distinguished permissible from nonpermissible exercises of federal judicial
power over state Iaw claims by contrasting "a case where two distinct grounds
in support of a single cause of action arc alleged, only one of which presents a
federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are
alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the
federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court,
even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and
dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground; in the latter it may not
do so upon the non-federal cause of action." 289 U.S. at 246.
383 U.S. at 722,
11
 For a discussion of this aspect of the case, sec pp. 896-97 infra.
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under Cannon. Specifically, it was claimed by the defendant union that,
even if the state claim was a proper remedy for the allegedly violent activity,
it could not be applied to all the activity in question. The Court, agreeing
with the defendant, stated that "the permissible scope of state remedies
in this area is strictly confined to the direct consequences of such conduct
[violence], and does not include consequences resulting from associated
peaceful picketing. . .))12 (Emphasis added.) The Court thus had to deter-
mine whether the damages awarded to Gibbs under the state claim were
"strictly" limited to the "direct consequences" of violent activity, and it
found that they were not so limited.
The suit had been brought for damages under both federal law (under
section 303) and state law. The facts alleged in support of these claims
covered both the violent and the peaceful activity. Similarly, the damages
claimed were not specifically categorized as resulting exclusively from the
violent or exclusively from the peaceful activity. The vitality of both causes
of action made the task of characterizing the damages as resulting from
one or the other unnecessary. However, when the section 303 suit was dis-
missed, such a characterization became critical. The problem was twofold:
(1) whether the acts of violence resulted in damages which were severable
from the results of the peaceful picketing; and (2) if the results were
severable, whether the court below was sufficiently careful to make clear to
the jury that the plaintiff could only recover for the direct results of the
violent acts.
First, the Court noted that, as in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-
moor Dairies, 1 "
acts which in isolation are peaceful may be part of a coercive
thrust when entangled with acts of violence. . . . [I]icketing . . .
set in a background of violence [could justify a conclusion] .. .
that the momentum of fear generated by past violence would sur-
vive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful."
The Court concluded that, where such special facts are proved, the conse-
quences of all the activity, violent and peaceful, may be used in assessing
the proper remedy under state law. "Where the consequences of peace-
ful and violent conduct are separable, however, it is clear that recovery
[under state law ] may be had only for the latter.""
Observing the checkered history of the tort of conspiracy as a weapon
against labor movements,' the Court took a dim view of its use here,
characterizing it as "poorly defined" and highly susceptible to judicial ex-
pansion. It concluded that on the record as a whole the "notion of 'conspiracy'
was employed here to expand the application of state law substantially
12 383 U.S. at 729.
13 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
14 Id. at 294.
15 38.3 U.S. at 732.
10 The Court cited, inter alia, Riley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 195 F.2d 812 (6th
Cir. 1952); Original Ballet Russe Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1943); Sayre, Labor and the Courts, 39 Yale L.J. 682, 684-87 (1930). 38.3 U.S. at 732
n.19.
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beyond the limits to be observed in showing direct union involvement in
violence."17
 The Court pointed out that the plaintiff's complaint did not
specifically confine its prayer for damages under state law to the direct
results of violence, and that counsel's argument to the jury similarly lacked
this circumscription. Further error was noted in the trial court's instructions
to the jury. The distinction between conduct arguably within the protection
or prohibition of the LMRA which is subject to valid state jurisdiction, and
conduct which is not, was characterized by the trial court as turning on the
lawfulness of the activity. The Supreme Court declared that this instruction
was confusing and erroneous, and stated that it is violence, not unlawfulness,
which distinguishes conduct properly regulated by the state.
That this part of the opinion could be considered dictum makes it even
more important, because the Supreme Court chose to discuss the issue in
spite of the opportunity to avoid it. The Court made it quite clear that only
under very special circumstances would it let a single instance of violence
be held to permeate otherwise peaceful activity by a labor organization so as
to allow state remedies to be applied to the totality of the activity. Indeed,
the Court would not accept the "impression" of the court of appeals
that the threat of violence remained throughout the succeeding days
and months. The night and day picketing that followed the spectac-
ular beginning was but a guaranty and warning that like treatment
would be accorded further attempts to open the Gray's Creek area.
The aura of violence remained to enhance the effectiveness of the
picketing. Certainly there is a threat of violence when the man who
has just knocked me down my front steps continues to stand guard
at my front door.' 8
 (Emphasis added.)
The rejection of such an impression leaves very few imaginable situations
where peaceful picketing could be validly held to have been totally tainted
by isolated acts of violence.
III. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Appropriate Bargaining Unit
At the heart of labor-management relations lies the bargaining unit. It
is here that the right of self-organization is first realized by the employee,
whose interest is the focus of the LMRA. It is all important that these bar-
gaining units be appropriate and do not mix antagonistic interests or un-
necessarily submerge the legitimate interest of a small group of employees in
the interests of a larger group. Congress has entrusted to the NLRB the
determination of which group of employees should be considered appropriate.
It is the exercise of this power with which this section deals.
1. Craft Severance
On March 1, 1954, the NLRB announced its decision in American
Potash & Chem. Corp., 1
 which embodied the policy guidelines that the
17 Id. at 732-33.
18
 343 F.2d 609, 616, 59 L.R.R.M. 2279, 2284 (6th Cir. 1965).
107 N.L.R.13. 1418, 33 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1954).
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Board would use in determining whether the severance of a bargaining unit
comprised of the craftsmen in a larger unit would be appropriate. Under
the American Potash doctrine, once the group petitioning for severance
demonstrated to the Board that it constituted a true craft unite and that
the association seeking to represent the unit had traditionally represented
such craft groups, the Board would grant the petition for a severance elec-
tion. On December 28, 1966, the Board announced that "it is patent . .
that the American Potash tests do not effectuate the policies of the Act," 3
and, in a series of three cases, the Board proceeded to state the tests which
would best effectuate the policies of the LM.RA in determining the appropri-
ateness of a craft severance petition.
Of the three cases, Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 4
 E. 1. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co.,° and Holmberg, Inc.,6 Mallinckrodt is the most definitive.
In this case the Board listed six areas of inquiry which would henceforth
bear upon the appropriateness of the craft severance:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct and
homogeneous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen performing the
functions of their craft on a nonrepetitive basis, or of employees
constituting a functionally distinct department, working in trades or
occupations for which a tradition of separate representation exists.m
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees sought
and at the plant involved, and at other plants of the employer, with
emphasis on whether the existing patterns of bargaining are produc-
tive of stability in labor relations and whether such stability will be
unduly disrupted by the destruction of the existing patterns of rep-
resentation.
3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit
have established and maintained their separate identity during the
period of inclusion in a broader unit, and the extent of their par-
ticipation or lack of participation in the establishment and mainte-
nance of the existing pattern of representation and the prior oppor-
tunities, if any, afforded them to obtain separate representation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the
industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production pro-
cesses, including the extent to which the continued normal opera-
2
 In our opinion a true craft unit consists of a distinct and homogeneous group
of skilled journeymen craftsmen, working as such, together with their ap-
prentices and/or helpers. To be a "journeyman craftsman" an individual must
have a kind and degree of skill which is normally acquired only by undergoing
a substantial period of apprenticeship or comparable training.
Id. at 1423, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1383.
3
 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011, 1016 (1966).
4 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
5
 162 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 64 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1966).
6
 162 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 64 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1966).
7
 In a footnote to this consideration, the Board stated that it was dissatisfied with
the growing laxity of the originally stringent tests for the validity of a group as a craft
unit. 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016 n.14.
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tion of the production processes is dependent upon the performance
of the assigned functions of the employees in the proposed unit.
6. The qualifications of the union seeking to "carve out" a
separate unit, including that union's experience in representing em-
ployees like those involved in the severance action. 8 (Footnotes
omitted.)
More than changing the American Potash tests, the Mallinckrodt deci-
sion expanded the scope of the Board's inquiry into appropriateness. It
should be noted that the character of the unit of employees sought to be
severed and the character of the union seeking to represent them continue
to be relevant factors under Mallinckrodt, as seen in considerations one
and six above. It is to be noted also that consideration number three is
but an adjunct to number one in that it also tests the distinctiveness of
the group seeking severance. In this respect, the relevant qualities of the
group sought to be severed, qua group, will henceforth be subject to a more
extensive scrutiny. 9
In addition to expanding the already existing American Potash tests, the
Board added other considerations which were to be equally relevant to the
appropriateness of the severance, namely, considerations two, four, and five
above. These considerations direct themselves to the interests of the larger
unit from which severance is sought and the interests which all involved—
employees, employers, unions, and the country—have in maintaining stable
labor relations. Specifically, there seems to be a tacit presumption in number
five that a larger bargaining unit, having established itself, is the more
appropriate and should not be carved up to permit severance. The Board has
also deemed relevant the interest which the employer has in bargaining
collectively with all the employees vital to the operation of a particular
production process. Consideration four, on the other hand, seems no more
than a statement that the Board recognizes that lessons may be learned by
analogy, i.e., what has worked in other businesses in the industry will
probably work in the particular business involved, all else being equal.
In Mallinckrodt the Board expressed dissatisfaction with the American
Potash tests on two grounds. First, these tests did not adequately provide
for consideration of the interests of the larger bargaining units, nor for those
of the employer; rather, American Potash concentrated solely on the interests
of the group seeking to be severed on the basis that a deserving group could,
almost as a matter of right, obtain severance. Second, the American Potash
tests made static the denial of craft severance in the "National Tube"
industries." In Mallinckrodt the Board announced that it would apply
8 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016. In a footnote to the last consideration, the Board indi-
cated that the strict "traditional representative" test of American Potash would be
loosened so that the "tradition" would no longer be a sine qua non, but rather one of
the factors in determining the appropriateness of the union as a bargaining representative.
Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016 n.15,
D Compare the American Potash test for a true craft unit, note 2 supra, with con-
siderations one and three in the text in light of the statement of the Board given in note
7 supra.
10 In National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1199, 21 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1948), the Board
decided that members of a craft group would be denied severance if they were employed
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the same tests to all industries, and, in a significant footnote, the Board
stated:
To the extent that American Potash forecloses inquiry into all
relevant factors, and to the extent that it limits consideration of the
factors of industry bargaining history and integration of operations
to cases arising in the so-called National Tube industries, it is over-
ruled. To the extent that the decisions in National Tube Company
. . . [its progeny] ... and decisions relying thereon may be read
as automatically foreclosing craft or departmental severance or the
initial formation of such units in unorganized plants in the
industries involved, they are hereby overruled."
The Mallinckrodt decision was quite explicit and cannot be criticized
for a lack of candor. Yet there is a residuum of doubt as to the weight
that each of the newly enumerated considerations will merit in future
Board decisions. The Board declared only that it intends to be free "from
the restrictive effect of rigid and inflexible rules in making . . unit deter-
minations," ] - and that each case will be decided on a case-by-case basis
after weighing all the relevant factors. The dissent in Mallinckrodt suggested
that the Board now gives the new considerations at least as much weight as
those considerations held over from American Potash. The main thrust
of the dissent is that once the American Potash tests—a true craft unit and a
traditional representative—have been met by the petitioner, the burden of
proving "that the separate community of interests normally possessed by
craftsmen has become submerged in the larger community of interests of
the employees in the broader unit'" 3 should be placed upon those who would
deny separate representation. Specifically, the dissent did not consider a
showing of long-enduring bargaining history on a larger-unit basis to be a
factor meriting as much weight as the American Potash considerations.
The clash of opinion can be aptly demonstrated by the , differing results
reached by the majority and dissent in Mallinckrodt and Holmberg. In both
cases the facts showed that the employees in each group which sought to be
severed possessed special skills which would have undoubtedly met the
American Potash test for a true craft unit. And, further, neither of the
majority opinions found that the union seeking to represent the severed group
would not have been acceptable if the other elements required for severance
in an industry which involves highly integrated production processes and in which the
prevailing pattern of bargaining is industrial in character. National Tube involved the
basic steel industry. Three other cases were decided under National Tube, each finding
another industry to be of a like quality: Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804, 26
L.R.R.M. 1039 (1950) (aluminum); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076, 25
L.R.R.M. 1173 (1949) (lumber) ; Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 362, 23 L.R.R.M.
1090 (1948) (wet milling). In American Potash the Board decided that it would not
extend the National Tube doctrine to any more industries, but would continue to reject
petitions for severance from employees in those industries which had already been held to
be National Tube industries.
11 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1017 n.17.
12
 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
12 Id., 64 L.R.R.M, at 1019 (Member Fanning, dissenting).
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were present. Yet the integrated nature of the production processes in which
the employees were involved and the Iong bargaining history of the larger
unit-25 years in Mallinckrodt and 24 years in Holmberg—balanced the
scales in favor of continuation of the larger unit. Among the particulars
which the majority opinions stressed were the fact that the would-be craft
unit employees currently received wages equal to those which the union,
seeking to sever and represent them, had obtained for its present constituents
elsewhere. These employees also had their own seniority system for purposes
of transfer, layoff, and recall, and the employees had long manifested a
lack of concern for preserving a separate identity for bargaining purposes.
In both of these cases, the dissent found the long bargaining history and
adequate representation of the craftsmen insufficient to overcome the interests
that craftsmen possess in having their individual community of interests
separately represented.
Yet the thrust of the dissent's discontent is the apparent quantum of
weight which the length of the bargaining history is now to be given as a
factor militating against severance. Although the majority opinions cite
sundry reasons for their denial of the petitions for severance in Mallinckrodt
and Holmberg, the weight of these considerations in relation to bargaining
history becomes suspect in the face of the total absence of bargaining history
at the plant involved in E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.," where the Board
granted an election for a craft unit. It must be noted, however, that Du Pont
involved an original unit determination as opposed to craft severance from a
preexisting unit, and therefore definite conclusions that bargaining history
is a factor whose weight is nearly controlling should not be quickly drawn
from this case. Further decisions on craft severance should clear the muddy
waters. It is certain, though, that whereas bargaining history was once irrele-
vant, it is now significant among those factors which are to be weighed in
determining the appropriateness of severing a craft unit.
There is a limit to the weight bargaining history may have in such
Board determinations. It is provided in section 9(b) that
the Board shall not . . . (2) decide that any craft unit is inappro-
priate • . on the ground that a different unit has been established
by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees
in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation... . 16
This section was passed in 1947 as a direct result of the rule established in
American Can Co.," that it would always be improper to "carve out" any
smaller unit from a larger bargaining unit that had already been estab-
lished.' 7
 It has been the interpretation of this section which has led to the
vacillation in craft severance policy by the Board. In National Tube Co., 78
which was decided shortly after the enactment of section 9(b) (2), the
Board held that this section contained no language which would bar the
14 Supra note 5.
15
 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2) (1964).
16 13 N.L.R.B. 1252, 4 L.R.R.M. 392 (1939).
IT S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947).
18 76 N.L.R.B. 1199, 21 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1948).
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Board from considering either a prior determination or the bargaining history
of a particular employer as a factor in determining the appropriateness of
a proposed craft unit, so long as that factor was not given controlling weight.
As noted earlier, the Board made an about face in American Potash
which, in effect, reversed National Tube as to the proper interpretation of
section 9(b) (2), and found the only relevant considerations to be the true
craft status of the employees and the tradition of the petitioning union
as a craft bargaining representative. The conclusion presents itself that,
by now overruling American Potash, the Board has returned to the National
Tube policy and will use the National Tube progeny as precedent in future
Board decisions. One vital exception to this conclusion must be excised—
the effect of an integrated production process where the initial establishment
of bargaining units is being determined. This difficulty is evidenced by the
Du Pont decision, which found a craft unit appropriate notwithstanding a
highly integrated production process. Mallinckrodt and Holmberg, on the
other hand, suggest that National Tube's precedent for denying craft sever-
ance from an existing unit of employees, all of whom are necessary to an
integrated production process, has been revitalized.
In sum, the Board has recognized that
we are in a period of industrial progress and change which so pro-
foundly affect the . . . organization of industry that a concomitant
upheaval is reflected in the types and standards of skills, the work-
ing arrangements, job requirements, and community of interests of
employees. 19
Consequently, the Board has decided to approach future cases with policy
guidelines which consider the total fact situation as relevant to the decision
at hand, rather than with mechanical rules which premise a conclusion on the
finding of certain limited factors. No longer will there be a presumption
that "the specific community of interests among members of a skilled craft
outweighs the community of interests that exists among the employees in
general."20
2. Multi-Employer Bargaining Units
Section 9(b) of the act is a congressional mandate for the Board to
determine which unit of employees is appropriate for collective-bargaining
purposes to assure them "the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guar-
anteed by this subchapter."" But section 9(b) further provides that the
Board shall make its determination from among the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. There is no direct provision allowing
the Board to certify as appropriate a multi-employer bargaining unit; yet
there arise fact situations where it would clearly be in the best interests of
all concerned, especially those of the employees, for the bargaining unit
to include the employees of more than one employer. The Board finds
statutory sanction for certifying multi-employer bargaining units in two
19
 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M, at 1016 n.16.
20
 American Potash & Chem. Corp., supra note 1, at 1420, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1381.
21
 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
	 159(b) (1964).
791
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
types of situations: 22
 (1) where each employer involved exercises a sufficient
amount of control over the employees in the multi-employer unit so that
each may be considered a joint employer of the unit employees; and (2)
where a group of employers joins together for the express purpose of bar-
gaining collectively with the aggregate of their employees who are repre-
sented by a single union. Whereas a determination of the appropriateness
of the multi-employer bargaining unit in the latter situation is but a recogni-
tion of a preexisting relationship, established through the consent of the
parties involved, the same determination in the former requires the conclu-
sions of law that a joint-employer relationship exists.
In Jewel Tea Co.,2" S. S. Kresge Co.,24 and Thriftown	 the Board
utilized the joint-employer approach and found multi-employer bargaining
units appropriate. The facts of all three cases were basically the same;
each involved the owner of a retail department store who either licensed or
rented certain portions of his store to persons who wished to sell specific
wares within the department-store complex. The issue before the Board
was whether the appropriate bargaining unit should include the licensee's
employees with the department-store owner's employees. In deciding that
the appropriate unit should be all-inclusive, the Board examined two factors
and determined that each department-store owner was the joint-employer
of the licensee's employees. First, the Board looked to the contractual rela-
tionship between the department-store owner and the licensees for indicia
of control by the department-store owner over the labor relations of the
licensees. Second, the Board looked to the realities of the situation to see if,
in fact, the department-store owner shared in the control of the labor rela-
tions of the licensees. I f these two inquiries produced affirmative results, the
Board would then proceed to inquire if there existed a substantial community
of interest among the employees of the joint-employer unit. In all three
cases, the Board found a community of interest among the employees of
the store-wide unit and a sufficient amount of control being exercised by
the department-store owner over the employees of the licensee, and the store-
wide unit was certified.
In Thriftown, Members Fanning and McCulloch took issue with the
majority's finding that a joint-employer relationship existed. Basically, the
dissenters felt that the majority had placed too much weight on the
apparent homogeneity within the store; such homogeneity was created for the
eyes of the customers and, according to the dissenters, had little relevance
to the legal concept of a joint-employer situation. The dissenters considered
that the majority had abandoned the requirement of real control over labor
22 The Board's rationalization of this sanction is rather complex. Because § 2(2)
of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964), defines an employer as
"any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly," the Board reasons
that a group of employers acting in concert are agents of each other, and therefore that
the employees involved may be considered in the employ of any one employer. Where a
group of employers bargain with their employees through an association, the association
becomes the employer of all the employees involved.
25 162 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 64 L.R.R.M. 1054 (1966).
21 161 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 63 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1966).
25 161 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 63 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1966).
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relations as an element of a joint-employer relationship and had replaced
it with the agency concept of apparent authority. They pointed out that
whether or not the public may believe that the department store is under
one management is irrelevant to the actual labor-management relations
within the store and should, therefore, be given no weight as a factor in
establishing a joint-employer relationship. Although the dissent's point is
well taken, it does not appear that the Board overemphasized this aspect of
the case in concluding that a joint-employer relationship existed.
The dissent further criticized the majority in Thriftown because the
finding of a joint-employer situation in that case seemed to be based on such
insignificant facts that the dissent could not imagine a retail department-store
situation in which the all-inclusive unit would not be found to be appropriate.
These fears were quickly allayed, however, with the decision of the Board in
Bargain Town U.S.! .26 The facts of Bargain Town were very similar to those
of Thriftown, Kresge, and Jewel Tea. Without deciding the joint-employer
issue, the Board declared that a bargaining unit consisting of only the depart-
ment-store owner's employees was appropriate. In its opinion, the Board said
that
even if the existence of a [joint-employer] . . . relationship were
found it does not necessarily follow that the storewide unit includ-
ing leased and licensed department employees is the only appro-
priate unit. The question for determination is whether the store unit
sought by the Petitioner, which excludes the disputed employees,
may also be an appropriate unit within the meaning of the Act. 27
(Emphasis added.)
If the decision in Thriftown raises any doubts as to the propriety of the
Board's finding of a joint-employer relationship, they will seem petty com-
pared to those raised by NLRB v. Checker Cab Co.28 As noted above, a
multi-employer bargaining unit has been certified by the Board either where
a joint-employer relationship exists or where a group of employers join
together to bargain collectively with their employees: 29 The facts of Checker
Cab do not fit neatly into either of these categories.
Two hundred sixty-eight independent owners of taxicabs had joined
together to support a business association which was to serve each of the cab
owners. Under the agreement, the association acted as a hiring hall for cab
drivers, accepted complaints about the drivers and recommended disciplinary
action to the cab owner, and distributed a manual of conduct to all new
drivers. The major purpose of the association, however, was apparently to
promote the business of the independent cab owners by dispatching cabs, by
advertising, and by providing potential customers with easy access to the
cabs. All the independent cab owners denied that the association was
28 162 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 64 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1967).
27 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1161. The decision in this case was unanimous by a three-
member panel composed of Members Zagoria, Fanning, and McCulloch.
28 367 F.2d 692, 63 L.R.R.M. 2243 (6th Cir. 1966).
29 See note 22 supra.
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formed for the purpose of bargaining collectively with the drivers." There-
fore a multi-employer bargaining association was not present here, because
there was lacking the necessary mutual consent of the employers and the
union. Thus, if the drivers constituted an appropriate bargaining unit,
it could only be on the basis of a joint-employer relationship. In this
respect it should be noted that each independent cab owner had final au-
thority on hiring and firing his cab drivers, each managed his own cabs, each
handled the wages of his own employees and attended to the withholding of
taxes. Lastly, the association neither owned nor operated any cabs, and did
not hold a license to do so. Nevertheless, the NLRB found that the cab
drivers employed by all the independent cab owners who belonged to the
association constituted a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes 31
and the court of appeals affirmed. To find a joint-employer relation,
the Board would have had to find either that the association exercised suffi-
cient control over the cab drivers of all 268 cab owners or that each cab
owner had sufficient control over the cab drivers of the other 267 cab owners.
The Board could not have found the latter, for the number of relationships
involved was staggering. As to the former, the facts militate against such
a finding unless the recommendations of the association were, in fact, authori-
tative, which does not seem to be the case.
Perhaps the Board, in its zeal to certify as an appropriate unit a group
of employees whose community of interest was obviously substantial, was
less than precise in its determination as to the joint-employer relationship.
The great harm here is not the result so much as the lack of clarity used in
rationalizing it. The test of a joint-employer relationship, if it is to play an
important part in Board determinations, should not be a phantom concept;
if it is, the danger results that it will become no more than a facade, cam-
ouflaging other significant considerations.
In Mallinckrodt, the Board demonstrated an acute awareness of the neces-
sity of exercising its full expertise in unit determinations. This awareness
led to the overruling of American Potash, for that case shackled the Board's
exercise of discretion. In Checker Cab, the Board may have been a bit too
eager to exercise its expertise, and in doing so, it may have slighted one of the
bounds placed upon it by Congress—that of section 9(b), which allows only
employer units or subdivisions thereof.
B. Union Communication with Employees
1. "Name and Address" Rule
In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 1
 the Board announced a new rule apply-
ing to election procedure which was designed to "maximize the likelihood
that all the voters will be exposed to the arguments for, as well as against,
union representation." 2 The Excelsior rule requires that an employer file a
30
 The cab owners comprised the employers in this case, and the drivers working
for them comprised the would-be unit.
31
 153 N.L.R.B. 651, 59 L.R.R.M. 1503 (1965).
156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966).
2
 Id. at 1241, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
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list with the regional director containing the names and addresses of all
eligible voters in the appropriate unit within seven clays after the scheduling
of an election. 3 The regional director is then to make the information con-
tained in that list available to all interested parties, and "failure to comply
with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election. . . ." 4
If the employer fails to comply with the Excelsior rule, the Board may
select a course of action from three alternatives. First, the NLRB may set
aside the results of the election and reschedule another one. Although this
remedy does not exert any legal pressure upon the employer to comply with
the Excelsior rule, it does result in a harrassment in the form of repeated
elections which might persuade the employer to comply. Second, the Board
may issue a subpoena for the lists pursuant to section 11(1) of the LMRA, 6
and then, if the employer fails to provide the list, petition a federal district
court for enforcement of that subpoena pursuant to section 11(2) . This
second remedy would, of course, be the most appropriate and effective in keep-
ing with the purpose of the rule, namely, to guarantee an informed electorate,
for the list then would be available to the union, enabling it to communicate
with the employees more thoroughly. Finally, the Board may find that the
employer's refusal to supply the list is an unfair labor practice' and issue an
order directing the employer to bargain with the union even if the union loses
the election'
The Board has established two questions, the answers to which deter-
mine whether the Excelsior rule has been violated: (1) has the employer
made a good-faith attempt to comply with the rule; and (2) has the em-
ployer's attempt resulted in substantial compliance with the rule. A regional
director applied these criteria in Retail Office Employers, Inc.? and Valley
Die Cast Corp. 1° In each case the union objected to the validity of the elec-
tion on the ground that the list supplied by the employer did not contain
all the names and correct addresses of the eligible voters. In both cases it
was found that the employer had made a good-faith attempt to supply all
the names and correct addresses. In neither case was it found that the list's
deficiency was substantial enough to merit a new election.
In Valley Die the complaining unionlost the election 170 votes to 121.
On the day of the election the union did not have the correct addresses of 48
out of 314 elegible voters. The election was lost by 49 votes, which means
3 The Board made one exception to the rule's application. It shall not apply to an
expedited election conducted pursuant to LMRA § 8(b) (7) (c), added by 73 Stat. 544
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(h) (7) (c) (1964). Id. at 1242 n.14, 61 L.R.R.M, at 1219 n.14.
4 Id, at 1240, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
5 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29	 § 161(I) (1964).
6 61 Stat. 150 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964).
7 In Excelsior, the Board declined to comment on whether a refusal to comply with
the rule would be a violation of LMRA § 8(a)(1), 61 Stat, 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1964). 156 N.L.R.B. at 1246, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1221.
8 This type of remedy for violation of the Excelsior rule has not yet been litigated
either before the NLRB or before a court. It is submitted that such a remedy would not
be unprecedented in light of Bernel Foam Prods., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 56 L.R.R.M.
1039 (1964).
9 62 L.R.R.M. 1642 (1966).
10 160 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 63 L.R.R.M. 1190 (1966).
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that with the same number of votes cast, an opposite selection on 25 ballots
could have changed the election results. In this respect, 48 missing addresses
seems to be substantial, and the inference is that the good faith of the em-
ployer's attempt tipped the scales in his favor.
The Board has made it clear that it will not accept other methods of
facilitating union-employee communication as a substitute for compliance
with the Excelsior rule, for example, delivering the names and addresses of
the appropriate union agents to each employee and informing the employees
that the union would like to confer with them;" informing the employees
that the union wants their addresses and distributing to each employee a
stamped envelope addressed to the regional director of the NLRB;" or
supplying the list to a third party who would, at the employer's expense,
mail all union literature to the employees." Elections conducted under
these circumstances were set aside. The good faith of the employer in offering
these substitutes was deemed irrelevant. Thus, it seems that good faith only
becomes a factor when the employer is attempting to comply with the letter
of the rule, and not just its spirit.
In two other cases, Crane Packing Co." and Northern Metal Prods.
Co.,15 the Board again did not consider the actual effect of the employer's
failure to comply with Excelsior, and thus visited an ostensibly per se ap-
proach upon the Excelsior remedy. In Northern Metals, the Board set aside
an election in which two unions were vying for representative status. The
defeated union objected to the election on the ground that the employer had
not supplied the regional director with a list of the employees' names and
addresses as per the Excelsior rule. This failure to comply meant, of course,
that neither union had received a list. The decision is consistent with the
rationale of Excelsior, that only an educated electorate can best select its
bargaining representative; yet it does not necessarily follow that the absence
of the list resulted in an uneducated electorate. In its decision, the Board did
not consider this possibility. In Crane Packing, the NLRB stated that a
violation of the Excelsior rule would result in the election being set aside not-
withstanding the existence of convenient alternate methods of communication
available to the union.
It is possible to conclude from these decisions that, irrespective of the
effect, a refusal by the employer to supply the names and addresses of the
employees will insure the union a second chance at the polls. Perhaps the
Board should exercise some discretionary restraint in situations where, for
example, the employer has not supplied the required list, but the union knows
all the names and addresses and loses the election anyway. Certainly rules
which lend themselves to a mechanical application have their place within
an administrative setting to expedite otherwise burdensome decisions. Yet
when expediency derogates from statutory mandates, the propriety and
11 Montgomery Ward & Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 63 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1966).
/2 British Auto Parts, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 62 L.R.R.M. 1591 (1966).
13
 Union Bleachery, 160 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 63 L.R.R.M. 1208 (1966).
14
 160 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 62 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1966).
15
 161 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 63 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1966).
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worth of the expedient rule must be determined on balance. In this light,
the statement of a federal district court judge seems very relevant:
While professing not to do so, it does seem to me that the
Board does inferentially, at least, take the position it is protecting
the union rather than the employees' interests, in some of the argu-
ments that are propounded in the Excelsior case.
It is the employees whose rights are to be protected under the
law, and whose interests are to be preserved and fostered and
nurtured by the Board, in its impartial capacity as an Agent of the
Government 1 5
2. Subpoenas and the "Name and Address" Rule
During the current Survey year, the NLRB sought court enforcement of
subpoenas issued pursuant to Excelsior for the names and addresses of
eligible employee voters in five instances, only three of which will be noted 17
as they exemplify the issues contained in all five. The Board was granted en-
forcement three times and denied enforcement twice.
The key issue in the two noted cases in which enforcement was denied,
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 18 and NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div.,19
was the courts' construction of sections 11(1) 2° and 11(2) 21 of the LMRA.
Both courts found that under these sections the Board could validly subpoena
only material which was to be used in "matters under investigation." The
lists of names and addresses for which the Board had issued subpoenas were
not for use in "investigations," but rather were solely for the purpose of
facilitating the unions' communication with the employees, and therefore the
subpoenas were outside of the Board's power under sections 11(1) and 11(2).
In the third noted case, NLRB v. Wolverine Indus. Div., 22
 the rationale of
the court as it enforced the subpoenas added little substance to the issue
beyond the conclusion that it thought enforcement was a good idea. Follow-
ing some interesting, if not relevant, parallels between the campaign activity
of the League of Women Voters and that of the United Mine Workers, 23 the
court concluded "that ... the subpoena . is a valid aid to the Board in
administering the processes it is called upon to administer under the law." 24
Under section 11(1) of the LMRA the Board "shall at all reasonable
times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy
any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that
relates to any matter under investigation or in question." 25
 (Emphasis
15
 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2061, 2062 (M.D. Fla. 1966).
17
 The two cases not to be discussed both enforced the NLRB's subpoena. NLRB v.
British Auto Parts, 64 L.R.R.M. 2786 (CD. Calif. 1967); NLRB v. Rohlen, 64 L.R.R.M.
2168 (N.D. Dl. 1967).
18 64 L.R.R.M. 2299 (M.D. Fla. 1967).
19
 63 L.R.R.M. 2513 (M.D. N.C. 1966).
20 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1964).
21
 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964).
22 64 L.R.R.M. 2060 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
25 See -United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), discussed pp. 783-86
supra.
241 64 L.R.R.M. at 2061.
25 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1964).
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added.) Under section 11(2) of the LMRA, the federal district courts are
specifically granted jurisdiction to enforce subpoenas issued by the Board and
to issue contempt citations for failure to comply. 26 Both the Hanes court and
the Montgomery Ward court found that they did not have jurisdiction under
section 11(2) to enforce the subpoena before them, because the Board's
subpoena was not within the scope of section 11(1), viz., matters under in-
vestigation or in question. The objection of these courts was previously voiced
in another Montgomery Ward case:
All the Board wants is [to act] . . . as a conduit in handing [the
voter list] . . . over to the Union, and I think, therefore, that it just
does not—is not connected with an effort to secure evidence or testi-
mony of a witness in connection with any matter that is under in-
vestigation.27
In the Hanes case the court also assumed, arguendo, that it did have
section 11(2) jurisdiction and concluded that enforcement of the subpoena
would then be within the discretion of the court, in which case, the court
stated, it would still refuse enforcement. In Montgomery Ward the court
assumed that it did not have section 11(2) jurisdiction, but instead possessed
an inherent jurisdiction. 28 In the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction, the
court refused to enforce the subpoena on the ground that the equities of the
case did not call for a subpoena. It was added by the Montgomery Ward court,
in dicta, that a different factual matrix—one with more compelling equities—
might induce the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction and enforce such
a subpoena, notwithstanding a lack of section 11(2) jurisdiction. The court
contrasted the facts before it—seventy employee voters, of which the union
lacked the names and addresses of only six—to the more compelling case of
thousands of eligible voters with a substantial number of names and addresses
unavailable to the union.
3. Union Access to Employees.
In a decision unique for its facts, the Second Circuit recently ruled that
the NLRB may require an employer to grant nonemployee union organizers
access to its premises. NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc. 29 involved union
attempts to organize the employees of a 468-acre spa remotely situated in
the Catskill Mountains. The employer had from 565 to 786 employees, de-
pending upon the season, of which 60 per cent lived within the confines of
the spa. The facilities available to the employees were such that they rarely
found need to leave the employer's premises. When they did leave, it was
usually by auto, in attire indistinguishable from that of the spa's clientele.
As a result, the union organizers waiting at the frontier had great difficulty
26 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964).
27 Supra note 16, at 2062.
28 Although the court did not specifically refer to 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964),
it was noted in Hanes and is therefore probably the source of jurisdiction to which
the court was referring. That section reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress
regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
20 372 F.2d 26, 64 L.R.R.M. 2295 (2d Cir. 1967).
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communicating with the employees. Nor did the resident employees have
telephones in their rooms through which the union organizers could communi-
cate with them. The court also agreed with the Board that radio and news-
paper advertising were both expensive and relatively ineffective, and conse-
quently were not a useful alternative." The court concluded that "no
effective alternatives [were] . . . available to the union in its organizational
efforts."31 Under such circumstances, the court agreed with the Board that
the nonemployee union organizers should be granted access to the employer's
premises.
In its decision to enforce the Board's access order, the court found it
necessary to construe two important Supreme Court decisions. In Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,32 the Court held a broadly defined no-solicitation
rule to be invalid as enforced against the employees. In NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co.," the Court held, in a decision carefully confined to its facts, that
a nonemployee's right to solicit or distribute literature on the employer's prop-
erty was not coterminal with an employee's right. The Grossinger court read
these two cases to require a rule that
the Board in each case . . . balance the necessities of the union for
direct access to employees against the employer's right of control
over his own property and any detriment which might result from
the admission to that property of union organizers. 34
It does not appear from the opinion that the employer's argument stressed
the possibility of any detriment to his business resulting from union access.
Rather he seemed to have emphasized his proprietary right to exclude whom-
ever he pleased from his property.
The Board order was twofold, only one part of which was enforced by
the court. The Board had ordered the employer to grant union organizers
access to his property and had ordered the employer to cease and desist
from making speeches to the employees during working hours on company
premises unless it gave the union a similar opportunity to address the em-
ployees. This combination was too extreme for the court; only the former
remedy was enforced. The court reasoned that the Board does have the
power to issue such an order, but only if the employer is enforcing a no-
solitication rule." Inasmuch as the Board order granting access was en-
3° Cf. NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128, 130, 54 L.R.R.M. 2492, 2493
(2d Cir. 1963).
31
 372 F.2d at 29, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2298.
32 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
33 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
34 372 F.2d at 30, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2298.
35
 See Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 30 L.R.R.M. 2305 (2171 Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953). It should be noted that the Bonwit rule had
been discredited in NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78, 34 L.R.R.M. 2293 (6th
Cir. 1954), which denied enforcement of a cease-and-desist order similar to that in Bonwit
in an essentially correlative fact situation. Further doubt was cast upon Bonwit in NLRB
v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1958), in which the Court made it clear
that the NLRB must make a careful analysis of both the employer's and the union's
interests, properly balancing the two, before it orders any remedies similar to that in
Bonwit. The Court concluded, on the facts of that case, that an employer may enforce a
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forced, "there is no occasion for the Board's order providing the union with
an equal opportunity for addressing the employees." 36 The Grossinger court
appears to have applied the law suggested by the Court in Babcock & Wilcox,
to wit, the remedy for union nonaccess to employees is indeed a function of
the severity of that nonaccess. In Babcock & Wilcox, the Supreme Court
had hypothesized facts almost identical to Grossinger:
[I] f the location of a plant and the living quarters of the em-
ployees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union
efforts to communicate with them, the employer must allow the
union to approach his employees on his property. 37
4. Contract Bar to Solicitation
Is a broad no-solicitation rule, which would be a violation of section
8(a) (1) 38 if imposed unilaterally by the employer, valid if it is incorporated
into a collective-bargaining agreement? In General. Motors Corp." the NLRB
held that it would be a violation, and found that both the union and the
employer had committed unfair labor practices by so agreeing.4° The collec-
tive-bargaining agreement provided that bulletin boards would be erected
and thenceforth would be the sole method of communcation between the em-
ployees and the union. No other distribution or solicitation would be allowed.
This effectively precluded an intervening union or independent employees
from distributing literature, because the currently certified union had exclu-
sive use and control of the bulletin board.
The Board defined the issue as striking the proper balance between the
integrity of a collective-bargaining agreement and the right of the individual
employees to communicate through the distribution of organizational
material. The Board reasoned that the preservation of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement's integrity is premised on a respect for the negotiating
valid no-solicitation rule and use methods of persuading the employees which were not
available to the union. The Court stated that it should affirmatively appear that a con-
siderable imbalance would result before the NLRB could properly impinge upon the em-
ployer's freedom of speech and rights of property. In 1963 the Board reaffirmed its stand
on the Bonwit rule in May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 49 L.R,R.M. 1862 (1962),
enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797, 53 L.R.R.M. 2172 (6th Cir. 1963). There the Board held
that it was a violation of § 8(a)(1) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1964), to "(1) enforce a broad but privileged [no-solicitation] rule; (2)
make antiunion speeches to massed assemblies of employees; and (3) at the same time
deny to organizing unions a similar right of reply," because this combination created "an
imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication." 136 N.L.R.B. at 800, 49
L.R.R.M. at 1863. Later, the Sixth Circuit did enforce a similar order in a similar fact
situation, distinguishing it from May on the ground that there was a "glaring imbalance"
in organizational communication. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889, 891,
58 L.R.R.M. 2115, 2117 (6th Cir. 1965).
36
 372 F.2d at 30-31, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2299.
37
 351 U.S. at 113.
38
 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
39
 158 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 62 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1966).
49
 The union's unfair labor practice correlative to the employer's § 8(a) (1) viola-
tion is in § 8(b) (1) (A) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A)
(1964).
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and bartering which produced the agreement. Consequently, a specific
clause of the agreement should be afforded this respect unless it does not
appear to be the result of a quid pro quo bargain: The Board thought it
naive to suggest that either the union or the employer was sacrificing any
rights in agreeing to the no-solicitation clause. The realities, as the Board
saw them, were that a mutual benefit accrued to both in the form of a bar-
gaining relationship free from the harrassment of another union vying for
the position of bargaining representative. The court considered the no-
distribution clause as more the result of collusion than give-and-take bar-
gaining.
This decision by the Board is a reaffirmation of a policy first announced
in Gale Prods.41 The Board decision in Gale was denied enforcement;
the court of appeals considered the integrity of the collective-bargaining
agreement to be the paramount consideration.42 It was in the face of this
denial of enforcement and two others, 43 that the Board once again issued
an order to invalidate a contract bar to solicitation in General Motors.
It is submitted that the analysis of the Board in General Motors is
correct, and that the result is just. As was suggested before, the rights of a
union within the statutory framework of the LMRA are derived from its
representative status. As a representative, it has a right to bargain col-
lectively for the employees. But when a union uses this right to silence the
voice of discontent, it is an abuse of power and should be remedied.
C. Recognition Without Election: Authorization Cards
Although the LMRA provides for an election to determine who, if
anyone, shall represent the employees of an appropriate bargaining unit, 1
employers, employees, and labor organizations may, within certain limitations,
decide this question for themselves. It is this latter method of establishing
a collective-bargaining relationship which is the subject of this section.
After the NLRB conducts an election, it certifies the result. 2 A union
which has been certified as the collective-bargaining representative enjoys
certain benefits resulting from the certification. One of the more important
benefits is the one-year period during which the Board will protect the bar-
gaining status of the union: during that year the employer must bargain
in good faith with the union without questioning its majority status.3 In
Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc.,4
 the NLRB decided that in situations involving
"a bargaining status established as a result of [the employer's} voluntary
recognition of a majority representative, . . . like situations involving certi-
41 142 N.LR.B. 1246, .53 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1963).
42
 337 F.2d 390, 57 L.R.R.M. 2164 (7th Cir. 1964).
42
 General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516, 59 L.R.R.M. 2080 (6th Cir.
1965); Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, .59 L.R.R.M. 2077 (6th Cir. 1965).
1
 LMRA § 9(c), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29
U.S.C, § 159(c) (1964).
2
 LMRA § 9(0(1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1964).
3
 NLRB v. Holly-Gen. Co., 305 F.2d 670, 50 L.R.R.M. 2676 (9th Cir. 1962).
4
 157 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 61 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1966).
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fications, . . . the parties must be afforded a reasonable time to bargain and
to execute the contracts resulting from such bargaining." 5 The Keller facts
did not involve a refugal-to-bargain charge against the employer; rather,
the employer was charged with unlawfully executing a contract with a
minority union. 6 Notwithstanding the union's minority status at the execution
of the contract, the Board dismissed the charge against the employer. The
Board emphasized that the union did have a majority status at the time it
was recognized by the employer, and because of this the Board concluded
that the recognition was lawful. If the recognition is valid, the Board rea-
soned, then the union and the employer should not be required to forfeit
the fruits of their bargaining merely because three weeks later, at the time
of execution of the contract, the union had apparently lost its majority
status.
The rationale of Keller was extended by the Board in two later decisions,
Montgomery Ward & Co? and Universal Gear Serv. Corp. 8 Keller was per-
missive—an employer may bargain with a minority union if the union had
majority support when recognized. Montgomery Ward and Universal made
bargaining in such a situation mandatory. After a period of three days
following recognition in Montgomery Ward, and of fifteen weeks in Universal,
decertification petitions signed by a majority of the employees were filed with
the NLRB. The employers then refused to bargain with the unions on the
ground that the decertification petitions had shown that the unions did not
enjoy the support of a majority of the employees. The Board sustained the
union charges that the employers had committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain with the unions . 6
In all three of these cases, it was crucial to the holding that, at the
time of recognition, the union did, in fact, have the support of the majority
of the employees, for the Supreme Court has held that "there could be no
clearer abridgement of § 7 of the Act, assuring the employees the right 'to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing' or 'to
refrain from' such activity," than to grant "exclusive bargaining status to
an agency selected by a minority of . . employees, thereby impressing
that agent upon the nonconsenting majority."10 The fact of majority support
in these cases was established by authorization cards signed by a majority of
the employees, indicating that they wished the designated union to be their
bargaining representative. The validity of these cards as true indications
of the employees' choice is thus critical to the protection of the employees'
section 7 rights stated above.
5 Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1397.
6 Under LMRA § 8(a)(2), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1964), it
is "an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it . ." In ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961), the Court held that
recognizing and bargaining with a minority union violated this section.
7 162 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 64 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1966).
8 157 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 61 L.R.R.M. 1527 (1966).
" LMRA § 8(a) (5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964), provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
With the representatives of his employees. . ."
ILGWU v. NLRB, supra note 6, at 737.
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The Board measures the validity of an authorization card by the clarity
of the language used on it and by the oral representations which are made
about it during the organizational drive by the union." If, considering these
two factors, it does not appear that the signatory employee was misled as
to the purpose of the card, the Board will sustain the validity of the card 12
Yet there still remains the question of whether an employee intends to make
a decision comparable to that made in an election booth when he signs an
authorization card; that is, does the employee give the signing of the card
sufficient consideration to make it a true indication of his choice of a bar-
gaining representative. There can be no real test of this factor. To date, the
Board has decided to presume that an employee is sufficiently cognizant of
the significance of an authorization card.°
Apparently the Board has decided to extend that presumption to the
Keller situation. In Sound Contractors Assin," the Board held that it must
"affirmatively appear . . that the employer extended recognition . . in
good faith on the basis of a previously demonstrated showing, of majority
and at a time when only that union was actively engaged in organizing the
unit employees,"15
 before the Board will visit the Keller protection upon a
bargaining relationship. In Sound Contractors, the complaining union had
alleged only that there had been a voluntary recognition by the employer
followed by his refusal to bargain with the union. The Board held that this
was not an unfair labor practice, because the union had not affirmatively
shown the basis on which the employer had recognized it, nor whether it
had minority or majority support at the time of recognition. The union did
not have evidence of these elements in the form of authorization cards.
Sound Contractors held that there could not be a lawful voluntary recog-
nition where there was more than one union actively campaigning at the
time of recognition. In Retail Clerks Local 770 v. NLRB," the Ninth
Circuit upheld the Board's ruling that an employer did not commit an un-
fair practice by relying on authorization cards in recognizing one union
where there were two competing for the representative position. The two
decisions, however, are not contradictory, because in Retail Clerks the court
sustained the Board's finding that in fact only the recognized union was
actively campaigning. Moreover, the union which was recognized produced
authorization cards signed by an overwhelming majority of the employees.
11
 NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 58 L.R.R.M. 2475 (6th Cir.
1965), For a detailed discussion of the Board's treatment of authorization cards, see
Comment, 7 B.C. Ind. Sr Corn. L. Rev. 909, 933-38 (1966).
12 NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra note Il.
13 Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999, 32 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1953).
See, however, a speech made by NLRB Chairman McCulloch in which he cited the
following statistics to show the unreliability of cards:
In 58 elections, the unions presented authorization cards from 30 to 50 percent
of the employees; and they won 11 or 19 percent of them. In 87 elections, the
unions presented authorization cards from 50 to 70 percent of the employees,
and they won 42 or 52 percent of them.
50 L.R.R.M. 36 (1962).
14 162 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 64 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1966).
15 Id., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1009.
16
 370 F.2d 205, 64 L.R.R.M. 2155 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Although the Retail Clerks decision is distinguishable from Sound Con-
tractors, the validity of the former may still be questioned in view of the
doctrine of Midwest Piping & Supply Co. 17 Basically, this doctrine requires
the employer to remain strictly neutral where there is competition for the
position of bargaining representative. As a result, employers are required to
let the NLRB determine, through an election, which of the competing unions
has the support of a majority of the employees. 18 The Board has hollowed
out exceptions to this rule, and it is tempting to place Retail Clerks within
one, but it is submitted that this could only be accomplished by a strained
construction of these exceptions. In Shea Chem. Corp.," the Board held that
the Midwest Piping rule would not apply where the representation claim of
one of the rival unions was invalid for such reasons as: (1) the existence of
a contract with another union which would bar an election; (2) Board
certification of the rival union for less than a year; or (3) the inappropriate-
ness of the unit in which majority status is claimed. Retail Clerks goes
farther; it allows an employer to recognize a rival union on the basis of
authorization cards where both unions could legitimately represent the
employees, if there is no substantial question as to which union does have
majority support.
Conren, Inc. v. NLRB 2° presents yet another situation in which authori-
zation cards play a vital role in establishing a lawful collective-bargaining
relationship. In this case the Seventh Circuit enforced a Board order directing
an employer to bargain with a union upon request. In so ordering, the Board
found that the union's demand for recognition occurred when it had the
support of the majority of the employees as evidenced by authorization
cards signed by thirty-two of the fifty-three unit employees. The Board
also found that the employer did not entertain a good-faith doubt as to
the union's majority status when the employer refused to bargain with it.
These facts clearly established the commission of an unfair labor practice
which the Board has often remedied with a bargaining order. 21
Conren, therefore, would not be uncommon but for the fact that, nine
and one-half months prior to the union's demand for recognition, there had
been a representation election in which a majority of the voting employees
elected to remain unrepresented. The significance of this election arises from
section 9(c) (3), which states that "no election shall be directed in any bar-
gaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding 12 month
period, a valid election shall have been held." 22 The employer contended
that, since the union could not obtain an NLRB election, the employer's
duty to bargain with or recognize that union was obviated. The court sus-
tained the Board's rejection of this argument with the following rationale:
17 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 17 L.RR.M. 40 (1945).
18 Novak Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1573, 41 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1958).
19 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 42 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1958).
20 368 F.2d 173, 63 L.R.R.M. 2273 (7th Cir. 1966), 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
652 (1967).
21 See, e.g., Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964);
Joy Silk Mills Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1949).
22 61 Stat. 144 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3)
(1964).
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[T]he language and legislative history of section 9(c) clearly indi-
cates that Congress was aware of the alternative methods of estab-
lishing and determining union representative status [yet] . .. it
concerned itself only with limiting the frequency of Board directed
and conducted elections for such purpose when it enacted section
9(c) (3). . . . [Therefore] . . . to so extend a similar post election
proscriptive period to a union's acquisition of representative status
by means of authorization cards would, in our opinion, constitute
an attempt by the court to usurp a legislative prerogative."
The majority expressed no opinion on the value or propriety of foregoing all
questions of representation for 12 months following an election.
Vigorously dissenting, Judge Kiley found that this question of value
and propriety was precisely the issue upon which the court should decide the
case. According to the dissent, the basic policy behind section 9(c) (3)
is the protection of industrial stability, and the dissent asserted that "union
soliciting of cards within a year of [a] ... valid election is as disruptive
of industrial peace as a second election." 24 The dissent further contended
that it was the court's duty to explore this issue rather than refrain from
doing so. As authority for this, the dissent cited two cases in which courts
had to resolve conflicting expressions of employee desires on representational
questions. These cases were considered inapposite by the majority. In the
first case, Brooks v. NLRB, 25 the Supreme Court sustained the representative
status of a union, chosen in a valid election, notwithstanding the fact that
a petition, signed by a clear majority of the employees and stating that
they did not wish to be represented by the union, was handed to the employer
one week after the election and one day before certification. In the second
case, NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 2 ° the Eighth Circuit held that it was not an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to recognize a union chosen
in an election which was conducted within a year after a previous valid
election. The rule established by these cases, according to the dissent in
Conren, is that a court should validate that method of employee expression
which is the most reliable, and thereby assure to the employees their freedom
of choice.
On the facts of Conren, the dissent maintained that the previous election
conducted by the NLRB was clearly more reliable than the later authoriza-
tion-card evidence. The dissent cited language from the Brooks case to
buttress its contention:
[T]he binding effect of an election, which provides responsibility in
the electorate and needed coherence in administration, is "equally
relevant to labor relations"; [and] . . . the revocation of authority
conferred or withheld in a "solemn and costly" election should
occur by no less a solemn occasion. 27
23 368 F.2d at 174, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2274.
24 Id. at 177, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2276.
25 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
26 344 F.2d 998, 59 L.R.R.M. 2210 (8th Cir. 1965).
27
 368 F.2d at 176, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2276.
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It is submitted that both the majority and the dissent failed to consider
a basic presumption which lies at the heart of the LMRA: the objective
of industrial stability is usually best served by the existence of a representa-
tive who will bargain with an employer in the interests of the employees. 28
Although in Brooks the bargaining status of one union was voided, there re-
mained the union originally certified as the winner of the first election. The
same is true of Blades Mfg. Corp. In Conren the Board was allowing a bar-
gaining representative, who apparently had enjoyed majority status, to enter
the labor-management relations of a business where there had not been a union
before. Thus, such a construction of the certification year does not seem to
be disruptive of industrial stability; it seems, rather, to be quite the oppo-
site.
Two other cases fortify the assertion that a viable collective-bargaining
relationship should be sustained where possible. In Hoban v. United Air-
craft Corp.," the district court sustained the NLRB's contention that the
employer should continue to bargain with a minority union with which he
had bargained previously while having full knowledge of the union's
minority status. The union had been certified as the representative of the
employees many years earlier but had lost its majority status in the five-
or six-year period preceding the employer's refusal to bargain. In spite of its
reluctance to order an employer to bargain with a minority union, the court
nevertheless chose this alternative rather than allowing the severance of a
collective-bargaining relationship.
Similarly, in Johnston Grain Co. v. NLRB," the court sustained the repre-
sentative status of a union with a questionable majority where the alterna-
tive was to leave the parties with no collective-bargaining relationship. In
that case a group of employees had filed a decertification petition with the
NLRB in an attempt to end the status of the current bargaining representa-
tive through an election.31 This petition was filed after the certification year
had elapsed. The court sustained the Board's finding that the employer
was committing an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the
union despite the expiration of the certification year and the employees'
decertification petition.
It should be pointed out that, in both of these cases, the courts and the
Board grounded the order to bargain with a minority union on bases other
than their preference for the existence of a collective-bargaining relation-
ship.3' Yet this does not detract from the fact that, in the ultimate analysis,
28 See NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1964); LMRA § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
29 63 L.R.R.IVI. 2081 (D. Conn. 1966).
30 365 F.2d 582, 63 L.R.R.M. 2039 (10th Cir. 1966).
31 Under LMRA § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)-
(A) (ii) (1964), an employee may file a petition for a decertification of his current
bargaining representative. If the petition is accompanied by evidence of a lack of sup-
port for the current representative, the NLRB will conduct an election. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.17 (1967).
32
 In Hoban v. United Aircraft Corp., supra note 29, the court found reason to
order the employer to bargain with the minority from the fact that he had been doing so
with full knowledge of the union's minority status since 1960. In addition, it appeared
that the only reason the employer had for ultimately refusing to bargain was to assert
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such a preference must be implicit in the kind of determinations that were
made in these cases.
Finally, NLRB v. Alva Allen Indus. /no." should be noted to dispel any
notion that the decision should always go in favor of maintaining a collective-
bargaining relationship. The court held that it was not an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to refuse to recognize or to bargain with a certified union
when there were only eleven days remaining in the certification year. In
refusing to enforce the Board's unfair-labor-practice finding and order, the
court emphasized the employer's good-faith belief in the union's loss of
majority support, and added that it did not consider the concept of a "cer-
tification year" to be a "black-letter" 365-day period but rather a reasonable
time approximating one year." The Board had contended that any refusal
to bargain within a one-year period was per se an unfair labor practice. Per-
haps if the Board had instead argued the merits of the charge, as it had in
Hoban and Johnston Grain, the result would have been different. In any event,
the court did choose to permit the severance of a collective-bargaining rela-
tionship when it could easily have maintained it.
One of the basic reasons for the passage of the Wagner Act" was the
belief that securing to the workingman certain rights within his employ-
ment relationship would safeguard "commerce" from the injury and interrup-
tion which had previously resulted from industrial strife." Basic among
these rights was collective bargaining through representatives of the em-
ployees' own choosing. To protect this right, Congress instructed the NLRB
to conduct an election among the employees or to use any other suitable
means to determine if there was a party which a majority of the employees
wished to have represent it for the purpose of collective bargaining.37 In
1947, Congress decided that such a determination would best be made
through an election.38 Yet, as illustrated in the cases discussed in this
section, less formal means of selecting bargaining representatives are not
only condoned by the NLRB but also enjoy the protection of Board orders
when they are questioned. No doubt, voluntary agreements between employees
and employers should be encouraged; this is not only true democratic action
but also promotes industrial stability. However, as stabilizing as a voluntary
agreement between an employer and a union may be, it should not override
the right guaranteed to the majority of the employees of a bargaining unit
to select a representative of its own choosing.
Authorization cards are far less reliable than elections." Yet bargaining
leverage against the union to drop unfair-labor-practice charges against the employer
in return for continued bargaining. In Johnston Grain Co. v. NLRB, supra note 30, the
court thought it decisive that the employer had privately agreed to bargain with the
union after the certification year had elapsed.
33 63 L.R.R.M. 2515 (8th Cir. 1966).
34 Accord, Brooks v, NLRB, supra note 25.
36 490Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
36 Wagner Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
§ 151 (1964).
37 Wagner Act § 9(C) (1) , 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
38
 LMRA § 9(c)(1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 	 § 159(c) (1). The amendment
deleted the words "any other suitable method," leaving only the election process.
39 See note 13 supra.
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representatives are being recognized on this basis at an increasing rate.
Indeed, in Keller, Universal Gear, and Montgomery Ward, recognition ob-
tained through authorization cards was held sufficiently valid to withstand
an equally persuasive indication of employee discontent with the bargaining
representative. And, in Conren, authorization cards were a sufficient indica-
tion of union majority support to overcome the usual bar to the establishment
of employee representation different from that established by an election
held within the previous twelve months. It is submitted that in using this
admittedly less reliable tool for determining the employees' choice, the
Board should be extremely careful not to abridge the employees' freedom of
choice. The rights extended to unions by the LMRA are derived from their
representational status: This raises serious doubts as to the propriety of
Board orders directing employers to bargain with unions which have proved
their majority status with such unreliable evidence as authorization cards;
such doubts are increased when the union is of an admittedly minority status.
D. Withdrawal from a Multi-Employer Bargaining Unit
Under the LMRA, a group of employers may join together and bargain
with their employees' bargaining representative through a single agent;' this
is known as the multi-employer bargaining unit. Multi-employer bargaining
units are established through the mutual consent of the employers and the
unions involved. The significance of such consent is evidenced by the Board's
use of bargaining history as the primary test of the appropriateness of the
unit.2
 This section deals not with the establishment of such a unit, but
rather with the right of the participants to withdraw therefrom.
In Retail Associates, Inc.,3
 the Board announced a set of basic rules for
valid withdrawals from multi-employer bargaining units. First, after negotia-
tions have started, mutual consent of all the parties is required for with-
drawal. Second, a unilateral decision to withdraw must be accompanied
by adequate written notice given prior to the termination or modification
date of the multi-employer bargaining agreement. The Board also made
some requirements as to the intent of the party withdrawing. It may not be
done for the purpose of achieving a momentary expediency, or as part of
the bargaining strategy. Rather, a valid withdrawal must be made with
The NLRB claims the right to certify a multi-employer bargaining unit on the
following basis: LMRA § 9(b), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964), provides
that the Board shall select the appropriate bargaining unit from either the employer,
craft, or plant unit, or subdivision thereof. The Board maintains that this does not
prohibit a multi-employer bargaining unit, because § 2(2) of the act, 61 Stat. 137 (1947),
29 U.S.C. •§ 1.52(2) (1964), defines "employer" as including the agent of an employer.
The Board synthesizes these two sections to find that each employer is the agent of
the other(s) for collective-bargaining purposes where the employers involved have
mutually consented to join in a bargaining association. The courts have upheld such a
unit as appropriate. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1956),
which comments favorably on multi-employer bargaining units.
2
 See Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777, 785, 30 L.R.R.M. 1119, 1122 (1952),
where the Board declared that "collective bargaining is facilitated by adhering to the
methods of the past, in the absence of any indication that a change in these methods
has become necessary."
3 120 N.L.R.B. 338, 41 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1958).
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the intent to cease multi-employer bargaining on a relatively permanent
basis and to adopt an individual bargaining relationship. Such intent must
be unequivocal and expressed in good faith. These rules as announced by the
Board have met with the approval of the courts. 4
Until 1965 these rules were applied only to employers; a union's right to
withdraw had not been litigated. In that year, however, the Board, in Hearst
Consol. Publications, Inc.'" and Evening News Ass'n,° held that a union had
a right to withdraw equal to that of an employer.? During the Survey year,
these decisions were upheld by Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB 8 and Detroit
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. N.LRB,G respectively.
In both cases the employers raised substantially the same argument in
defense of their refusals to bargain individually with the withdrawing unions.
The argument attacked the logic behind the Board's conception of a union's
status in a multi-employer bargaining unit as being equal to that of an
employer. Member Brown, dissenting in Hearst and in Evening News,
advocated the employers' contention. Member Brown pointed out that the
union's withdrawal disintegrates the multi-employer bargaining unit for all
involved; on the other hand, should an employer withdraw, the community
of interest among the others in the group is not substantially lessened.'°
Consequently, a withdrawal by the union results in individual bargaining
between the union and each employer of the association, whereas a with-
drawal by an employer results in individual bargaining only with that em-
ployer.
Because of this difference in the effect of a union's withdrawal vis-à-vis
that of an employer, Member Brown advocated more stringent require-
ments for union withdrawal than for employer withdrawal. The union, he
contended, should be required to make a positive showing that it has legiti-
mate reasons for withdrawing, such as an historical weakness in bargaining
success, a lack of industrial tranquility in the bargaining unit, or the heter-
ogeneity of the employers involved as to employment and labor practices.
The majority of the Board found the deciding factor to be the con-
sensual nature of the multi-employer bargaining unit. If the consent of both
4 See NLRB v. Sheridan Creations Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 61 L.R.R.M. 2586 (2d Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co., 281 F.2d 893, 46 L.R.R.M. 2919 (9th Cir. 1960).
5 156 N.L.R.B. 210, 61 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1965).
9 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1965).
7 In both cases, the Board found that the employers in the association involved,
who had refused to bargain individually with a union which had made a good-faith
and timely withdrawal from the multi-employer bargaining unit, had committed an
unfair labor practice in violation of §1 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5). The validity of the
union's withdrawal was determined under the Retail Associates rules.
8 364 F.2d 293, 62 L.R.R.M. 2722 (2d Cir. 1966).
9 372 F.2d 569, 64 L.R.R.M. 2403 (6th Cir. 1967).
" As an example of this, in Hearst the dissent noted Ice Cream, Frozen Custard
Indus. Employees, Local 717, 145 N.L.R.B. 865, 55 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1964). In the Ice
Cream case, the Board had found that the multi-employer bargaining unit had remained
viable even though there was a period in which certain member employers had signed
individual collective-bargaining agreements with unions. It should be noted that by
signing the individual agreements the employers and unions involved had, in effect,
mutually agreed to a withdrawal, albeit temporarily.
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groups is needed to establish the unit, 11
 then the consent of both should be
a requisite to continuation. The Board concluded that, having exercised its
discretion in setting standards for employer withdrawal from such units, it
would be an abuse of that discretion to fail to apply those same standards to
union withdrawal, because, when all relevant factors are considered, the
two parties have an equal claim to withdrawal. The argument that a union
stands in a different position is grounded on irrelevant factors, according to
the majority.
The argument of Member Brown, when distilled, is a comment on the
bargaining power resulting to a union which withdraws, as opposed to the
power resulting to an employer which withdraws, from a multi-employer
bargaining unit. Since the employer is severed from his compatriots, he wields
less strength at the bargaining table; a multi-employer union which breaks up
the unit greatly enhances its bargaining position. In rebuttal, the Board
quoted the Supreme Court as saying that our labor policy does not "contain
a charter for the National Labor Relations Board to act at large in equaliz-
ing disparities of bargaining power between employer and union." 12 The
Board further found that allowing equal freedom of withdrawal from the
multi-employer bargaining to unions would enhance the growth of such
units. A greater restriction on union withdrawal would tend to inhibit unions
from initially consenting to such units.
Both reviewing courts agreed with the Board that a union may have a
right of withdrawal equal to that of an employer. But such a right, it was
held, may be circumscribed and applied by the Board in its section 9(b)
discretion to determine appropriate units."
The more significant discussion by the courts and the Board involved
the effect of their holdings upon the employer's right to "lock out" union
employees when there is a "whipsaw" strike. In NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Local 449, 14 the Supreme Court held that employers 'who are a part of a
multi-employer bargaining unit may lock out all bargaining-unit employees
if the employees strike against only one member of the unit. The employers
in Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRBn and Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v.
NLRB" claimed that allowing a union to withdraw would be in derogation
of the employers' right to protect their joint bargaining position by a
lockout." Both courts were careful not to suggest that the union could avoid
the employer's right to lock out by withdrawing. While the Publishers' Ass'n
court merely noted that that issue was not before it and that bargaining
II See Local 128, Retail Clerks v. Leedom, 42 L.R.R.M. 2031 (D.D.C. 1958), in
which the Board was enjoined from conducting an election in a multi-employer unit on
the ground that one of the local unions objected to a multi-employer bargaining unit.
See also Great Atl. & Pax. Tea Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 361, 54 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1963).
12
 154 N.L.R.B. at 1497, 60 L.R.R.M. at 1150, quoting NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
13 Sec note 1 supra.
14
 353 U.S. 87 (1957). This case is commonly referred to as the Buffalo Linen case.
15 Supra note 8.
15 Supra note 9.
17
 This problem was specifically left untouched by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Local 449, supra note 14, at 94 n.22.
810
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
strength and tactics are not proper bargaining-unit criteria, the Detroit
Newspaper Publishers court went into the subject further. This -court stated
that it would consider legitimate a lockout by the employers involved in
the case if there were a union withdrawal, accompanied by a strike against
one of the members of the former association. The court said that the lockout
would be legitimate, not to protect the employers' joint bargaining strength,
but rather as an
economic weapon [used] . . . in order to prevent [a] ... business
from being ruthlessly destroyed ... particularly in the newspaper
industry where the commodity, news, is perishable, competition
with other media is keen, and the employer is compelled to deal
with a multitude of unions. 18
In support of this conclusion, the court cited NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local
449,i 9 NLRB v. Brown,2° and American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 21 implicit
in which cases the court found the right of employers to use the lockout
as a weapon in support of a legitimate bargaining position.
Finally, in Detroit Newspaper Publishers, the court rejected the em-
ployers' claim that under section 8(b) (1) (B) 22 the union would be com-
mitting an unfair labor practice by'refusing to bargain on a multi-employer
basis. In disagreeing, the court pointed out that, after the withdrawal by the
union, the employers would still have the right to be represented in separate
bargaining by the multi-employer association. 23
There seems little doubt that the reviewing courts were correct in hold-
ing that the validity of employer and union withdrawal from multi-employer
bargaining units is within the discretion of the NLRB. Nor can it be strongly
argued that the Board's discretion has been abused. But conversly, it is
submitted, the Board could have imposed higher withdrawal standards upon
unions, as suggested by the dissent in both Board opinions, and still not
abuse its discretion. The wisdom of the Board's ruling, then, is the question-
able aspect of these cases. One case involved twenty-five years of multi-
employer bargaining with the union, the other, fifty. Both cases involved
a highly competitive industry with a perishable commodity, news—charac-
18
 372 F.2d at 572, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2406.
19 Supra note 14.
20 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
21 380 U.S. 300 (1965),
22 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6) (1) (B) (1964). This section provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to . .
restrain or coerce . . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for the
purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. . , ."
23
 If this is in fact so, it raises some interesting problems with respect to the
employer's duty to bargain in good faith. If the multi-employer association, while
bargaining for individuals, could insist, to the point of impasse, upon bargaining issues
grounded in the welfare of the multi-employer group, then the union's withdrawal would
be meaningless (especially if the employers could still lock out, as suggested by the
court). On the other hand, if the association could not bargain as it did while the multi-
employer unit was intact, the court's guarantee of the employers' unrestrained choice
of bargaining representative is of little value.
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teristics which indicate that multi-employer bargaining units can best serve
all concerned. Thus, perhaps Judge Kaufman was reasonable to fear,
as did the dissenting member of the Board ... , that our decision
will not alleviate and might, perhaps, exacerbate the antagonisms
which have been the antithesis of labor-management peace. Thus
. . multiemployer bargaining will be disrupted upon the whim
of one of the parties without any reasons assigned and with more
abrasiveness sure to follow as a result. 24
IV. ARBITRATION
A. Powers of the Arbitrator
1. Questions of Arbitrability
In 1960 the Supreme Court held that, within the arbitration system,
the function of the courts is quite limited.' Indeed, "it is confined to as-
certaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on
its face is governed by the contract."2 Two years later, the Court held,
more specifically, that "under our decisions, whether or not the company
was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter
to be determined by the Court on they basis of the contract entered into
by the parties."3
Thus, the Court has limited the judicial function in the arbitration
process to a determination of what the parties have agreed to arbitrate. If,
upon looking at the contract, a court determines that the parties have agreed
to arbitrate a specific issue, the court can go no further. All matters of
substance will then be left to the arbitrator under the contract.
Since "a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which he has not agreed so to submit," 4 the question of who determines
the issue of arbitrability is a matter of some importance. There is a hint
in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 5 that
the question of arbitrability may be taken away from the courts by agreement
of the parties. 3 In Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, Local 1645, 7
the Second Circuit held that "the parties may voluntarily submit arbitrability
to an arbitrator,"8 but, if a dispute arises, the one who alleges that this
24 Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, supra note 8, at 297, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2725 (Kaufman,
J., concurring).
I United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. .564 (1960).
2
 Id. at 568.
3 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962).
4 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960).
5
 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
G Where the assertion by the claimant is that the parties excluded from court
determination not merely the decision of the merits of the grievance but also
the question of its arbitrability, vesting power to make both decisions in the
arbitrator, the claimant must bear the burden of a clear demonstration of that
purpose.
Id. at 583 n.7.
7
 347 F.2d 93, .59 L.R.R.M. 2588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940 (1965).
8
 Id. at 95, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2590.
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was the agreement of the parties has the burden of "clearly demonstrating"
that the allegation is true.°
During the current Survey year, the earlier Torrington principle was
reasserted in, another case involving the same two parties. In Metal Prods.
Workers, Local 1645 v. Torrington Co., 1° the appellant union moved to
vacate an arbitration award holding that a grievance concerning the method
to be used to recall strikers was not arbitrable. The company denied that it
had agreed to arbitrate a dispute on such a matter. There was a clause in
the applicable collective-bargaining agreement giving the arbitrator the
power to rule upon whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate a given
grievance.' 1
 The arbitrator determined that the company was not required
to arbitrate the dispute, and the union brought this action to vacate that
determination. 12
The court held that the clause in the agreement granting the arbitrator
the power to decide the question of arbitrability was the "clear demonstra-
tion" required by Warrior & Gulf" and the earlier Torrington case."
Once the arbitrator determined that there was no arbitrable dispute, the
courts would no longer intervene.15
This was a relatively easy case, because the collective agreement specifi-
cally stated that the parties had agreed to let the arbitrator determine
arbitrability. In a more difficult case, where there is no such clear statement,
the court still has the obligation to interpret the contract to determine
whether the parties had agreed to submit the issue of arbitrability to the
arbitrator. Apparently, since the party alleging that fact must "clearly
demonstrate" its existence, and since someone must determine the question
of arbitrability, there is a presumption that arbitrability is for the courts.
It seems that this presumption is quite strong for several reasons. One is that
it is not known what standard the arbitrator should use in making his deci-
sion. In Warrior & Gulf the Court said that "in the absence of any express
provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only
the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration
can prevail . . ." 16 Thus, a court must apply a very lenient standard on
9 Id. at 96, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2590, citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., supra note 5, and footnote to the Court's opinion, supra note 6.
10 358 F.2d 103, 62 L.R.R.M. 2011 (2d Cir. 1966).
11 The court quoted the clause giving that power. Id. at 105, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2013.
12 The union claimed that the employer had agreed to use the procedures of the
new collective agreement to recall the workers or to recall all workers and to lay off
those who were unneeded, in accordance with the terms relating to seniority in the
collective agreement. By the powers under the agreement, the arbitrator was to settle
grievances concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement.
13
 Supra note 5, at 583 n.7.
14 Supra note 7, at 96, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2590.
13 358 F.2d at 106, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2013.
16 Supra note 5, at 584-85. The Court also stated that
an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved
in favor of coverage.
Id. at 582-83.
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questions of what should be arbitrated, although an arbitrator, not held to
such a standard, may interpret his powers more strictly.
In addition, the question of arbitrability is a matter of general contract
interpretation, and an arbitrator is no more qualified for contract interpreta-
tion than a court. Until this Survey year, not even the NLRB was per-
mitted to interpret a collective agreement. In NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp., 17 the Court allowed the Board to construe a collective agreement
which contained no arbitration clause, but only insofar as was necessary
to determine the validity of an asserted contract defense to an unfair-labor-
practice charge. 18 It would thus appear that the courts are quite jealous of
their prerogative to decide the question of arbitrability and will yield only
where the parties clearly have intended otherwise.
2. Arbitrator's Use of Prior Practice
Another question with regard to the scope of the arbitrator's power is
whether he may use the prior practice of the parties in discharging his duty
to interpret and apply the collective contract. This leads to a further
question: If the arbitrator may so use prior practice, how broad or how
limited is that power? In yet another case involving the Torrington Company
and Local 1645, 1 ° the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a
federal district court decision 2° which had vacated an arbitrator's award in
favor of the appellant union because the arbitrator had used prior practice as
a basis for his award and, in doing so, had exceeded his authority.
The case arose when the company announced in 1962 that it was dis-
continuing the unilaterally instituted policy of giving its employees time off
with pay to vote on election day. 21
 At that time the union had a weak and
narrow arbitration clause in its collective agreement, permitting the arbitrator
little or no leeway to overrule company action. The union filed an unfair-
labor-practice charge which was later dismissed. In 1963 the parties began
negotiating a new collective agreement, and the company immediately
affirmed its stand on the issue of paid time off for voting. The union asked
for a contrary provision, but, in the ensuing negotiations and strike that
followed, both parties agreed to continue the old agreement subject to cer-
tain amendments which did not include any statement as to voting time off.
In 1964 the parties signed their current contract, which contained no mention
of time off for voting. During the period between 1962 and the signing of
the new collective agreement, the company refused to pay employees for time
missed in order to vote.
In 1964, following the institution of the new collective agreement, the
company again made it clear that such time off would not be permitted.
However, the union had obtained a new, broader arbitration clause and filed
17 385 U.S. 421 (1967), noted p. 997 infra.
18 Id. at 428.
19
 Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 62 L.R.R.M.
2495 (2d Cir. 1966).
20 60 L.R.R.M. 2262 (D. Conn. 1965).
21
 The policy had been in force for twenty years but had never been a part of any
collective agreement. 362 F.2d at 678, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2496.
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a grievance under it in December 1964. 22
 The arbitrator found that the
past practice of the company in permitting paid time off for voting was
firmly established and
that the company therefore had the burden of changing this policy
by negotiating with the Union, and that in the negotiations which
culminated in the current bargaining agreement the parties did not
agree to terminate this practice. 23
The company brought the current suit in the federal district court to
vacate the arbitrator's award of back pay for the election days which had
passed since the practice had ceased. The court held that the arbitrator had
exceeded his authority "by going outside the terms of the contract itself
to include a benefit which he ruled was implied." 24 The district court stated
that
labor contracts generally affirmatively state the terms which
the contracting parties agree to; not what practices they agree to
discontinue. This agreement made no provision for "paid voting
time" and the arbitrator exceeded and abused his authority when
he attempted to read into the agreement this implied contractual
relationship. 25
On this rationale the district court vacated the arbitrator's award.
The union argued on appeal that the district court had exceeded its
authority by examining the merits of the award. The court of appeals dis-
missed that argument by holding that the arbitrator's award is subject to
review by a court on the issue of whether he "exceeded the limits of his
contractual authority."26
 Thus, by reviewing the power of the arbitrator,
the district court was merely performing its duty.
The court then held that the district court had properly found that
the arbitrator had exceeded his authority as granted in the collective agree-
ment because he had added to the terms of the existing agreement a past
practice of the company which had been discontinued long before negotia-
tions on a new contract had begun. The Second Circuit rejected what had
been found to be the arbitrator's conclusion, that since the company had
been the one to raise the issue in negotiations and had been the first to
drop the issue from discussion, "the company cannot complain if its policy
22
 The old arbitration clause bound the arbitrator not to overrule company decisions
unless he found "that the Company misinterpreted or violated the express terms of the
agreement." Id. at 681 n.7, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2499 n.7. The new agreement eliminated this
provision and gave the arbitrator full power to interpret and apply the agreement. Id.
at 678 n.2, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2496 n.2. Both arbitration agreements, however, required that
the arbitrator not add to, delete, or modify the collective agreement. Id. at 681 n.7,
62 L.R.R.M. at 2499 n.7.
23
 Id. at 679, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2497.
24 Supra note 20, at 2263.
25 Id. at 2264.
241
 362 F.2d at 680, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2498. Support for such a holding may be found
in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960) (dictum) ; Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499, 508, 52 L.R.R.M. 2662,
2668 (2d Cir. 1963).
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under the old contract is now continued." 27 The court stated that the policy
of paid voting time had been revoked before negotiations began, and, when
the company reiterated its position during the bargaining, it was merely an
invitation to the union to bargain on the issue. Thus, it was up to the union
to press the issue at the bargaining table, and, since it did not, "the company
was surely justified in applying in November 1964 a policy it had rightfully
established in 1962 . . . . "28 The court held that while
in some cases, it may be appropriate exercise of an arbitrator's
authority to resolve ambiguities in the scope of a collective bargain-
ing agreement on the basis of prior practice, . . . the mandate that
the arbitrator stay within the confines of the collective bargaining
agreement ... requires a reviewing court to pass• upon whether the
agreement authorizes the arbitrator to expand its express terms on
the basis of the parties' prior practice. 2°
The court held that the arbitrator had added to the terms of the collective
agreement, and that such action was beyond the scope of his authority. 30
The basic problem in the Torrington case is the extent to which prior
practice may be used as a factor in the arbitrator's decision. The majority
admitted that it may be used somewhat, but only if authorized by the collec-
tive agreement 3 1 This differs from the dissent only in its interpretation of the
contract and of the powers that the contract gives to the arbitrator. The dissent
found that the broad arbitration clause which became effective in 1964
"was a clear recognition by the parties that there can be 'implied' as well as
'express' terms in the agreement."32 The majority, on the other hand,
ignored the implication from the change in the arbitration clause and based
its decision upon that part of the contract which forbade the arbitrator to
add to its terms. 33 The majority seemed to determine that a contract clause
which forbids the arbitrator to add to, delete from, or modify the contract
limits the arbitrator to the four corners of the contract in arbitrating ques-
tions which have been raised during negotiations but which have not been
incorporated into the contract. Only where the issue has not been made a part
of the negotiations may it "be appropriate to resolve a question , on the
basis of prior practice in the plant or industry . . . "34
Another case decided during the Survey year seems to bear out the
result in Torrington. In Local 77, Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. Philadelphia
Orchestra Ass'n, 35 the union brought suit to vacate an arbitrator's award
27 362 F.2d at 681, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2498.
28 Id. at 682, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2499.
29 Id. at 680, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2498.
30 Judge Feinberg dissented. While agreeing that an arbitrator's award may be
reviewed by a court to see if it was within his authority, Judge Feinberg felt that past
practice was an acceptable means of resolving a dispute, and that use of past practice
was not beyond the arbitrator's authority. The dissenter chastised the majority for
reviewing the merits of the decision. Id. at 682, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2500.
31 Id. at 680, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2498.
32 Id. at 683, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2500.
33 See note 22 supra.
84 362 F.2d at 681, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2499.
35 252 F. Supp. 787, 62 L.R.R.M. 2102 (ED. Pa. 1966).
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in favor of the orchestra association. The court granted the association's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the award was not beyond the authority
of the arbitrator. The dispute arose because the association had scheduled a
flying tour of Central and South America. Although the collective-bargaining
agreement made no mention of air travel, it did specifically speak of travel
by train or bus. The union objected to travel by air, and by mutual agree-
ment the issue was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator gave his award
in favor of the association, finding that the contract did permit the associa-
tion to require the orchestra members to fly. 3°
In his opinion, the arbitrator said that
there is no mention of air travel in the contract at all, and it is
agreed that when this language first was negotiated, there was no
problem regarding air travel. It seems clear to me that the language
was written in 1952 without any mutual intent at all concerning air
travel, one way or the other."
Thus, the mutual intent of the parties had to be gleaned from their action
during the life of the contract, for without resorting to this prior action the
arbitrator could not decide the issue. After reviewing the past practice of the
parties, which established that the members of the orchestra had flown
without objection many times, the arbitrator stated that
in my judgment, this history indicates that the parties have recog-
nized and accepted air travel as an acceptable and permissible mode
of travel. To that extent I think there has been shown a mutual
intent and understanding, to the effect that travel by airplane, just
as much as travel by railroad, is a proper mode of transportation . .
under the contract as
The arbitrator went on to conclude that the association could require air
travel under the contract.
The union instituted this suit to vacate the award, claiming that it
was beyond the power of the arbitrator because, in giving the award, the
arbitrator modified or amended the contract, which he was forbidden to do."
The court dismissed the union petition, holding that "the Award is one which
draws its essence from the contract."° Since the court could not review the
merits of the award, it merely examined the arbitrator's methods and stated
that "the Arbitrator did indeed carry out with fidelity his obligation to
interpret and apply the contract."' 1
These two cases seem to spell out both the right of the arbitrator to
use past practice in reaching his conclusions and the scope of that right.
Torrington expresses, as dictum, the point of view that it is proper for the
a° Id. at 793 (App. A).
37
 Id. at 796-97 (App. B).
88 Id. at 747 (App. B).
39 The only mention in the case of this limitation on the arbitrator's power is in
the arbitrator's award itself. Id. at 799 (App. B). But this is essentially what makes the
ruling similar to that in Torrington.
4° Id. at 792, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
41 Id. at 791, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
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arbitrator to look to past practice only when the issue before him has not
been raised during negotiations. 42 In Local 77 the parties had negotiated on
the general issue before the arbitration, but there had been no discussion of
air travel specifically, because the contract was negotiated at a time when
"travel by air had not developed to the point where it was regarded as
feasible for the Orchestra's tours." 43 Since the arbitrator in Local 77
found the travel clause of the collective-bargaining agreement uninforma-
tive on the issue of air travel, and since no prior negotiation history could
be examined in order to determine the intent of the parties, prior practice
became an essential and useful tool to the arbitrator. This is in contrast to
Torrington, where there had been discussion of the issue of paid time off for
voting to which the arbitrator could have turned to aid him in interpreting
and applying the collective agreement. The arbitrator did not have to resort
to prior practice in such an instance, because the intent of the parties could
be gleaned from the discussions and negotiations involved in the making
of the contract.
The consensus of the two cases seems to be that prior practice is a fit
tool of the arbitrator's trade—at least where the contract forbids him to add
to, delete from, or modify the contract—when there are no discussions or
negotiations between the parties to which he may turn to discover their
intent. It is perhaps possible to broaden this power by also allowing the use
of past practice when the discussions which did take place are ambiguous
in their result. Thus, in Local 77, the arbitrator found that the parties'
discussion of travel offered him no insight into their intent as to air travel
specifically, and thus the prior practice could be used.
3. Arbitration Awards and the Criminal Law
In 1960, in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp.," the Supreme Court decided that an arbitrator's award must be
enforced if "it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 45
In the current Survey year, a federal district court, in UAW, Local 985 v.
W. M. Chace Co.," went a step further when it answered in the negative the
question "whether this Court can summarily order a party to arbitration to
follow .the dictates of the arbitrator when to do so may require him to
commit [al misdemeanor ... ."47
The case arose when, following a strike, the employer failed to recall
ten female employees whose jobs had been moved to Puerto Rico during the
strike. Since male employees with less seniority had been recalled, the ten
women invoked the grievance procedure contained in the collective-bargaining
agreement. This included arbitration, and the arbitrator ordered reinstate-
ment of the female employees. The employer refused to abide by the arbitra-
tor's award, and the union sued to enforce the award, moving for judgment on
42 See p. 816 supra.
93 252 F. Supp. at 795 (App. B).
44
 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
46
 Id. at 597.
46
 64 L.R.R.M. 2098 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
47 Id. at 2099.
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the pleadings on the ground that the award drew its essence from the con-
tract. The employer moved for dismissal, claiming that to comply with the
award would be to violate Michigan statutory law concerning the type of
work female employees could legally do. The court denied both motions,
because the award was not clear enough for the court to determine whether
Michigan law would be violated, or for the court to say with finality that
the award was drawn from the essence of the contract.
The contract which the arbitrator was to interpret had two provisions
relating to female employees. One of these permitted such an employee to
displace employees with lesser seniority if lifting and weight restrictions did
not apply." The other allowed female employees to take jobs which were
not prohibited by law.49
 Michigan also had a statute which, the court held,
made it a misdemeanor for an employer to assign a female to a "task dis-
proportionate to her strength."5° The union, pressing for summary enforce-
ment of the award, argued that in reaching his decision the arbitrator had
considered both the contract clauses relating to female employees and the
Michigan statute and had found that neither prevented his making the
award. Since the award was based upon the arbitrator's understanding of
the contract, it was contended that Enterprise Wheel required the court to
enforce it.
The court rejected these contentions and held that it could look beyond
the arbitrator's opinion to determine the lawfulness of enforcing the award. 5 '
The court went on to state that "it is too plain for argument that no court
will order a party to do something, if in order to comply with the court's
directive, he must commit a crime." 52
 From the arbitrator's award the court
could not determine that the tasks which would be assigned to the women
would not be disproportionate to their strength. The arbitrator had failed to
direct the employer to be certain that the work assigned would not violate
the statute, or to order the employer to assign the women to work in a
specified fashion which would not violate the statute; he had only ordered the
employer to reinstate the female employees in certain jobs which might or
might not violate the statute. Since the award, as issued, was insufficient for
the court to determine that the work assigned would not be disproportionate





 The statute provided as follows:
Any employer of labor in this state, employing both males and females,
who shall discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as between sexes
who are similarly employed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. No female
shall be assigned any task disproportionate to her strength . . . .
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.824 (Supp. 1965). While the court noted that the above section
did not clearly state that assigning to females work which was beyond their strength
was a misdemeanor, it found that "this is the result at least by virtue of M.S.A.
§ 28.199." 64 L.R.R.M. at 2099 n.2.
51
 Id. at 2100.
32 Ibid.
53
 The court also denied the employer's motion to dismiss, because "the record
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It appears that only one other court has had occasion to consider a
similar situation. In In the Matter of W. Union Tel. Co., 54
 the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed a per curiam decision of the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, that an arbitrator's award which "tends to condone
and encourage the commission of illegal acts" 55
 could not be enforced by a
court. The case arose because a union, Local 40 of the American Communica-
tions Association, whose employees worked for Western Union, resolved to
force Western Union and other companies to deal fairly with other employees
who were on strike. Local 40 did not strike, but its members refused to handle
messages which were transmitted to or from companies whose employees
were on strike. When Western Union informed members of Local 40 that
they would be suspended if they failed to handle the messages, the union
asked for arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the employees could
take the course of action they had initiated, and he ordered the company to
reinstate those employees who had been suspended.
The union brought an action to enforce the award, and the Supreme
Court, Special Term, ordered enforcement. On appeal, the Appellate Division
reversed, because the award allowed the employees to pursue a course of
conduct which would violate penal statutes. 56
 The union appealed to the
New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division on the
same grounds.
Thus, the case law which is available appears to support the decision
of the district court in Local 985, but, in the federal labor-law domain, that
case stands alone. The proposition expounded in Local 985 is that where the
award of the arbitrator would, if followed, cause the party against whom it
was issued to breach the penal law of the state, the award will not be en-
forced. The case may, perhaps, be read more deeply in that the courts will
be permitted to go behind the contractual power of the arbitrator to the
merits of the issue before him. If an award is drawn from the essence of
the collective-bargaining agreement, but its enforcement would cause the
party to commit a crime, there would be a clear conflict between the limited
review power of the courts over arbitration proceedings and the duty of
the courts as instruments of public policy and the police power. It seems
clear from Local 985 that the latter duty would prevail.
shows no more clearly that the assignments ordered by the arbitrator would give rise
to a violation of M.S.A. § 28.824 than it does that they would not." Id. at 2101.
54 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949), affirming 274- App. Div. 754, 79 N.Y.S.2d
545, 22 L,R.R.M. 2237 (1948) (per curiam).
55
 274 App. Div. at 754, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 547, 22 L.R.R.M. at 2238.
59




2. Being such clerk, operator, messenger or other employee
	 . . in a
telegraph office shall wilfully refuse or neglect duty to transmit or deliver
messages received at such office , • is punishable by a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment. (Emphasis added.)
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B. Implied Intent to Arbitrate
The preference for arbitration as a solution to the recurring internal
problems of labor and management was illustrated during the Survey year
by a decision of a federal district court in Ohio. UAW v. Defiance Indus.,
Inc.' involved a pension-plan agreement which was to be administered by
a committee of two members from the union, two from the company, and an
impartial chairman who would vote only in case of a deadlock. Employing
its power to .determine whether or not a party to a collective-bargaining
agreement was bound to arbitrate,2 the court held that disputes arising under
the pension plan were in fact subject to arbitration.
The case arose when, in 1961, the company closed its Muncie, Indiana
plant and took the position that the shutdown terminated the pension plan. 3
The union filed the instant suit to compel payments under the plan, claim-
ing that the shutdown alone was not sufficient, under the agreement, to
terminate the plan.4 Thereafter, in 1964, a former employee applied for
pension payments, and an employer-designated member of the pension board
rejected his claim because the employee had failed to comply with a proce-
dural requirement of the plan. The other employer-member apparently agreed
with this ruling, but the two union members of the board disagreed and
asked for the election of an impartial chairman to break the deadlock!'
The request was refused, and the union moved that the court action be stayed
pending arbitration of that dispute, and that the company be required to
arbitrate the employee's claim to pension payments.
The district court granted both of the union's motions. It rejected the
company's contention that because the pension plan had created no final
force in the decisions of the impartial chairman, the parties did not intend
to create an arbitration procedure. The court stated, as an answer to this
contention, that the language of the agreement was mandatory.6 In addition,
the court said:
1 251 F. Supp. 650 (?'.D. Ohio 1966).
2 There is no mention in the court's decision that the pension plan was part of a
larger collective-bargaining agreement.
3 It was not stated in the opinion whether the company had more than the one
plant and, if so, whether its position was that the plan was terminated in all plants.
4 The plan provided:
As amended hereby, said Pension Agreement entered into the first day of Septem-
ber, 1955, shall continue in full force and effect until the 18th day of November,
1962, and from year to year thereafter unless by notice given not less than
sixty (60) days prior to November 18, 1962, either party notifies the other of
its desire to terminate or amend the Agreement.
251 F. Supp. at 651. The company closed the plant and notified the union on April 24,
1961.
5 The agreement provided that such an impartial chairman should "be selected by
mutual agreement of the Company and the Union members of the Board, but shall
vote . only in the event of a deadlock." Id. at 652.
6
 The plan provided:
The Plan shall be administered by a Board of Administration [whose) . . .
members shall serve without compensation from the Trust Fund. An impartial
chairman shall be selected by mutual agreement of the Company and the
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In light of the obvious advantages (economy, expedition, and final-
ity) which arbitration brings to stalemates in the day-to-day ad-
ministration of a pension plan, it would require a strained construc-
tion of the provisions of this contract for the Court to find lacking
an intent to create an arbitration procedure.?
The court held that it was not significant that the power of the impartial
chairman was limited to only a small portion of the pension agreement. It
went on to say that the fact that the agreement did not contain the word
"arbitration" was not important.8
Having thus determined that the agreement did require arbitration,
the court stayed the judicial proceedings pending arbitration. The court
relied upon the case of Smith v. Union Carbide Corp.? in which a court of
appeals held that the district court, which had determined that proper
arbitration procedure had not been used, should have returned the case to
the arbitrators rather than have heard the case itself, de novo.'° The Defiance
court used this case only because the agreement in Union Carbide provided
for a decision as to employee disability by a panel of two physicians. If
they disagreed, a third doctor was to cast the deciding vote. The court of
appeals in Union Carbide labeled this procedure "arbitration," and no
question appears to have been raised as to whether it was in fact arbitra-
tion?'
A more helpful case was cited by the court in Defiance only for the
proposition that the word "arbitration" need not appear in the agreement
in order for it to require arbitration. 12
 This was the Supreme Court decision
in General Drivers, Local 89 v. Riss & Co." In that case the Court reversed
a court of appeals holding that a reinstatement order by a contractually
established joint committee was not entitled to enforcement because it
was not an arbitration award within section 301 of the LMRA." The collec-
tive agreement in Riss provided a grievance procedure which ended with a
decision to be made by a Joint Area Cartage Committee. It specifically stated
that the decision of such committee was final and binding, and provided
penalties for failure to comply. 15 The Sixth Circuit had held that "there is
Union members of the Board, but shall vote at meetings of the Board only in
the event of a deadlock. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid.
7 Id. at 653.
8 Ibid.
9
 350 F.2d 258, 60 L.R.R.M. 2110 (6th Cir. 1965).
10 Cf. Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 475, 63 L.R.R.M. 2361 (D.S.C. 1966),
where the court allowed a trial de novo on the merits after a finding that the arbitration
proceeding had been unfair.
11
 If the parties never raised the issue of whether the procedure in Union Carbide
was arbitration, and the court never discussed it, but merely treated it as arbitration,
there is some question as to the value of the case as precedent for Defiance, which
raises precisely that issue.
12 251 F. Supp. at 653.
is 372 U.S. 517 (1963) (per curiam).
14
 298 F.2d 341, 49 L.R.R.M. 2550 (6th Cir. 1962).
19
 This part of the agreement was quoted but ignored by the court of appeals. Id.
at 342, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2551.
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no finality to this grievance procedure," and thus "the order of the Joint
Area Cartage Committee was not an arbitration award which could be
enforced by the courts„ . .""
In reversing, the Supreme Court stated that "if, as petitioners allege, the
award of the Joint Cartage Committee is under the collective bargaining
agreement final and binding, the District Court has jurisdiction under § 301
to enforce it. . . . "17 (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court recognized that
the word "arbitration" was not necessary to have an enforceable award,"
but it did require that the collective-bargaining agreement make that award
final and binding.
It is not established by the facts of Defiance whether the award of the
board of administration was final and binding under the collective-bargaining
agreement. However, under the explicit holding of Riss, the decision could
not have been in favor of arbitration unless the agreement itself made the
arbitration final and binding. Thus, if the court in Defiance intended to
follow Riss, it must have found evidence that the pension plan did indeed
make the decision of the impartial chairman final and binding. This could
have been the meaning of the court when it referred to the language of the
pension plan as "mandatory." 1 D Perhaps this is sufficient, but the enunciation
of the court is weak when compared with the strong language of the Supreme
Court in Riss.
If, however, the court in Defiance neither found nor required final and
binding force in the decision of the impartial chairman, it has opened the
door to further holdings that parties have agreed to arbitrate in every situa-
tion where arbitration would have "obvious advantages." 20 This would go
well beyond the generally accepted rule that parties may be required to
arbitrate only what they have agreed to arbitrate. This would also greatly
increase the use of arbitration, perhaps in circumstances and instances where
no standards have been provided for arbitration in the relevant collective
agreement. The value of such a rule is difficult to assess and would appear to
be an unwarranted expansion of the arbitration system.
C. Arbitration and Section 303
Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act creates a legal ac-
tion for damages in favor of an employer who is injured by unlawful secon-
dary activity. 1 The question of whether such legal action should be stayed
16
 Ibid.
17 372 U.S. at 519.
1s Ibid.
10 251 F. Supp. at 652.
20
 Id. at 653.
1 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
This section provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an in-
dustry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in
any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 8(b) (4)
of the National Labor Relations Act ... .
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefore in any district court of the
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pending arbitration of the damage claim under a broad arbitration clause
was answered in the negative in Old Dutch Farms, inc. v. Milk Drivers &
Dairy Employees, Local 584.2 The dispute between the parties arose when
the company opened a retail milk depot, and the union, claiming that the
operation of the depot violated the collective-bargaining agreement, 3 sub-
mitted the dispute to arbitration. Subsequently, the union induced work
stoppages among the employees of a neutral employer in an effort to get that
employer to cease doing business with Old Dutch Farms. After a charge
by Old Dutch Farms, the NLRB found this action to be unlawful secondary
activity under sections 8(b) (4) (i)(B) and 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) 4 Shortly there-
after the company began this action to recover damages under section 303.
The union moved to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration of
the damages claim because the claim fell within the broad arbitration clause,
which provided that
any and all disputes and controversies arising under or in connec-
tion with the terms and provisions of this agreement, or in connec-
tion with or relating to the application or interpretation of any of
the terms or provisions hereof, or in respect to anything not herein,
[sic] expressly provided but germane to the subject matter of this
agreement . . . shall be submitted for arbitration to an arbitrator.
5
The district court stayed the court proceedings, holding that the dispute arose
out of the contract relationship because it was based on the "depot" clause
of the contract and because the contract contained a "no-strike" clause. 6
There was no requirement, stated the court, that arbitration be limited to
breaches of contract, as long as there is a "specificity of subject matter"
on which the arbitration could operate.? The district court went on to hold
that the arbitration clause was broad enough to include questions of the
contract relationship as well as of the contract itself.
The company appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed "on the ground that the employer is not precluded
by the arbitration clause . . . from asserting in the district court a claim for
tort damages based on the alleged unlawful secondary activity of the union
and forced to rely upon arbitration for relief." 8 It was up to the court to
United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof
without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having
jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and
the cost of the suit.
2
 359 F.2d 598, 62 L.R.R.M. 2007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
3
 The relevant clause of the collective agreement provided that "it shall be a
violation of this agreement for any party . . . to sell or distribute milk retail from
wholesale trucks or for employers to establish, service, or deliver to depots for the
purpose of distributing or selling milk." Id. at 599 n.1, 62 L.R.RM. at 2008 n.l.
4
 146 N.L.R.B. 509, 55 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1964), enforced, 341 F.2d 29, 58 L.R.R.M.
2290 (2d Cir. 1965).
5
 359 F.2d at 600, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2008.
6
 243 F. Supp. 246, 59 L.R.R.M. 2745 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
7
 Id. at 248, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
8
 359 F.2d at 600, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2008.
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determine whether the company had agreed to arbitrate its tort damage
claim.° The action involved no alleged breach of contract even though it
was based on union activity brought about by the employer's alleged breach
of the "depot" clause of the collective agreementl° The wrongfulness of the
union's secondary activity under section 8(b) (4) was independent of what-
ever company action caused the union to act. Thus, even if an arbitrator
were to find that the company had breached the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, the secondary activity of the union would still be actionable under
section 303 if the employer were "injured in his business or property."
The court went on to say that:
The resolution of the present controversy requires (I) a de-
termination of whether the union violated Section 8(b) (4) of the
NLRA, and (2) an assessment of the actual business injuries sus-
tained by the employer. Courts hardly can be considered less com-
petent than a labor arbitrator . . . to determine whether particular
union activities violate a federal labor statute or to assess the extent
of an employer's business injuries."
In a footnote, the court stated that it was not a prerequisite to a section 303
action that the NLRB give a prior determination that the alleged union
activity was a violation of section 8(b) (4), nor would the courts be bound
by such a determination."' Thus, the court appears to be saying that section
303 tort damage actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts,
which are as competent as the NLRB to determine if unlawful secondary
activity has taken place and as competent as an arbitrator to assess its
effects. The court stated that
this leads to the conclusion that absent a clear, explicit statement in
the collective bargaining contract directing an arbitrator to hear and
9 See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co,, 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962). •
10
 See note 3 supra.
11
 359 F.2d at 602-03, 62 L.R.R.M, at 2010.
12 Id. at 602-03 n.7, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2010 n.7. The court relied on International
Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952), where the Supreme
Court said that "certainly there is nothing in the language of [§ 3031 . which makes
its remedy dependent on any prior administrative determination that an unfair labor
practice has been committed." Id. at 244. The Court pointed out that § 303(a)(4) makes
secondary activity "unlawful for the purpose of this section only." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
This separates the judicial proceedings for damages from the administrative proceedings
under § 8(b) (4).
This, however, does not explain what the effect would be if the NLRB rejected the
contention that certain union activity was a violation of § 8(b)(4), but the court, in
a § 303 suit, determined that it was. In addition, while Local 584 states that the courts
are not bound by a determination of the NLRB that a certain activity is or is not
an unlawful secondary activity, it does not state what the result would be if the court
had made the prior determination; would the NLRB be bound? If the Juneau case is
goad authority, it would seem that the administrative and judicial processes are totally
separate, and that the NLRB would not be bound by a prior determination of a court.
In the recent case of Taube Elec. Contractors v. MEW, Local 349, 63 L.R.R.M.
2502 (S.D. Fla. 1966), the district court held that § 303 provides a remedy in the
courts totally independent of that available from the NLRB under § 8(b)(4). The
court cited Juneau with approval.
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determine the validity of tort damage claims by one party against
another, it must be assumed that the employer did not intend to
forego his rights under Section 303 and that the parties did not
intend to withdraw such disputes from judicial scrutiny. 12
The decision in Local 584, brought down to its most basic and broadest
level, is simply a reiteration of the general rule that a party may not be
required to arbitrate that which he has not agreed to arbitrate. 14
 The tort
damage claim could be made subject to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator, but
only if the parties expressly provided for such a power in their collective-
bargaining agreement. This is quite different from statements made in earlier
decisions that courts should construe arbitration clauses so liberally that all
matters of disagreement should be arbitrated except those matters which the
parties had specifically excluded. 15
 It may be assumed that the difference
results from the fact that a damage remedy is provided by section 303 as a
matter of public law; the parties will thus not be presumed to have intended
any other form of remedy unless they provide for it explicitly. Perhaps if no
statutory remedy were provided, the liberal rule of "arbitrate unless specifi-
cally excluded" would be applied.
D. NLRB Jurisdiction in the Face of Concurrent Arbitration
The question of NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor practices where
there is concurrent arbitration was raised during the Survey year in NLRB v.
Acme Indus. Co. 1
 In this case, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of a
court of appeals which had set aside an order of the NLRB. This order had
compelled the Acme Industrial Company to give to the union, with which it
had a collective-bargaining agreement, certain requested information. The
case arose because of a union claim that the company had refused to give it
information necessary to enable the union to determine whether the company
was violating the collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement had two
clauses which were relevant to the dispute. The first stated that the company
would not subcontract work if it would cause the layoff of employees. 2 The
second permitted employees in one location to move to another location if
the equipment in the plant in which they were employed were moved. 3 In
13
 359 F.2d at 603, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2011.
14 See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 375 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) ; United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
15
 Id. at 581, 584-85.
1
 385 U.S. 432 (1967), reversing 351 F.2d 258, 60 L.R.R.M. 2220 (7th Cir. 1965).
2
 This clause read:
Section 3. It is the Company's general policy not to subcontract work which
is normally performed by employees in the bargaining unit where this will
cause the layoff of employees or prevent the recall of employees who would
normally perform this work for the Company . .
351 F.2d at 259-60, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2220-21.
2
 This clause read:
Section 10. In the event the equipment of the plant or of any department,
entirely or partially, is hereafter moved to another location of the Company,
employees working in the plant or in such department who are subject to re-
duction in classification or layoff as a result thereof may transfer to the new
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1964 the union discovered that the company was removing some equipment
from its plant and asked the reason for such activity. When the company
stated, through its foreman, that no violation of the agreement had taken
place and refused to answer the question, the union filed grievances charging
violation of the contract clauses. After the union had again requested specific
information concerning the move and the company had again refused, the
union filed unfair-labor-practice charges with the NLRB.
The Board found that "the information sought by the Union was neces-
sary in order to enable the Union to evaluate intelligently the grievances
filed and to determine whether such grievances were meritorious, and whether
to press for arbitration."4 Since such a determination was a proper function
of the union, the Board held that the company "has failed to bargain with
the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act." 5 As a result,
the Board ordered the company to cease and desist from this refusal to bar-
gain, and to furnish to the union the necessary information.
The company petitioned the court of appeals to set aside the order of
the Board, and the union cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order. The
court found that the grievances filed by the union under the arbitration
clause of the collective-bargaining agreement were still pending at the time
of the unfair labor-practice hearing. This being the case, the court deter-
mined that federal labor policy, as stated in Section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act° and in United Steelworkers of America v. Ameri-
can Mfg. Co.,' was applicable to actions of the NLRB. Therefore, the court
concluded that
where the determination of the relevancy of information necessarily
involves factors interrelated with or dependent upon construction of
the substantive provisions of the labor agreement, and those provi-
sions are the bases of pending grievances already submitted under
the grievance and arbitration procedures of the agreement, Board
intervention in the guise of determining and enforcing the periph-
eral matter of the duty to furnish information requested contributes
nothing to any objective of the Act and in our opinion is improper.
location with full rights and seniority, unless there is then in existence at the
new location a collective bargaining agreement covering production and main-
tenance employees at such location.
Id. at 260, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2221.
4 150 N.L.R.B. 1463, 1465, 55 L.R.R.M. 1277, 1278 (1965).
5
 Ibid.
6 61 Stat. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964). This section provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
7 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The Supreme Court said:
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the griev-
ance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining
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The order clashes with the policy of effectual achievement of con-
tractual arbitration. 8
The NLRB appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which reversed the
court of appeals. The Court stated that "the only real issue in this case .. .
is whether the Board must await an arbitrator's determination of the rele-
vancy of the requested information before it can enforce the union's statutory
rights under § 8(a) (5)." The Court found that the Board is not in the same
position as the courts, which review the fairness of the arbitration process or
the agreement of the parties to arbitrate: "The relationship of the Board to
the arbitration process is of a quite different order."" Thus, the statements
in United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co." which require a
court to afford a preeminent position to the arbitrator "do not throw much
light on the problem.712
The parts of the LMRA which deal with the powers of the Board shed
more light on the relation between the Board and the collective-bargaining
agreement. Section 8(d) defines rather explicitly the duty to bargain collec-
tively as a duty to discuss questions involving the collective agreement."
Failure of the employer to comply with section 8(d) is an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(a) (5). 14 Finally, section 10(a) gives the NLRB power
to prevent unfair labor practices, such as a refusal to bargain, even though
the agreement between the parties prescribes another means of adjustment.''
Thus, the Court seems to be saying that, while a court must defer to arbitra-
tion because its powers are limited to determining if and what the parties
agreed to arbitrate and to reviewing the award of the arbitrator under certain
circumstances, the Board has jurisdiction, even where there are concurrent
arbitration proceedings, to determine the existence of and the remedy for an
alleged unfair labor practice."
8
 351 F.2d at 261, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2222.
9
 385 U.S. at 436.
10 Ibid.
11 Supra note 7.
12 385 U.S. at 436.
13
 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964):
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the perfor-
mance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to . . . any question arising [under the agreement] . •
14
 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S,C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
18
 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964):
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or other-
wise . . . •
18 it is important to note that in this case the issue did not concern the existence
of a contractual defense to an unfair-labor-practice charge. In a case decided with
Acme, NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967), the Supreme Court held
that the Board could examine the contract to determine the merits of such an alleged
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Alternatively, the Court decided that even if the arbitrator's preemi-
nence under American Mfg. Co. 17 applied to the Board as well as to the
courts, "that policy would not require the Board to abstain here." 18 The
order of the NLRB that the company deliver information to the union was
not "a binding construction of the labor contract. [The Board] . . . was only
acting upon the probability that the desired information was relevant, and
that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and
responsibilties. 71° Since the Board was in no way determining the merits of
the dispute, the prerogative of the arbitrator on those substantive issues was
unhampered. In fact, the Board was aiding the arbitration procedure by per-
mitting the union to effectively and knowledgeably evaluate the problem in
order to determine whether it could or should use the arbitration process.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that it was an unfair labor practice,
within the domain of the Board, for an employer to refuse to give to the union
information necessary for it to determine whether the company had violated
contract clauses and was thereby subject to arbitration proceedings. The
Court used two grounds. First, the LMRA itself provided that the NLRB
had such jurisdiction. 20 By analogy, it is settled that if an act is both an
unfair labor practice and a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement,
the Board is not deprived of jurisdiction because the courts have concurrent
jurisdiction; 21 similarly, it would seem that the Board would be equally com-
petent to deal with an unfair labor practice which is itself subject to arbitra-
tion or which derives from a collateral issue which is arbitrable. Second, the
action which was an unfair labor practice in this case was the refusal to give
the union the information required to properly fulfill its role in the arbitra-
tion process; it was not the same as the alleged breach of contract. The
latter was the moving of equipment in violation of the contract. The NLRB
did not interpret the contract to see if it had been breached; it merely or-
dered the employer to make available to the union information upon which
the union could make that decision and bring the issue to arbitration. The
issues which the Board had to decide were not the same as those which the
arbitrator had to decide, and thus no reason to await arbitration existed.
defense. In C & C, however, there was no arbitration clause covering the dispute. There-
fore the decision did not determine the relationship between the Board and an arbitrator,
but between the Board and the courts as to the contract defense. For an expanded
analysis of the questions raised and treated by these two cases, see p. 997 infra.
17 Supra note 7.
18 385 U.S. at 437.
19 Ibid.
20 This jurisdiction has also been recognized by the NLRB. See International
Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1156 (1962), where the Board
said:
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating
unfair labor practice charges even though they might have been the subject
of an arbitration proceeding and award. Section 10(a) of the Act expressly
makes this plain, and the courts have uniformly so held.
21 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), held that, where an unfair
labor practice was also a breach of contract, it is within the domain of the courts and
not preempted by NLRB jurisdiction, but it did not say that the NLRB was deprived
of jurisdiction.
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V. SEcnoNT 301 SUITS
A. Right of an Individual Employee to Sue
During the current Survey year several important cases were decided
concerning the right of an individual employee to bring suits against his
employer,' his collective-bargaining representative, 2
 or both.' The employee's
right to sue his employer is a new aspect of labor law and is just beginning
to develop, whereas the union's duty of fair representation and the employee's
right to sue to enforce that duty have long been recognized. 4
 However, the
courts have been deciding this latter form of action under section 301 5 only
recently.° It was not until the Supreme Court decided that an individual
employee could sue his employer for breach of a collective-bargaining contract
under section 301 7
 that the courts began to place actions against the unions
into the same category. It appears that this trend may have recently reached
a peak. The best way to study the process is to look at each line of devel-
opment separately—first, individual suits against employers, and then suits
against the unions for breach of their duty of fair representation.
1. Individual Suits Against the Employer
In 1962 the Supreme Court heIds that an individual employee has the
right to sue his employer for breach of contract under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act.° In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 1°
decided in 1965, the Court restricted that right to employees who have at-
tempted to use the grievance procedures established in the collective-bargain-
ing agreement." During this Survey year, the Fifth Circuit has further
limited the individual's right to sue under section 301.
In Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,12 an employee who
• Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 62 L.R.R.M. 2389
(5th Cir, 1966).
2 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
3 Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 475, 63 L.R.R.M. 2361 (D.S.C. 1966).
4 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R,,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
• LMRA § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
• See Vaca v. Sipes, supra note 2; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
7 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
8 Ibid.
9 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). This section provides that:
suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
10 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
11 The Court said:
As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy
requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must
attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by the employer
and union as the mode of redress. If the union refuses to press or only per-




 362 F.2d 414, 62 L.R.R.M. 2389 (5th Cir. 1966).
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had been discharged during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement
sued his former employer for wrongful discharge in an Alabama state court.
The employer removed the action to the federal district court under section
301 and defended on the basis that the grievance procedure provided in the
collective-bargaining agreement was exclusive and, therefore, that the em-
ployee could have no recourse to the courts.
The grievance procedure prescribed in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment covered employee discharges and involved a four-step process. The
last step required that the union representative meet with the plant manager
to discuss the grievance, after which the plant manager was to render a deci-
sion. This decision would be "final and binding upon all parties involved,
unless the International Vice-President of the Union notifies the Plant
Manager . .. of the Union's intentions to strike in protest of such deci-
sion . . . 13 It was assumed by the court that the plaintiff had exhausted
the remedies provided in the collective-bargaining agreement. 14
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim on the ground that the remedy in the collective-bargaining agreement
was exclusive and final, and thus was a good defense to any individual
action brought in a court. " [W]hen a dispute arises within the scope of
a collective bargaining agreement, the parties are relegated to the remedies
which they provided in their agreement." 15
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit relied upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Maddox and upon basic federal labor policy. It noted that
in Maddox the employee had not exhausted his contractual remedies and the
grievance procedure provided therein for final and binding arbitration. Al-
though Maddox involved an arbitration provision, the court said that this
was not a significant difference, because basic federal labor policy favored
the use of private remedies," and arbitration was only one such remedy.
The basic question in the Haynes case was whether Maddox supported
the plaintiff's contention that once the contractual grievance procedure had
been exhausted, the courts were available for individual suits even if the
contract remedies were intended to be exclusive. The Fifth Circuit answered
that exhaustion of grievance procedures made no difference and that im-
plications in Maddox to the contrary were not compelling.iT
A close examination of Maddox can lead one to the conclusion that the
reasons for allowing an individual suit in Haynes are more compelling than
the Fifth Circuit considered them to be. The language in Maddox is broad
13 Id. at 415-16, 62 L.R.R.M• at 2390. It might be argued from the wording that
if notification of a strike is given, the decision of the plant manager is not final, and
further steps are contemplated. This follows from the fact that the plant manager's
decision is final "unless" notification of an intent to strike is given.
14 Id. at 417, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2391. The final step, notification by the International
Vice-President of intent to strike, had not been taken.
13 Ibid.
10 Ibid. The basic federal policy referred to is enunciated in LMRA § 203(d), 61
Stat. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964), which states that "final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement,"
17 362 F.2d at 417-18, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2391. •
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and speaks of the necessity for "exclusive" grievance procedures," of the
importance of having the union represent the employees in grievance claims
rather than having each employee sue the employer," and of the require-
ments of federal law. 2° Nevertheless, the broad language in Maddox is not
totally in support of the Haynes result, because the Maddox decision re-
quires only that the employees "attempt use of the contract grievance
procedure."21
 It speaks of the dangers of permitting the employee "to com-
pletely sidestep available grievance procedures."22 (Emphasis added.) Finally,
the Court stated that the employee's "suit in the present case is simply on
the contract, and the remedy sought . . . did not differ from any that the
grievance procedure had power to provide." 22 Coupling these statements with
the fact that there was an arbitration agreement in Maddox could lead to
the conclusion that, despite broad language throughout the opinion, the
Court was concerned only with a contract containing arbitration as a part
of the grievance procedure. In addition, it should be remembered that Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n, 24
 the case which first recognized the individual
right to sue under section 301, noted that "there was no grievance arbitra-
tion procedure in this contract which had to be exhausted before recourse
could be had to the courts." 25
 (Emphasis added.) It would seem that Smith
recognized the need for individual suits in the absence of arbitration.
What the Fifth Circuit is saying, in essence, is that the employer and
the union may eradicate the individual employee's right to sue under Smith
by merely making exclusive whatever grievance procedures appear in the
contract. While Maddox, read literally, merely requires the individual em-
ployee to attempt to exhaust his contractual remedies, Haynes goes farther
and states that, as long as those remedies have been made exclusive in the
collective-bargaining contract, the employee is bound by them alone. This
point of view is definitely consistent with statements of various commentators
concerning the purposes of collective bargaining. 25
 These writers feel that the
labor laws are explicitly designed to prevent "the workingman's handicap in
seeking fair and equitable terms of employment through individual dealings
with his employer . . . 
. "27 By requiring dealings on an employer-to-union
basis, the inequities are to be reduced or eliminated. Once this balance of
power has been established, to permit the individual employee to sue the
employer each time he disagrees with his union's handling of a problem
is 379 U.S. at 653.
15 Id. at 656.
20 Id. at 655. The Court refers to the requirement that federal Iaw be applied in
§ 301 suits, and federal laws express a policy favoring private settlement.
21
 Id. at 652.
22
 Id. at 653. See also Vaca v. Sipes, supra note 2, at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
23
 374 U.S. at 657.
24
 Supra note 7.
25
 Id. at 196 n.1. See also Wyle, Labor Arbitration and the Concept of Exclusive
Representation, 7 B.C, Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 783, 796 (1966), wherein the footnote by
the Court in Maddox is noted as significant.
26
 See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956); Wyle,
supra note 25.
27 Wyle, supra note 25, at 783-84. LMRA § I, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1964), states the federal policy concerning the laborer's bargaining disadvantage.
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would undermine its effectiveness. 28 The employer would be less concerned
with union demands than with individual grievances, and the whole balance
favored by the overriding federal labor policy would be destroyed.
Despite the merit of this argument, however, in certain instances it
would seem inequitable to leave the aggrieved individual employee without
a remedy beyond that which his union and employer see fit to provide for
him. Such is the Haynes type of situation, where the employee is bound by
the decision of the plant manager. This is far different from submitting a
dispute to a neutral person or board. The former procedure naturally leads
to a decision by an interested party. In the latter procedure the employee
will be given a hearing by disinterested officials unassociated with the ulti-
mate effects of their decisions. 29 The lack of stature of a single employee
does not limit his right to have a remedy. It is true that the individual em-
ployee cannot compel arbitration," but a union is more likely to take an
individual grievance to arbitration than to strike over it. However, in the
Haynes situation the employee is at the mercy of a possibly biased official
and cannot have his decision reviewed in any court, no matter how wrong it
may be, as long as it is reasonably fair and within the power of the decision
maker.31 The only recourse is the drastic one of successfully inducing the
union to strike, but, since unions are not likely to strike too often in
behalf of the complaints of one member, that avenue is largely ineffective.
In fact, if a union were to strike, it would be a result exactly contrary to
the theories of "industrial peace" surrounding federal labor law." Thus,
for the court in Ilaynes to rely on the broad language in Maddox as to the
exclusiveness of contract remedies, and yet to neglect the matter of neutral
arbitration—a basic factor in determining the fairness of the settlement
procedure—was to ignore that which should have been a significant con-
sideration.
The court in Ilaynes did allude to a possible exception to the rule of
exclusivity of remedy which it had laid down. It stated that the "appellant
does not contend that the union did not faithfully represent him. . . He
does not charge fraud on the part of either the company or the union."83
This statement intimates that had the employee been able to allege such
activity, he might have been permitted to go into court even if the contract
remedies were exclusive. This is consistent with a similar statement in
28 One of the most vital parts of the balance of power is the private-settlement provi-
sions of the usual collective-bargaining contract. One type of private settlement is
arbitration. "If the individual employee could compel arbitration of his grievance regard-
less of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the contract would be substan-
tially undermined. . . ." Vaca v. Sipes, supra note 2, at 191.
28 The decision of an arbitrator may be reviewed by a court only to determine
if it is unfair or not within the power of the arbitrator. United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Very likely the decision of the
plant manager is subject to the same review. It is basically the personal interests which
differentiate the two forms of grievance procedure.
Bo Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 52 L.R.R.M,
2038 (2d Cir, 1962).
al See note 29 supra.
32 See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S, 448, 455 (1957).
33 362 F.2d at 418, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2392.
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Maddox that "if the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses
the individual's claim, differences may arise as to the forms of redress then
available.”"4
The clear inference from such dicta is that an employee who wishes to
bring an individual breach-of-contract suit against his employer will be
unable to do so as long as the contract grievance procedures have been made
exclusive—unless he can show that there has been some form of fraud on
the part of the union or of the employer or that the union has breached its
duty of fair representation, thus preventing his full and free use of the
contract procedures. The clearest statement of this inference in a suit against
an employer has been in the recent case of Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc.35
In Thrift the employee was discharged and exhausted all the procedures
provided in the collective-bargaining agreement, including arbitration. He
then brought suit in a federal district court against both the employer and
the union. In seeking damages for wrongful discharge, Thrift alleged that
at the arbitration stage the employer had presented evidence against him
which both the union and the employer knew to be false. He further alleged
that the union had refused to offer available evidence to refute the charges.
These allegations amounted to a charge of collusion between the union and
employer to prevent the employee from receiving a fair hearing at the arbitra-
tion proceeding. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
This fact situation is essentially quite similar to that in Haynes, the
primary difference being the plaintiff-employee's allegation of collusion
which prevented his effective use of the grievance procedures provided in
the collective-bargaining agreement. The district court denied the defendant
company's motion to dismiss:
IT]he allegations of plaintiff, if only to the effect that the decision
reached by virtue of the grievance procedure was erroneous, would
not suffice. But plaintiff has proceeded to accuse defendants of using
false information and withholding other pertinent information
in violation of his rights to have fair and nondiscriminatory treat-
ment when he resorted to grievance procedures. If these rights have
been denied him, he has a cause, and this he has alleged."
Thus, under Thrift, in an action for damages for wrongful discharge, an
employee will have a right to sue his employer regardless of the exclusive-
ness of the contract grievance procedure if his bargaining representative and
employer collude to prevent him from fairly using the available contract
remedies."?
34 379 U.S. at 652.
35
 256 F. Supp. 475, 63 L.R.R.M. 2361 (D.S.C. 1966).
:la Id. at 477, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
37
 There is a procedural problem raised by the decision in Thrift. It seems that,
having found that the union and employer colluded in the arbitration proceeding, the
court would order the arbitration redone—fairly. The arbitration procedure is itself
inherently fair, and the unfairness of the participating parties could be cured by re-
quiring the union and employer to act fairly. In Thrift, however, the court retained
jurisdiction.
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In both Thrift and Haynes, the discharged employees were dissatisfied
with the final results of the grievance procedures provided by the collective-
bargaining agreements, and both sought further relief in the courts. Because
Thrift alleged that the union and employer had acted improperly during the
grievance procedures, he was able to transfer his grievance to a cause of ac-
tion in the courts. Haynes, however, failed to allege similar facts, and his
claim was dismissed. It seems that the current status of individual suits
under section 301 is that the contract grievance procedures are final if so
declared, unless the employee can allege actions by the employer or by the
union or by both which prevent the fair operation of those procedures.
The Maddox decision was the subject of judicial discussion in another
aspect of labor law. In Walker v. Southern Ry.,38 the Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, decided explicitly that the Maddox requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to individual suits under
the Railway Labor Act, and reversed a contrary holding by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuits° While this holding deals with the Railway
Labor Act and is thus outside the traditional scope of this Survey, it is dis-
cussed because of its association with Maddox.
The facts40 of Walker are again similar to the Haynes decision. The
plaintiff was a fireman for defendant railroad company. In 1957 he was
displaced by another with greater seniority. Plaintiff thereupon left work and
remained away until, allegedly, just before his seniority expired. The rail-
road claimed that his seniority had run out, and he brought this suit for
wrongful discharge.41 The district court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and
the defendant railroad appealed, contending that the district court had no
jurisdiction because plaintiff had not pursued the grievance procedures
established in the collective-bargaining agreement. The court of appeals
reversed the district court, stating:
At the time of the District Court's decision the law clearly per-
mitted an immediate suit by a discharged employee against his rail-
road for a breach of the collective agreement. • . . But closely
following the entry of judgment in this action, the Supreme Court
decided [Maddox]. . . Although that case did not deal with a
railroad employee, nevertheless we read the opinion as requiring
in our case an exhaustion of remedies both under the collective
bargaining and before the Adjustment Board prior to suit.
True, the [Maddox] . . . opinion observed that the Court did
In Haynes and similar situations, the process has within itself the making of bias
and lack of fairness, because the decision is made by an interested party. The courts
should probably be more careful in this type of situation and retain jurisdiction to
hear the merits.
38 385 U.S, 196 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1020 (1967).
n9 354 F.2d 950, 61 L.R.R.M. 2102 (4th Cir. 1965).
4 ° The facts are taken from the opinion of the court of appeals. Ibid.
41 The running of seniority refers to the length of time a displaced employee will
retain a place on the recall list in accordance with his seniority.
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not mean to overrule Moore v. Illinois Central R.R. . . . but the
ratio decidendi embraces the instant controversy. 42
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit on two basic grounds.'"
First, in individual suits under the Labor Management Relations Act, the
exclusive contract grievance procedure has been voluntarily entered into by
the parties, while "provision for arbitration of a discharge grievance, a
minor dispute, is not a matter of voluntary agreement under the Railway
Labor Act; the Act compels the parties to arbitrate. . .."44 Second, there
was great dissatisfaction with the length of time it could take to arbitrate
such a dispute.
To the reader sympathetic to the plight of the individual claimant
under section 301, these reasons seem hardly sufficient to distinguish the
two basic situations except in form. The federal policy favoring arbitration
is so strong in the nonrailway-labor field that it might easily be said to be
more compulsory than not, 45 even though not specifically embodied in the
statute. In any event, like the individual plaintiff under the Railway Labor
Act, the individual plaintiff under section 301 rarely, if ever, has any say as
to whether he wishes voluntarily to exclude his right to sue in favor
of an exclusive contract grievance procedure. Finally, it seems somewhat
anomalous that the railway employee, who is specifically required by statute
to arbitrate his discharge, may sue for damages if he chooses not to arbitrate,
while his brother under the LMRA, who is not bound by any such statutory
requirement, is denied an equal right.
2. Individual Suits Against the Union
The recent developments in private suits against employers have been
paralleled by developments in the individual's right to sue his collective-
bargaining representative for breach of the duty of fair representation. This
cause of action began in 1944 when, in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 45
the Supreme Court answered affirmatively the question
whether the Railway Labor Act . . . imposes on a labor organiza-
tion, acting by authority of the statute as the exclusive bargaining
representative of a craft or class of railway employees, the duty to
represent all of the employees in the craft without discrimination
because of their race, and, if so, whether the courts have jurisdic-
tion to protect the minority of the craft or class from the violation
of such obligation. 47
42 354 F.2d at 951, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2103.
43 There was a strong dissent by three Justices who felt that Maddox was con-
trolling. 385 U.S. at 199 (Harlan, Stewart, & White, JJ., dissenting).
44 Id. at 198.
45 See UAW v. Defiance Indus., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 650, 62 L.R.R.M, 2002 (N.D.
Ohio 1966), where an arbitration agreement was read into a collective-bargaining agree-
ment which did not, by its terms, contain one. This case is discussed pp. 821-23 supra.
46
 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
47 Id. at 193-94.
836
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
Negro employees of the railroad had brought suit, alleging that the union,
to which they were denied membership solely on the grounds of race, had
agreed with the employer to eliminate Negroes from the latter's rosters.
The Supreme Court held that the Railway Labor Act made the union the
exclusive bargaining agent for all members of the relevant bargaining unit;
this included Negroes ineligible for membership. The result of such a grant of
power is
not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional
limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate
against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also
under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those
rights. 48
Like a legislature, the union must fairly represent the interests not only of
those who are members of the majority, but also of all those who lost their
individual rights to bargain when the union became the exclusive bargain-
ing agent." It must "represent non-union or minority union members of the
craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.""
The Court concluded that this "duty which the statute imposes . . . con-
templates resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of
damages when appropriate for breach of that duty." 54
Thus, the Supreme Court construed the statutory requirement that the
majority union be the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees in the
relevant unit so that it included a positive, enforceable duty to represent
all of those employees fairly and in good faith. In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,"
the Court applied this same rationale to unions subject to the National
Labor Relations Act." Under both the NLRA and the RLA, the union is
required to meet these high standards because the minority, nonunion
employees are prohibited by law from choosing a representative of their
own. Since this is the case, the minority members must be entitled to rely
upon the majority's fair representation of their minority interests. In addi-
tion, the Court has recognized that the existence of the duty confers a federal
right upon the minority employees to seek enforcement. 54 This federal right
is based only upon the breach of a duty of fair representation, and no
statutory authorization to sue is needed.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 55 the Supreme Court continued to
recognize the right of an individual to bring suit against a union for breach
of the duty of fair representation. It permitted a suit by an employee who
claimed that he had been discriminated against by the union's acceptance
of provisions in a collective-bargaining contract which reduced his ranking
on the seniority roster. Again, no statute permitting such a suit was involved.
48
 Id. at 198.
49 Id. at 202.
50
 Id. at 204.
51 Id. at 207.
52
 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
53 Id. at 255.
54 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., supra note 46, at 204.
55
 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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The right to sue was, for all practical purposes, a federal common-law
right, unquestioned by the Court. Similar actions were permitted on the
strength of Huffman in Trotter v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry.
Employees 4" and in Pekar v. Local 181, Int'l Union of United Brewery
Workers  .51
In 1962, in Miranda Fuel Co.," the National Labor Relations Board
concluded that the labor organization's breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion is a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A)." The Board based its decision
on "the 'right' guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act 'to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing.' " 6° This provision
gives employees "the right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious
treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent."" The clear meaning of this
holding is that a union's breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice. Thus it is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB
under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon." 2
Although the NLRB's order in Miranda was denied enforcement by the
Second Circuit, 6 ' the Board has continued to hold that it has jurisdiction in
such cases." In addition, in Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 65
the Fifth Circuit has supported the Board's Miranda decision.
In response to the Miranda decision of the NLRB, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed court jurisdiction over breach of the duty of fair representation
cases. In Humphrey v. Moore," Mr. Justice White, for the majority, dealt
with a charge by an employee that the exclusive bargaining agent had
deceived him concerning his rights to job and seniority and had "deceitfully
connived with the E & L drivers and with the International union to deprive
Moore and others of their employment rights. . . ." 61 The majority held
that "these allegations are sufficient to charge a breach of duty by the
union,"°8
 and that "this action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor
5G 309 F.2d 584, 51 L.R.R.M. 2424 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943
(1963).
57 311 F.2d 628, 52 L.R,R.M. 2123 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 912
(1963).
58
 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172,
54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963).
56
 61 Stat 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C, § 158(6) (1) (A) (1964). This section provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents—(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 of this title. .
430
 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
61 Ibid.
62 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Court therein said: "When an activity is arguably
subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to
the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board .. . ." Id. at 245.
63
 Supra note 58.
64
 Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964).
65
 368 F.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395 (5th Cir. 1966). See also NLRB v. Local 1367,
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 368 F.2d 1010, 63 L.R.R.M. 2559 (5th Cir. 1966) (per
curiam). Local 12 and its unfair-labor-practice aspects are discussed pp. 883-84 infra.
66 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
67
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Management Relations Act."" This being the case, the Court could apply the
doctrine of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n" that an unfair labor practice
which is also a breach of contract is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the NLRB, but is also subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. 71 The Court
in Humphrey thus assumed jurisdiction by stating that:
Although there are differing views on whether a violation of the
duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under the
Labor Management Relations Act, it is not necessary for us to re-
solve that difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be, an un-
fair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's discharge
would violate the contract and was therefore within the cognizance
of federal and state courts. . . . 72
Basically, Humphrey dealt with a situation in which one local union
represented the employees of two companies which transported new auto-
mobiles for the Ford Motor Company in Louisville, Kentucky. When in-
formed by Ford that there was room for only one such company, the two
agreed, in effect, to an absorption of one by the other. Employees of the
absorbing .company, including Moore, asked their union how this would
affect their job and seniority status. They were informed that the employees
of the absorbed company could not transfer, and that the status of the
employees of the absorbing company was protected. At a subsequent meeting
of a contractually established joint committee of the union and employer,
it was agreed that the employees of the absorbed company could in fact
transfer and maintain their seniority. As a result of this, employees of the
absorbing company with less seniority than transferring employees were
discharged; Moore was one of those discharged. 1t was in this fact situation
that the majority found a section 301 breach-of-contract action. The result
is hard to understand" or explain. 14 In view of the time at which the case
appeared" and the implications in it, one is left with the clear impression
that it was the Court's purpose to let the NLRB know that actions of this
kind were to remain within the jurisdiction of state and federal courts. Even
granting this, however, the facts of the case would have to be severely
69 Ibid.
70 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
71
 Id. at 197.
72 375 U.S. at 344.
73 In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg said:
I do not . . . agree that Moore stated a cause of action under § 301(a) . . .
It is my view rather that Moore's claim must be treated as an individual
employee's action for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation .
Id. at 351.
74 See Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L.
Rev. 373, 387 (1965):
Humphrey might be interpreted to mean that where a cause of action other-
wise is alleged under 301, then the fair representation issue may also be litigated
in the nature of ancillary jurisdiction. Or Humphrey might be interpreted to
mean that 301 includes the fair representation claim when it is alleged that
such unfair representation has resulted in a breach of the contract.
75 The case appeared just after the NLRB persisted in applying its Miranda Fuel
doctrine despite the denial of enforcement by the Second Circuit.
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strained to find a breach of contract upon which to base a section 301 action.
The breach of contract would be most easily found if the duty of fair repre-
sentation could be read into the collective-bargaining contract. 79 This seems
very close to what the Court is doing in Humphrey, although it is certainly
not explicit.
Ultimately, once it passed this jurisdictional problem, the Court reverted
to the essential rationales of the Steele-Wallace line of cases. It found that
the union had acted honestly and in good faith as had been required since
the Steele decision in 1944. Thus, the same criteria of good faith and lack of
arbitrariness were used under section 301 as had been used for twenty years
without it.
The lack of a clear meaning in Humphrey prompted the Eighth Circuit
during this Survey year to accept one of the possible conclusions available to
it.77
 In Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc.," the court of appeals
held that charges that a union had conspired and colluded with the employer
in bad faith, to the detriment of the employees, were not based on a collective-
bargaining agreement, and consequently were within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRB. The plaintiffs were former employees of defendant company
who were seeking damages for the company's breach of the collective-
bargaining agreement. They further alleged that the collective agreement had
been collusively arranged by the defendant union. The agreement in ques-
tion was negotiated to end a strike and contained a provision recognizing
the right of the company to close its plant and terminate employees during
the contract period. Termination allowances were to be paid only if the
plant were closed during the term of the current contract. The company
terminated employees and closed the plant the day the agreement ran out,
and the plaintiff brought this action.
The federal district court dismissed the action, 79 and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, distinguishing the case from Humphrey v. Moore because, "un-
like Moore ... plaintiffs' allegations here are not contract oriented and not,
therefore, 'within the cognizance of federal and state courts.' " 8° (Emphasis
added.) Since the allegations
were not predicated upon the collective bargaining agreement so as
to give the court jurisdiction under § 301, but rather looked beyond
the agreement to the exclusive bargaining representatives' obligation
76 One may ask at this point what difference it makes whether the court has
jurisdiction of the unfair representation claim under 301 or, as it always has
in the past, under the rationale of Steele and its progeny. The answer, I think,
may be found in the preemption doctrine. . . . If the duty of fair representa-
tion is derived solely from the NLRA, and if the Board's Miranda-Hughes Tool
doctrine is upheld, then arguably the Board's jurisdiction would be exclusive
under the rule of the Garman case. On the other hand, if the duty to repre-
sent fairly can be derived from the contract, the courts would retain their
301 jurisdiction.
Murphy, supra note 74, at 387.
77 See ibid.
78
 365 F.2d 448, 63 L.R.R.M. 2087 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S, 957
(1967).
79 243 F. Supp, 755, 60 L.R.R.M. 2295 (E.D. Mo. 1965),
80 365 F.2d at 456, 63 L.R,R.M. at 2093.
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of fair representation, they were] . . . within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the National Labor Relations Board. 81
Thus, the court was assuming that Humphrey did require some relation
to the contract in the union's activities, but it failed to define just what it
meant by "contract oriented." Obviously it did not mean bad faith in
negotiating the contract, for that is exactly what the plaintiffs alleged. They
had alleged a breach of contract, but the Eighth Circuit found only an
allegation of a breach of the duty of fair representation, and this, it ruled,
was for the NLRB.
On February 27, 1967, Mr. Justice White and the Supreme Court again
attempted to explain how and why an employee's suit against his labor
representative for breach of the duty of fair representation could avoid
falling subject to the Garman preemption doctrine. In Vaca v. Sipes, 82 the
Court combined the questions of suits against employers and suits against
labor organizations. It stated that "the problem . . . is to determine under
what circumstances the individual employee may obtain judicial review of
his breach-of-contract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the
contractual remedial procedures." 83 Yet, the suit was against the union.
The case arose when an employee of Swift & Company was discharged.
He had been suffering from high blood pressure and had been on sick leave
in a hospital. Upon release from the hospital, he was certified by his family
physician as fit to resume work. The company doctor, however, refused to
so certify him, and the employee was permanently discharged. The employee
sought to use the union grievance procedure, and the union processed the
grievance up to the last step—arbitration. It refused to go further because a
doctor, which the union had retained to examine the employee, had concurred
with the company doctor that the employee was not sufficiently recovered to
work. It was at this point that the employee brought two suits in a state
court of Missouri. One suit was against the union, and one was against the
employer; both were for damages for wrongful discharge.
The union defended on the ground that the courts had no jurisdiction
because the charge was arguably an unfair labor practice and subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The lower court overturned a jury
verdict for the plaintiff-employee on that ground, but the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed and reinstated the jury verdict.
While reversing on the ground that federal law should be applied,84 the
81
 Ibid. In so ruling, the court appears to be upholding the Board's Miranda
doctrine. It is one thing to say that the suit is not contract-oriented and therefore not
properly brought under § 301. It is quite another thing, however, to say that the
allegations are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. To reach the latter con-
clusion, the court must be holding that the breach of duty was an unfair labor practice,
but the court does not articulate this step.
82
 386 U.S. 171 (1967). For the purposes of its decision, the Court assumed that
a breach of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice. Id. at 186. For'
a discussion of the unfair-labor-practice implications, see pp. 884-85 infra.
83
 Id. at 185.
84
 The state court had decided that a mere failure by the union to take a dispute
to arbitration breached its duty of fair representation if the employee had in fact been
wrongfully discharged. Under the applicable federal law, the Supreme Court said, it
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Supreme Court held that the state court had correctly determined that the
cause of action was within the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts.
Affirming state court jurisdiction, the Court addressed itself to both the
Miranda and Garmon doctrines. As to the Garmon preemption doctrine,
the Court stated that it "has never been rigidly applied to cases where it
could not fairly be inferred that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to
lie with the NLRB."85 The Court later added:
A primary justification for the pre-emption doctrine—the need
to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations
area and the desirability of leaving the development of such rules
to the administrative agency created by Congress for that purpose—
is not applicable to cases involving alleged breaches of the union
duty of fair representation. 8°
Since decisions in such cases usually require a study of the substantive issues
involved in the union negotiations and grievance handling, it cannot be said
that the NLRB is more competent to deal with them than the courts. In
addition, the NLRB "General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse
to institute an unfair labor practice complaint." 87 Thus, the employee could
be successfully stymied in his attempt to get redress of his grievance.
The Court then proceeded to explain why a suit for breach of the duty of
fair representation should at least be analogized to a standard section 301
suit. "[T]he fact is that the question of whether a union has breached its
duty of fair representation will in many cases be a critical issue in a suit
under L.M.R.A. § 301 charging an employer with a breach of contract." 88
Since the Maddox doctrine will deny an employee access to the court if he
fails to attempt to exhaust his contractual remedies," a union can totally
prevent his obtaining redress by refusing to process his grievance through
all of the required steps."
[INT] e think the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an
action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the
failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee
can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of
fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance.° 1
An employee's suit against his employer is no less a section 301 action be-
must also be shown that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in processing the
employee's grievance. Id. at 193-94.
8 5
 Id. at 179.
86 Id. at 180-81.
87 Id. at 182.
88 Id. at 183.
89
 But cf. Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 62 L.R.R.M,
2389 (5th Cir. 1966), discussed pp. 830-34 supra. The Haynes court seems to have read
out the word "attempt."
00
 The Court expressed strong doubts "that Congress, in conferring upon employers
and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures, intended to confer upon
unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach
of contract." 386 U.S. at 186.
In ibid.
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cause the employee must prove a breach of duty by the union in order to get
into court. "[T]he result should be no different if the employee . . sues
the employer and the union in separate actions." 92
Thus, the Supreme Court has taken positions on two basic questions.
First, it appears to have held that a breach of the duty of fair representation
is within the jurisdiction of the courts, at least where there is also a section
301 suit against the employer.93 This would be so even if it were assumed
that such a breach of duty were also an unfair labor practice." Thus, the
Board's Miranda doctrine has been overruled at least in part." Second, the
Court seems to have retreated somewhat from its Humphrey v. Moore deci-
sion that a suit for breach of the duty of fair representation is a section 301
action. Vaca v. Sipes would require that the suit against the union at least
be accompanied by a concurrent section 301 suit against the employer. This
is more in keeping with the language of section 301, which speaks of "viola-
tion of contracts."" By its new holding, the Court avoids such questions as
whether, if a suit against the union were under section 301, the Maddox
exhaustion rule would be applicable. But it leaves open the problem of the
suit by an employee against his union when such suit is unassociated with a
section 301 action against the employer. Arguably this would still be subject
to the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
B. Statutes of Limitations in Section 301 Cases
In his dissent in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,' Mr. Justice Black
worried that "by permitting unfair labor practice claimants to choose whether
they will seek relief in the courts [under section 301] . . . or before the
Board, "2 the Court would defeat the congressional policy which had been
embodied in the six-month statute of limitations for filing a charge alleging
an unfair labor practice. 3 He felt that, "by permitting suits like this one to
92 Id. at 187.
93
 The Court reasoned that
the employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach of [the bargaining]
. agreement, a breach which could be remedied through the grievance process
to the employee-plaintiff's benefit were it not for the union's breach of its
statutory duty of fair representation to the employee. To leave the employee
remediless in such circumstances would, in our opinion, be a great injustice.
Id. at 185-86.
'4 Id. at 186.
115 The concurring Justices, Fortas, Warren, and Harlan, would apply the Miranda
and Garman doctrines because a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice, and is not a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement.
LMRA § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
1 371 U.S. 195, 201 (1962). This was the first case to hold that an individual em-
ployee could sue his employer for breach of the collective-bargaining agreement under
§ 301.
2
 Id. at 202.
3
 LMRA § 10(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), reads in part as
follows:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, the Board ... shall have power to issue and
cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that
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be filed, it is now not only possible but highly probable that unfair labor
practice disputes will hang on like festering sores that grow worse and worse
with the years. "4
On March 24, 1966, a majority of six Justices, including justice Black,
held in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. 5
 that the statute of limitations to
be applied to section 301 suits is the appropriate state statute. The case
arose between the union and the employer over a collective-bargaining
agreement which provided that employees who qualified for a vacation but
were terminated before they took it would receive the accrued vacation pay
upon termination. The company refused to make payments required by this
clause. The employees brought a class action in an Indiana state court in
1958 to recover the amounts due, but this was dismissed as an impermissible
class action under state law. The employees then assigned their claims to
the union, which also filed a complaint in the state court; this too was dis-
missed. In 1960 the employees again tried a class action and again failed. 6
Finally, four years later, and seven years after the employees had been
terminated, the union brought the instant suit in the federal district court in
Indiana.?
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the contract was
a hybrid of the oral employment contract and the written collective-
bargaining agreement, and thus was governed by the Indiana statute of
limitations for contracts not in writing. 8 As such, it was barred because
brought more than six years from the date the cause of action arose.° The
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 1°
and then by the U.S. Supreme Court."
Before the Supreme Court, the union argued that the decision in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills' required the application of federal law to a
suit under section 301, and thus the state statute of limitations could not be
applied; instead, a federal limitation should be devised.13 In the alternative,
the union contended that even if a state statute of limitations were applica-
ble, it should be the longer limitation concerning written contracts."
The Court gave its answer to the union arguments in three parts. First,
it had to determine the issue of whether there should be a court-created
respect . .	 Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair
labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge
with the Board . . . .
4 371 U.S. at 203.
5 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
This description of the previous activities in the state courts is from the Supreme
Court opinion. Id. at 698-99. None of the previous actions was under § 301.
7
 235 F. Supp. 183, .57 L.R.R.M. 2516 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-601 (Supp. 1966).
9 235 F. Supp. at 187, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2519. The court noted that its decision was
in accord with Indiana cases involving a contract partly oral and partly written. Id. at
188, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2520,
10 346 F.2d 242, 59 L.R.R.M. 2448 (7th Cir. 1965).
11 Supra note 5.
12 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
13
 The union suggested no particular limitation for its proposed federal rule.
14 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-602 (Supp. 1966).
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federal limitation period. Second, once it had been decided that the Court
could not create a federal limitation, the Court had to determine what
limitation should be applied. Finally, after deciding that a state statute of
limitations was applicable, the Court had to determine which of two possibly
applicable state limitations the federal law would apply.
The Court conceded that Lincoln Mills did affirmatively require the ap-
plication of federal law in the field of section 301 suits, and admitted that
there are areas where the implementation of federal labor policy is so
important that the courts would have to invent federal rules.'" However,
said the Court, "the problem presented here . . . is not of that nature. 71 "
The purpose of uniform federal standards in labor law is to facilitate the
smooth operation of the federally fostered consensual proceedings between
union and management. These include "the formation of the collective agree-
ment and the private settlement of disputes under it."" However, as the
Court pointed out,
statutes of limitations come into play only when these processes
have already broken down. Lack of uniformity in this area is
therefore unlikely to frustrate in any important way the achieve-
ment of any significant goal of labor policy. Thus, although a uni-
form limitations provision for § 301 suits might well constitute a
desirable statutory addition, there is no justification for the drastic
sort of judicial legislation that is urged upon us."
The Court dismissed the argument that since Congress had not inserted
a limitation in section 301, it intended the courts to create one.
It is clear that Congress gave attention to limitations problems
in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947; it enacted a six
months' provision to govern unfair labor practice proceedings . . . .
In this context and against the background of the relationship
between Congress and the courts on the question of limitations pro-
visions, it cannot be fairly inferred that when Congress left § 301
without a uniform time limitation, it did so in the expectation that
the courts would invent one."
Having decided that it was not within the power of the courts to provide
a federal rule as to limitations, the Court then turned to the question of
what limitations provision it should apply. It stated that, since 1830, 2 °
state statutes of limitations have been applied to "govern the timeliness of
federal causes of action unless Congress has specifically provided otherwise.""
The Court again applied this rule and held, accordingly, that as a matter
15 383 U.S. at 701.
le Ibid.
17 Id, at 702.
18 Id, at 702-03.
78 Id. at 703.
20 McLuny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830), held that "the acts of
limitations of the several states, where no special provision has been made by congress,
form a rule of decision in the courts of the United States. • ." Id. at 277.
21 383 U.S. at 703-05.
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of federal law, the timeliness of a section 301 suit was to be determined
"by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations." 22
This conclusion brought the Court to its third step—which state statute
of limitations should the federal courts apply. There were two contracts
involved in Hoosier Cardinal: the oral contract of employment between the
company and each of its individual employees, and the written collective-
bargaining agreement between the company and the union 23 The Court,
having designated Indiana law as the governing law, determined that
Indiana's six-year statute of limitations on oral contracts should apply."
The union had urged that the twenty-year limitation on written contracts
be applied because section 301 contemplated suits for breach of the collective
agreement.25
The Court stated that a section 301 suit could not be "based solely upon
the separate hiring contracts, frequently oral, between the employer and
each employee."" But the Court saw no reason why "the separate contracts
of employment may not be taken into account in characterizing the nature of
a specific § 301 suit for the purpose of selecting the appropriate state limita-
tions provision."27 The rationale behind this statement is more clearly pre-
sented in the opinion of the district court. 28 It stated that the status neces-
sary to receive vacation pay was created by the individual employment
contract; the collective-bargaining agreement established the right to and
the rates of vacation pay, after a party had acquired such status. Thus, the
suit was truely on a contract partly oral and partly written." "Indiana
has clearly held that in a case where a contract is partially in writing and
partially oral the six-year statute of limitations applies. .. ." 3° By "taking
into account" the oral contract, the Supreme Court meant that, although
a right was created by the breach of the written contract, the status neces-
sary to establish damages required proof of the oral contract of hire. It is
to the total employment relationship that the collective-bargaining agreement
applies.
In addition to finding that Indiana would apply the six-year statute of
limitations, the Court found that federal labor policy favored a more rapid
disposition of cases than would he permitted if a twenty-year statute of
limitations were used.31 "Since state statutes of limitations governing con-
22
 Id. at 705.
22 The relationship between the oral contract of hire and the collective-bargaining
agreement 'was discussed' at length in J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-36
(1944).
24
 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-601 (Supp. 1966).
25 Under LMRA § 8(b), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), the
collective-bargaining obligation includes "the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached."
29 383 U.S. at 706.
27 Ibid.
28 Supra note 7.
29 Id. at 187, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2519.
30
 Id. at 188, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2520.
:II The Court cited the unfair-labor-practice limitation of six months. 383 U.S.
at 707. Note, however, that the Court chose the Indiana six-year limitation not
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tracts not exclusively in writing are generally shorter than those applicable
to wholly written agreements, their applicability to § 301 actions comports
with [federal policy]. . . "32
The reasoning of the majority had been foreshadowed in earlier case
law. 33 In International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc.," for example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court decision that state statutes of limitations could not be applied
to suits under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 33 The
court of appeals used the same argument as the Supreme Court later was
to use in Hoosier Cardinal: Even though a uniform limitation would be
desirable and there is no reason why the six-month unfair-labor-practice
limitation should not be applied, the setting of a uniform federal limitation is
in the congressional domain." Then, referring back to past federal court
practice, as did the Court in Hoosier Cardinal, the Ninth Circuit used the
applicable state statute of limitations.
It seems clear from such cases as Hoosier Cardinal and Fischbach &
Moore that, while the judiciary would prefer to see a uniform federal limita-
tion on section 301 and section 303 suits, the courts are precluded from
creating their own limitation by due regard for the legislative prerogative.
The problems which will result from the Hoosier Cardinal rule are quite
obvious. Where there is a multi-state employer, employees or unions suing
under section 301 will be prone to forum shop for the best available statute
of limitations. Those who cannot forum shop may well be barred by their
home statute, while their brothers in another state—with the same cause of
action arising out of the same facts—will still be free to sue. Where the
action is a multi-state one, there is the further problem of conflict of laws.
There is the additional problem of which state statute of limitations
to apply even if the suit affects only one state. As in Hoosier Cardinal, the
court may have to decide what kind or kinds of contracts are involved before
it can choose the applicable statute. Also, where the union and the employees
sue separately, why should one suit be treated differently from the other?
Finally, when an employee sues the union, what contract is involved in
the union-employee relationship and what limitation applies?
The solution to these problems lies within easy reach—a uniform federal
limitation—but the grasp must be that of Congress.
because it was the shorter of the two, but because Indiana would have applied it. To
have done otherwise would have been to create a federal limitation.
32
 Ibid. The dissent felt that federal law should be applied, and that only such
state law as effectuates federal policy should be incorporated. However, the dissenting
opinion suggested no federal rule of limitation which should be fashioned. Id. at 709-14
(White, J., dissenting).
33
 See, e.g., ReIlford v. Eastern Coal Corp., 260 F.2d 447, 42 L.R.R.M. 2526
(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 958 (1959) (§ 301 action); Kreshtool v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n, 242 F. Supp. 551, 59 L.R.R.M. 2804 (D. Del. 1965)
(§ 303 action).
34
 350 F.2d 936, 60 L.R.R.M. 2141 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. C. D.
Draucker, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 384 U.S. 904 (1966).
35
 198 F. Supp. 911, 49 L.R.R.M. 2631 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Sec also Note, 3 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 542 (1962); Note, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 1164 (1962).
35
 350 F.2d at 938, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2142.
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C. Supervisory Unions and Section 301
In Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n,' a
federal district court rather hesitantly 2 reached the conclusion that a union
composed entirely of supervisory employees is a "labor organization" within
the meaning of section 301. 3 The case arose between the employer and the
union when the former sold some of its ships and, as a result of the sale, had
to discharge some supervisory employees who were members of the union.
The union brought suit in a state court to compel arbitration of the em-
ployees' claims for severance pay. The employer petitioned the federal
district court for removal under section 301. Following removal the union
asked for remand to the state court on two grounds: First, that the federal
court had no jurisdiction under section 301, because the union was not a
"labor organization" within the meaning of that section, and, second, that
there was no diversity of citizenship on which to base federal jurisdiction
not otherwise granted by statute.
The basis of the first union claim was that a "labor organization" under
section 301 must be defined in the same way that it is defined in the "Na-
tional Labor Relations Act as amended by [the Labor Management Relations
Act]." The relevant section of the NLRA defines "labor organization" as
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee repre-
sentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose . . . of dealing with employers con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.° (Emphasis added.)
The key word in the definition is "employee," which is also to be defined
according to the NLRA as amended.6 This term is explicitly defined so as to
exclude "any individual employed as a supervisor." 7 The conclusion to
the union argument was that, since all its members 8 were employed as
supervisors, they were not "employees" within the definition of "labor
organization," and therefore the union was not a "labor organization" within
the meaning of the NLRA or section 301. From this it should follow that,
absent diversity of citizenship, a federal court had no jurisdiction over the
dispute.
1 256 F. Supp. 68, 62 L.R.R.M. 2488 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
2
 The court itself stated that "the soundness of this court's interpretation of LMRA
§ 301 should be reviewed, especially in the light of conflicting data within this Circuit,
with respect to the interpretation of the very section of the LMRA here involved." Id.
at 77, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
3
 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
4
 LMRA § 501(3), 61 Stat. 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1964).
NLRA § 2(5), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(5) (1964).
6
 LMRA § 501(3), 61 Stat. 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1964).
7
 NLRA § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1964).
8
 The court noted that it was not clear that all members of the union were super-
visory employees, but "for the purposes of this motion, the court is assuming that
all members of District 2, P4ERA are supervisors within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act." 256 F. Supp. at 71 n.3, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2490 n.3.
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The district court denied the motion to remand. It held that if section
301 were read properly, a court should concentrate upon the relationship of
the parties. In common usage, the union was a labor organization and the
supervisory personnel were employees. Section 301 was meant "to provide
for federal jurisdiction over breach of collective-bargaining contracts if
the parties were in an industry affecting interstate commerce."9 It was con-
ceded that the employer was "in an industry affecting commerce." 1° The
court went on to say that
interpreting the phrase "labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce" in its ordinary meaning corn-
ports with the expressed legislative intent of avoiding industrial
strife by making labor unions suable as entities in the Federal
courts?'
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that there were conflicting
holdings within the Second Circuit as to whether a union of supervisory
employees was within the purview of section 301. In A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v.
National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 12
 the appellate court was called
upon to determine whether the issuance of an injunction by a district court
was in error. The employer had obtained the injunction pending a determina-
tion by the district court of an allegation that the union had breached the
collective-bargaining agreement by striking. In ruling that the injunction
should not have issued, the court of appeals held that whether the employees
in the union were supervisors was a question of fact and "if they are 'super-
visors,' then MEBA is not a 'labor organization representing employees'
for the purposes of this action." 13 The court said that since the district
court had failed to determine the preliminary jurisdictional issue, there was
no justification for the issuance of the injunction.
The other side of the question is represented by National Marine Eng'rs
Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 14 which was a proceeding to review a cease-and-
desist order of the NLRB concerning alleged unfair labor practices by
the union. The court of appeals enforced the cease-and-desist order, because
it had found that the Engineers Association had admitted nonsupervisory
employees to membership. Thus, it was a "labor organization" for the
purposes of section 8(b). The court made no independent mention of section
301, but did distinguish Bull because it was decided under that section. 15
It would seem that both Bull and National MEBA support a result
contrary to that reached in Isbrandtsen.1° Bull, decided under section 301,
required a finding that, if the members of the union were all supervisory em-
ployees, the union was not a "labor organization" under federal labor law,
Id. at 76, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2494.
10 Id. at 71, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2489.
11 Id. at 77, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2494.
12
 250 F.2d 332, 41 L.R.R.M. 2126 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied sub nom. A. H.
Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
13
 Id. at 336, 41 L.R.R.M. at 2129.
14 274 F.2d 167, 45 L.R.R.M. 2499 (2d Cir, 1960).
15
 Id. at 174, 45 L.R.R.M. at 2504,
16 Supra note 1.
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and section 301 did not give federal jurisdiction. National MEBA, decided
under section &(b), found that the national union was a "labor organization"
under the NLRA because it admitted nonsupervisory employees to member-
ship. Thus, if District 2, in Isbrandtsen, had admitted nonsupervisory em-
ployees, it would have been a labor organization under the NLRA and
consequently under section 301 also. This follows from the requirement in
section 501(3) that the term "labor organization" be defined the same for
both purposes.17
 However, the court assumed that District 2 did not admit
nonsupervisory members and thus was plainly not a "labor organization"
under section 301 according to the strict language of the statute.
The holding in Isbrandtsen seems clearly contrary to the statutory
language of the LAIRA. The language of section 501(3) explicitly states
that the terms "employee" and "labor organization" should be defined the
same way for purposes of unfair labor practices and actions arising under
section 301. Applying that requirement strictly, District 2 should not have
been subject to federal jurisdiction in this instance; it should have been able
to have its case remanded to the state courts.
VI. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Board Procedure
Under established law, any person, even if he has no direct interest in
the outcome of a labor dispute, may file unfair-labor-practice charges with
the NLRB.' In turn, the party charged with unfair labor practices is always
a party in Board proceedings, 2
 and, if the Board initiates proceedings in .a
circuit court to enforce an order issued pursuant to a finding that unfair labor
practices have been committed, the one charged is automatically a party in
these proceedings.3 Further, any person who is aggrieved by a final order of
the Board in an unfair-labor-practice proceeding has a right to petition for
circuit court review.'
During the current Survey year, an important decision was handed down
concerning the right of a successful charging party, not directly affected by a
Board order, to intervene in a circuit court review of that order. In
NLRB v. Local 2, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumb-
ing & Pipe fitting Indus., 5 the Second Circuit held that the union violated
17
 61 Stat. 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1964).
1
 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1966) provides that "a charge that any person has engaged or
is engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce may be made by any person."
Any person filing a charge, even if he has no direct interest, is automatically a party to
Board proceedings.
2
 29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1966).
3
 LMRA § 10(e), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964). This section
provides in part:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
States . . for the enforcement of such order . • . Upon the filing of such
petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person
[the party found by the Board to have committed an unfair labor practice],
and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding. . . .
4
 LMRA § 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964).
360 F.2d 428, 62 L.R.R.M. 2211 (2d Cir. 1966),
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sections 8(b) (1)(A) and 8(b) (2) 6 by causing an employer to refuse to hire
four Negroes. The company denied employment to the four men as a result
of a strike called by the union in order to prevent such hiring.' The Board
found that the union was liable to the four men for all losses in pay from the
date of the strike to a date five days after the union's sending of a notice of
withdrawal of its objection.
The Second Circuit modified the back-pay remedy, but enforced the
order of the Board in all other respects. The charging party in the case was
a civic organization known as the Urban League, and, upon petition by the
union for review of the Board's decision, the Urban League sought to inter-
vene as a party before the court. At that time, the court deferred decision on
the motion to intervene and permitted the Urban League to participate as
amicus curiae. 8
When the motion to intervene was later considered, the majority held
that a successful charging party in the Board proceeding, although having
no direct interest in the controversy, has a per se right to intervene as a party
in the subsequent circuit court action. No further circuit court proceedings
remain in Local 2, and the only action left is the separate back-pay proceed-
ing before the Board, which may or may not be appealed. Thus, although the
Urban League may not receive a benefit by virtue of the court's ruling, the
decision will likely be of considerable importance in future circuit court pro-
ceedings.
Prior to UAW v. Scofield, 9
 a successful charging party was not allowed
to intervene on the side of the Board in circuit court proceedings. 1° The basis
for the prior ruling was that only the public interest was involved in unfair-
Iabor-practice proceedings, and the Board could adequately protect the rights
of the public. 11 However, in Scofield the Supreme Court held that a success-
ful charging party had a right to intervene in appellate court proceedings.
The rationale was (I) that the LMRA does bestow private rights upon in-
dividual employees as well as protect the public interest, and (2) that it is
as important to the charging party as to the charged party to have the op-
portunity to persuade the appellate court. 12
6
 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (1)(A), (2) (1964). Section 8(b)(1)(A)
provides: it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
[section 7]. . . ." Section 8(b) (2) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents . . . (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section. . . ."
7
 Although the four men came to the jobsite, they were never actually hired.
8
 The court did not state whether the company and/or the Board had contested
the Urban League's intervention, or whether it was considering the Urban League's
motion on its own initiative.
9
 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
10
 NLRB v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, 243 F.2d 777, 38 L.R.R.M. 2555 (9th Cir. 1956);
Stewart Die Casting Corp. v, NLRB, 132 F.2d 801, II L.R.R.M. 739 (7th Cir. 1942);
Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485, 11 L.R.R.M. 693 (7th Cir. 1942).
11 See cases cited note 10 supra.
12
 382 U.S. at 218. Private rights include the right of individual employees not to
be discriminated against in regard to a term or condition of employment because of their
union activity and the right to have the company bargain with their chosen bargaining
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In Sco field, however, the charging party was the union, which would di-
rectly benefit from the court order, and the Court stated: "that the charging
party may have vital 'private rights' in the Board proceeding is clear in this
very case . . . . "I3
 Thus, it is not apparent whether the Court meant that a
successful charging party has a per se right to intervene in circuit court pro-
ceedings even when the charging party is not directly benefited by the Board
order. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Local 2 seems correct in inter-
preting Sco field as creating this per se right, because, in the beginning of its
opinion, the Court stated that "we think that Congress intended to confer
intervention rights upon the successful party to the Labor Board proceedings
in the court in which the unsuccessful party challenges the Board's deci-
sion."14
 The language used seems deliberately broad and intended to state
an inclusive rule. Moreover, the Court stated that it would have to ascribe
"capriciousness" to Congress if it provided review for the unsuccessful charged
party but not for the successful charging party. 13 The Court thus seems to
have ruled that Congress intended to allow any person who had the f or mat
status of a charging party to intervene in any subsequent court action.
B. Duty to Bargain
1. Employer's Decision to Subcontract or Terminate
In the area of subcontracting, there are three main fact variations under
which unfair-labor-practice questions arise: (1) situations in which the
company subcontracts work previously done by its own employees, which
work is subsequently performed by the employees of other employers, and
for the performance of which the company continues to supply and maintain
the necessary capital, thus having no capital recoupment; (2) situations in
which the company subcontracts work which continues to be performed as in
(1), but in which the company does not supply and maintain capital and thus
does have capital recoupment; (3) situations in which the company termi-
nates part of its operations and does not have the work performed by anyone
else, recouping the capital formerly used in these operations. 1
In the leading subcontracting case, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
N LRB ,2 the company, for economic reasons, subcontracted maintenance work
previously performed by some of the company's employees, but continued
representative. The public interest involved stems from the fact that Congress has
deemed unfair labor practices to be a significant cause of work stoppages.
13 Id. at 220. The union charged that the employer had refused to bargain, and it
obtained a Board order compelling the employer to bargain. The Court in Scofield also
decided that a successful charged party in Board proceedings had a right to intervene
as a party in appellate court proceedings brought by an unsuccessful charging party.
Id. at 208.
14 Ibid.
13 Id. at 222.
I In all of these situations, it is assumed that the company is motivated by economic
considerations, and not by an antiunion animus. Otherwise the company would be guilty
of an unfair labor practice in each instance. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965).
2 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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to maintain and supply all the capital necessary to the subcontracted opera-
tions. Thus, Fibreboard fits within situation (1) above. The Supreme Court
held that the subcontracting was a "term or condition of employment" and
consequently a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under section
8(a) (5).1 The Court accordingly found that the company had violated
section 8(a) (5) when it did not notify and bargain with the union about its
decision to subcontract the maintenance work.
The Board and the circuit courts have differed on the question whether
Fibreboard applies to situation (2)—where there is subcontracting and
recoupment of capital investment. The Board recently has reaffirmed its
position that Fibreboard controls such situations. In Ozark Trailers, Inc.,'
the employer had ceased for economic reasons all operations in one of its
three plants which were engaged in the manufacture of truck bodies, without
notifying the union and without bargaining about the decision. Most of the
equipment located at the closed Ozark plant was then moved to one of the
other plants for storage. However, the production at the other two plants
did not increase substantially. Nor did the company partially terminate its
operations; instead, the employer contracted with an independent company
for the manufacture of truck bodies, with the independent company supplying
all the capital. Since the employer in Ozark did not supply the capital to the
contractor, this appears to be an instance of subcontracting with capital
recoupment, whereas Fibreboard was an instance of subcontracting without
capital recoupment.
Nonetheless, the Board found that Fibreboard was applicable to the facts
of Ozark. The Board held that the employer violated section 8(a) (5) by
not bargaining about both the decision to subcontract and its effects.° The
Board concluded that the question of whether the employer must bargain
about subcontracting should not turn on whether or not the company recouped
part of its capital investment. It quoted from the Supreme Court's decision in
Fibreboard:
The subject matter of the present dispute is well within the
literal meaning of the phrase "terms and conditions of employ-
ment." . . . A stipulation with respect to the contracting out of work
performed by members of the bargaining unit might appropriately
be called a "condition of employment." The words even more plainly
cover termination of employment which, as the facts of this case
indicate, necessarily results from the contracting out of work per-
formed by members of the established bargaining unit.°
The Board reasoned that, since termination of employment occurred as a
3 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 24 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
4 161 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
5 Requiring the company to bargain about the decision to subcontract obviously
implies the less-inclusive requirement of bargaining about the ef ects of such subcon-
tracting. Bargaining about the decision means discussing with the union the question
whether there will be subcontracting at all. Bargaining about the effects of subcontracting
means discussion of what severance pay, pension benefits, and the like should be given
to employees.
6 161 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267, quoting 379 U.S. at 210.
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result of the employer's decision to subcontract, regardless of whether he
recouped any of his capital, the employer had failed to bargain concerning a
"term or condition of employment." The Board also felt that to require
bargaining under these circumstances would effectuate one of the primary
purposes of the act—to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes by
subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of
negotiation.?
In NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 8 the Fifth Circuit supported the
Board's interpretation of Fibreboard. In this case, the employer, a manu-
facturer of oilfield pumping equipment, discontinued the transportation of
its products by its own vehicles and employees, and subcontracted the trans-
portation operations to public carriers. The company thereupon dismissed
some of its employees and sold the vehicles, with a resultant recoupment of
capital. The NLRB found that the employer had violated sections 8(a) (1),
(3), and (5), because the employer had contracted out the work in order to
rid itself of the union. The Fifth Circuit reversed that part of the Board's
order which required the company to resume the transportation operations,
because evidence was entirely lacking in the record which would warrant a
finding that resumption would further the policies of the act, but sustained
the Board's findings of the violations.
In dicta, however, the Fifth Circuit added:
Of course it is now clear that the Board was correct in finding
that the Employer must negotiate the decision to subcontract. Quite
apart from antiunion conduct, or here the claim of economic justifi-
cation, the decision to subcontract work is a subject for mandatory
bargaining. Any doubt which may have existed was put to rest by
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB. . . . 9 (Emphasis added.)
The court did not mention the factual distinction that in Fibreboard there
was subcontracting but no capital recoupment, whereas in American Mfg.
there was subcontracting and such recoupment. Thus, the court simply
concluded that Fibreboard required bargaining where there was contracting
out which resulted in the substitution of employees by those of an independent
contractor to do the same work under similar conditions, apparently ir-
respective of whether there was capital recoupment.
These decisions conflict with the Eight Circuit's decision in NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, Inc. 1") There the court, upon remand from the Supreme Court
to reconsider its previous opinion in light of Fibreboard, reaffirmed its holding
that the employer's decision to subcontract the distribution of its dairy prod-
ucts was not a mandatory bargaining subject. For economic reasons, the
employer had decided unilaterally to have independent contractors distribute
7 See LMRA § 101, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
8 351 F.2d 74, 60 L.R.R.M. 2122 (5th Cir. 1965),
9 Id. at 80, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2126.
10 350 F.2d 108, 60 L.R.R.M. 2084 (8th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966).
11 379 U.S. 644 (1965), vacating and remanding 322 F.2d 533, 54 L.R.R.M. 2171
(8th Cir. 1963).
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his products. He therefore discharged his driver-salesmen and sold the trucks.
The court distinguished its case from Fibreboard on the basis that
there was a change in the capital structure of Adams Dairy which
resulted in a partial liquidation and a recoup of capital investment.
To require Adams to bargain about its decision to close out the
distribution end of its business would significantly abridge its
freedom to manage its own affairs. Bargaining is not contemplated
in this area under the history and usage of § 8(a) (5). 12
In a partial termination case, NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,' 3
the Third Circuit rejected the Board's view that under Fibreboard an
employer must bargain about the decision to terminate, and limited its
agreement with the Board to the extent that the Board held that bargaining
about the ef ects of the termination was mandatory under section 8(a) (5).
In this case, an employer, for economic reasons, unilaterally decided to
terminate operations at one of his two plants, without subcontracting the
work or having it performed at the other plant. Although engaged at the
time in negotiations for a new contract, the employer failed to notify the union
of his decision. Relying on the rationale of Fibreboard, the Board found a
violation of section 8(a) (5) in the employer's failure to discuss both the
decision to terminate and the effects of the termination."
Because the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice was in part based
on its determination that the employer must bargain about whether or not to
close the plant, the court remanded the case for the Board to determine
whether failure to discuss the effects of the termination constituted in this
case a substantial or a technical violation. The court distinguished Fibreboard
on the ground that in Royal Plating there was no substitution of employees,
while there was a recoupment of capital investment and a change in economic
direction. The court also distinguished Fibreboard on the basis that, in
Royal Plating, the Newark Housing Authority, by the exercise of its power
of eminent domain, would have forced the company to sell the premises.
The court noted that the union could only attempt to persuade the employer
to relocate the plant and could not cause him to keep the plant in operation.
Under these circumstances, the court did not feel that bargaining could be
meaningful, except as to the effects of the termination of operations.
It is clear that the present state of the law is in conflict on the effect of
Fibreboard on partial terminations and on subcontracting which involves a
change in capital structure. Resolution of the conflict must await a Supreme
Court determination. Since the operations which were terminated in Royal
12 350 F.2d at 111, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2087.
13 350 F.2d 191, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033 (3d Cir. 1965).
14 148 N.L.R.B. 545, 57 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1964). Member McCulloch, one of the
five on the panel in this case, concurred solely on the ground that the employer violated
§ 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain concerning the effects upon employees of the plant
closing. Id. at 546 n.2, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1007 n.2. Member Jenkins found that the employer
did not bargain in good faith, because it failed to disclose all the facts during the contract
negotiations; Member Jenkins thus did not reach or decide whether there is a duty
to reveal the decision apart from contract negotiations. Id. at 551, 57 L.R.R.M. at
1008.
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Plating had become extremely unprofitable, it is inconceivable that the union
could persuade the employer to relocate the operations. Therefore, it is
submitted that the Third Circuit was correct in requiring the employer to
bargain only about the effects of the partial termination and not about the
decision to partially terminate. On the other hand, the Board's view of Fibre-
board seems preferable to that of the Eighth Circuit in Adams Dairy. It is
submitted that a change in economic direction or recommitment of capital
is not a material consideration under the LMRA, and that it is insufficient
to distinguish a case otherwise similar on its facts to Fibreboard. The essential
facts of Fibreboard and Adams Dairy are otherwise identical---subcontracting
of work and substitution of employees in order to achieve cost savings.
Another recent decision has illustrated the difficulty in determining
whether there has been contracting out within the meaning of Fibreboard,
and a further difficulty in determining what activity is sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of bargaining about such contracting. In United Auto Workers
v. NLRB," the District of Columbia Circuit Court, reversing the Board,
found that the employer had violated section 8(a) (5) by contracting out
work without bargaining with the union. In this case, finished cars had been
driven by General Motors employees from the end of the assembly line to a
position near a parking lot. From there the cars had been moved by employees
of another company, under a contract with General Motors, to the parking lot,
where they were parked for shipment as directed by dispatchers of the
independent contractor.
On May 2, 1963, General Motors told the union that, in order to increase
efficiency, the employees of the contractor would perform all the driving
of cars. However, before it put the change into effect that June, General
Motors met with the union six times to discuss the proposed change. At these
meetings the union protested against the proposal, but offered no counter-
proposals. The union and General Motors eventually reached a settlement,
which provided that the drivers who were replaced would be assigned compar-
able work, and that the union would not process grievances on behalf of the
displaced employees. However, the settlement was intended only as a stop-gap
solution until the dispute was settled either through arbitration or an unfair-
labor-practice proceeding.
The Board found that there was no violation of section 8(a) (5). 1 ° The
reasons the Board assigned for this conclusion were: (1) that the employer's
decision constituted a change in the method of operation rather than con-
tracting out; (2) that the management-rights clause which gave the employer
a right to make changes in "the methods, processes and means of manu-
facturing" without bargaining with the union covered this change; and (3)
that the change, which required the reassignment of six men, did not result
in any significant detriment to the unit which comprised over 1,500 employees.
is 64 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
16 In its original decision, General Motors Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 396, 57 L.R.R.M.
1277 (1964), and in its Supplemental Decision, 158 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 62 L.R.R.M. 1009
(1966), the Board reached the same result, using the same rationale. The circuit court
had remanded the first decision to the Board for clarification of its opinion. United Auto
Workers v. NLRB, 60 L.R.R.M. 2283 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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The circuit court, however, held that there was contracting out within
the contemplation of Fibreboard. The court pointed to the fact that the
drivers had lost their jobs, even though they received similar jobs elsewhere
in the plant, and that their jobs were now carried on by employees of the
independent contractor."' The court also held that this was not a de minimis
violation of the act, because the change reduced by six the number of jobs
performed by the members of the bargaining unit's
The court concluded further that the management-rights clause was not a
waiver of the union's statutory right to bargain concerning subcontracting,
since only a clear and unmistakable provision would suffice to waive a right
under the TAIRA, and the clause in question did not meet this standard."
From this case, it seems fairly clear that only an express use of the term
"contracting" will be held to constitute a waiver of the right to bargain
concerning subcontracting."
In the other troublesome aspect of this case, the Board had further
held that even assuming there was contracting out, the company had bar-
gained sufficiently to fulfill its bargaining requirements. 21 This conclusion
was attained without an express holding that it is necessary for the company
to bargain until impasse is reached before it can act unilaterally. From the
facts it does not appear that an impasse was reached in the bargaining, and
therefore, if this interpretation of the facts is correct, the Board has implicitly
held that under the circumstances of this case the ordinary duty to bargain
until impasse is reached22 will not be applied. Unfortunately, the circuit court
did not address itself to the issue of whether bargaining to an impasse is
required in subcontracting cases. Yet its finding that the company had
failed to bargain within the meaning of section 8(a) (5), although the
company had repeatedly discussed the proposed change with the union,
certainly seems to require bargaining to an impasse.
In its first Supplemental Decision in Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,"
the Board stated that
the Act requires that an employer give the employees' bargaining
representative notice and opportunity to confer about and discuss
17 64 L.R.R.M. at 2490.
18 The court distinguished this case from Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d
983, 62 L.R.R.M. 2069 (1st Cir. 1966), and District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 234,
61 L.R.R.M. 2632 (4th Cir. 1966), which held that contracting out was de minimis, and
that there need be no bargaining. The basis of the court's distinction was that in those
cases neither the bargaining unit nor the employees were adversely affected in any
respect as a direct result of the contracting out, whereas in United Auto Workers the
number of jobs in the bargaining unit was reduced by six.
19 Cf. California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436, 31 L.R.R.M. 1220
(1952); Hekman Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 631, 31 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1952); Tidewater
Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096, 24 L.R.R.M. 1518 (1949).
20 Even assuming arguendo that the change was a change in manufacturing, the
court concluded that the management-rights clause was not an unmistakable waiver
by the union, where the change amounts to contracting out. 64 L.R.R.M. at 2490.
21 158 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
22 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,
205 F.2d 131, 32 L.R.R.M. 2225 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
23 152 N.L.R.B. 619, 59 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1965).
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the closing down of a plant not for the purpose of securing the
employees' agreement before he may proceed, but to give his
employees an opportunity to induce him to follow a different course
of action which may safeguard both his and their rights and
interests.24 (Emphasis added.)
This statement quite clearly holds that an employer is not necessarily required
to bargain to an impasse before it can act. Thus far, other decisions of the
Board and the courts have simply stated that an employer must bargain with
the union.25 It would seem that there should be flexibility in the employer's
duty to bargain concerning subcontracting, and not a mechanical requirement
of bargaining to impasse. In some cases, subcontracting may be imperative to
an employer and of little detriment to the employees. On the other hand, in
Fibreboard the Supreme Court upheld an order that the company, which had
replaced its maintenance employees and had not reassigned them, reinstate its
maintenance department and all employees it had replaced.2° The severity of
the remedy indicates that the Supreme Court might require bargaining to an
impasse in such cases. However, unlike Fibreboard, the employer in the
General Motors case had announced the change in advance, had met with
the union six times, and had assigned the replaced drivers to comparable jobs.
Under these circumstances, it is submitted that the employer had met his
bargaining requirement.
2. Employer's Duty to Provide Information
a. Fringe-Benefit Data. An employer must provide the union with a list
of the job classifications and wage schedules of the unit employees, including
incentive and bonus rates, in order for the union to bargain intelligently with
the employer. 27
 If an employer refuses to grant benefits on the basis of
inability to pay, it must furnish the union with information substantiating its
claim. 28
 Moreover, the benefits to employees under a group insurance plan
whose premiums are paid by the employer are considered wages, and the
employer must furnish the union with a statement of the benefits there-
under.29
In a recent decision, Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. NLRB,3° the First
Circuit held that the costs to the employer of a noncontributory group
insurance plan, while not constituting wages, must be revealed under the
particular circumstances of the case. In an earlier case involving the same
24 Id. at 622, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1143.
25
 See NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 60 L.R.R.M. 2122 (5th Cir.
1965); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033 (3d
Cir. 1965).
26
 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
27 NLRB v. Perkins Mach. Co., 326 F.2d 488, 55 L.R.R.M. 2204 (1st Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 52 L.R.R.M. 2174 (2d Cir. 1963);
Union Elec. Steel Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 138, 51 L.R.R.M. 1576 (1962).
28
 NLRB v. Southland Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702, 58 L.R.R.M. 2555 (4th Cir. 1965) ;
NLRB v. Taylor, 338 F.2d 1003, 57 L.R.R.M. 2560 (5th Cir. 1964).
28
 W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 24 L.R.R.M. 2068 (1st Cir. 1949);
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 22 L.R.R.M. 2506 (7th Cir. 1948).
2° 358 F.2d 591, 61 L.R.R.M. 2657 (1st Cir. 1966).
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company,31
 the Board had held that the employer must divulge the cost to
him of additional premiums resulting from the employer's proposed increase
in a noncontributory group insurance plan, as well as the benefits thereunder,
on the basis that premiums were wages within the meaning of the act. How-
ever, the First Circuit reversed,32 on the ground that so expansive an inter-
pretation of "wages" would break down the distinction in the statute between
mandatory and nonmandatory bargaining subjects.
In the most recent Sylvania case, the Board again ordered Sylvania to
furnish premium-cost data. 33
 In this case, the union was considering whether
to bargain for an increased wage or an increase in benefits. On appeal, the
First Circuit distinguished the earlier Sylvania case as holding that an em-
ployer is not obligated to disclose the premium-cost data in order for the
union to determine whether the employer, and thereby the employees, are
receiving the best coverage for their money. The court in the present case then
held that the employer must reveal this same information in order to enable
the union properly to evaluate the respective merits of an increased benefit
plan and an increased wage.
Considering the fact that benefits and wage increases are interrelated in
most contract negotiations, the exception articulated by the court in Sylvania
seems broader than the rule. The effect of this case is thus to require the
employer to furnish premium-cost data to the union in all but the most
unusual instances. In addition, the holding conflicts with the following dicta
of the Seventh Circuit in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB: 34
C] ontributions made [by an employer] . . . to a pension plan .. .
represent a part of the consideration for services performed, and
payments made in the discharge of such obligations would, in our
view, be "wages" or included in "conditions of employment." 35
It is submitted that an employee's "wages" include the premium pay-
ments made by the employer. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, these are
part of the consideration which the employer pays for the employee's
services. There seems no substantial difference between the employer paying
the premiums on the one hand and, on the other hand, paying the employee
cash which is then used by the employee to purchase insurance.
b. Time Studies by Unions. One of the most important wage systems
is the incentive or piece-work system. Under such systems a time study is
required in order to determine the amount of production of average employees.
Typically, pay is based on this "standard" amount of production, with
additional pay for production above the standard level.
Under established law, the employer must bargain with a majority union
concerning an incentive wage system, because he is under an obligation to
bargain on wages.36
 An employer must also furnish to the union information
31 Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 924, 46 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1960).
32 291 F.2d 128, 48 L.R.R.M. 2313 (1st Cir. 1961).
33 154 N.L.R.B. 1756, 60 L.R.R.M. 1178 (1965).
34 170 F.2d 247, 22 L.R.R.M. 2506 (7th Cir. 1948).
35 Id. at 253, 22 L.R.R.M. at 2512.
33 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149, 41 L.R.R.M. 2679 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB
v. East Tex. Steel Castings Co., 211 F.2d 813, 33 L.R.R.M. 2793 (5th Cir. 1954).
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concerning an existing or proposed incentive plan, if such information is
necessary to enable the union to negotiate or process grievances under the
contract. 37 Moreover, the employer is required to furnish time-study data to
the union, even if there is no pending grievance or negotiations, when the
union merely seeks the information to determine whether a basis exists for
initiating a grievance or for making demands in future negotiations. 38 How-
ever, in NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co.,39 the Second Circuit held that an
employer is not required to grant the union access to his premises to conduct
an independent time study for any purpose, if there are adequate alternative
sources for the information sought by the union.
In seeming contradiction to its decision in Otis, the Second Circuit, in
Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB," recently required an employer to allow the
union to conduct independent time studies on his premises in order to
determine whether to initiate a grievance. The court distinguished its previous
holding in Otis on the basis that in Otis the union failed to show, as it did
here, that there were no other means by which the union could evaluate
employee performance. Because of the extent to which time studies are based
on the personal observation and judgment of the time-study engineer,'" the
court sustained the union's claim that it could not assess the accuracy of the
company's studies without making its own investigations: In basing its result
on this reasoning, the court seems to have distinguished Otis out of existence,
because it has effectively said that there is no adequate alternative source for
the information other than the engineer who made the study. Thus, it is not
unwarranted to say that the employer must permit the union to make its own
study whenever issues about piece rates arise.
3. Mandatory Bargaining Subjects
Ever since NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.," the Board
and the courts have been wrestling with the problem of defining mandatory
subjects of bargaining under section 8(a) (5 ). The test may be simply stated
to be that those subjects are mandatory which constitute "terms or conditions
of employment." It is in applying this general standard to the infinite variety
of fact situations that the difficulties arise.
37 See cases cited note 36 supra.
38 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, supra note 36.
39 208 F.2d 176, 33 L.R.R.M. 2129 (2d Cir. 1953).
49 362 F.2d 716, 62 L.R.R.M. 2415 (2d Cir. 1966).
41 The court summarized the testimony of the union time-study engineer as follows:
the engineer observes workers and concludes whether an objective "normal" worker
would work faster or slower. He would then "normalize" the time of the actual perfor-
mance upward or downward. The engineer also appraises the effect on production of
environmental factors such as heat and light, and allows for a decrease in production
caused by fatigue. Id. at 720, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2417.
42 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The Court there held that a prestrike ballot clause and
a recognition clause which excluded the international union certified as the representa-
tive and substituted its local affiliate were lawful bargaining subjects, but were non-
mandatory. The Court also held that a party violated § 8(a) (5) by insistence on a
nonmandatory subject of bargaining.
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In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB 43
 the employer refused to bargain
with the union about price increases in three plant cafeterias operated by an
independent contractor:" In a three-to-two decision, the Board found that
the employer had refused to negotiate a mandatory subject of bargaining in
violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (5). 45 The Board noted that the employer
did have a substantial degree of control over the prices and that there were
inadequate eating facilities outside the plant. It concluded that the on-site
eating facilities were an inducement to employment and were necessary in
order to attract and retain enough employees to man the plants. The dissent
contended that cafeteria prices were not sufficiently important to constitute a
condition of employment, and that loss of patronage resulting from high
prices would lower the prices.
In a two-to-one decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision.
Noting the statement in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB that "in
common parlance, the conditions of a person's employment are most obviously
the various physical dimensions of his working environment," 4° the court
adopted the expansive interpretation that "the availability of food and drink
at reasonable prices [is] . an obviously important part of one's physical
working environment."47 The dissent maintained that not every action of the
employer which indirectly or incidentally affects the interests of his employees
comes within the term "conditions of employment." 48 It concluded that
cafeteria prices were only remotely connected to conditions of employment
and did not have the requisite material impact on employee interests.
This case illustrates the expansive interpretation which is often given to
the words "terms and conditions of employment." If the court had based its
decision on the inadequacy of outside eating facilities, its decision would
be unquestionably correct. However, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court in
Fibreboard intended to include everything which was "physical" and which
was in the employer's working environment as a mandatory bargaining
subject. If this were the case, there would be practically nothing which
would not be a mandatory subject. In Fibreboard, the subcontracting of work
by the employer and the consequent termination of employment were found
to be terms or conditions of employment. Obviously there was a substantial
impact on the interests of the employees, whereas changes in cafeteria prices,
assuming outside facilities are adequate, would he of minimal importance.
In addition, the price changes would have only a remote relation to the actual
performance by employees of their jobs. The Supreme Court probably had in
mind such things as the heat, light, and safety conditions under which the
employees must work. The decision in Westinghouse, therefore, goes well
beyond the Fibreboard result, and extends the concept of the mandatory
bargaining subject to a new outer limit.
43 369 F.2d 891, 64 L.R.R.M. 2001 (4th Cir. 1966).
44 There had been an increase of five cents in the price of hot-food entrees and of
one cent in the price of carry-out coffee.
45 156 NL.R.B. 1080, 61 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1966).
40 379 U.S, 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
47 369 F.2d at 894, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
48 Id. at 898, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
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C. Per Se Violations
In order to hold that an employer has committed a violation of section
8(a) (3), the Board must generally find, on the basis of specific evidence, that
the employer acted with a discriminatory motive.' However, in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 2
 the Supreme Court held that an employer violated section
8(a) (3) by granting superseniority of twenty years to strike replacements
and to those who abandoned the strike, and fufther held that because the
action was so prejudicial to employee interests, the grant of superseniority
in itself violated the act; no specific evidence of illegal intent was required.
Later, in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court stated that
an act supplies its own evidence of illegal intent if it is "prejudicial to union
interests and . • . devoid of significant economic justification." 3 Two cases
during the current Survey year have again presented the question of what
employer conduct constitutes a per se violation of this section.
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,4
 the union had terminated the
collective-bargaining agreement in accord with its provisions and had com-
menced an economic strike. Thereupon the employer announced on July 12,
1963, that vacation benefits, which would have been payable even to the
strikers if the contract were still in existence, would be paid only to employees
who had never struck and to those strikers who had abandoned the strike by
July 1 of that years The Board found that the denial of vacation pay unlaw-
fully discriminated against employees because of their adherence to the strike'
The Board did not base its findings on any evidence of unlawful motivation
except that supplied by the refusal to pay the vacation benefits.
The Fifth Circuit reversed on the basis that the employer's conduct did
not constitute a per se violation and that the Board had failed to establish
a discriminatory intent. Relying on American Ship Bldg., the court stated that
the LMRA permits a wide range of employer activity which is reasonably
related to legitimate business interests, even though the activity incidentally
tends to discourage union participation. The court quoted the following
language from American Ship Bldg.: "In some cases, it may be that the em-
ployer's conduct carries with it an inference of unlawful intention so com-
pelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's protestations of
innocent purpose."' The Fifth Circuit then stated: "Based upon the term
`so compelling', we conclude that if the 'employer's conduct' carries with it
any other reasonable inferences of a legitimate motive, the inference of ille-
1 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17 (1954) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
2 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
3 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
4
 363 F.2d 130, 62 L.R.R.TVI. 2456 (5th Cir, 1966).
5 The collective-bargaining agreement provided that all employees with one year's
seniority were entitled to one week's vacation, and to two week's vacation when they
reached five year's seniority. In the event an employee did not work 1,525 hours in
a given year, he was not entitled to a full vacation but only to a pro rata share.
6
 150 N.L.R.B. 438, 58 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1964).
7
 363 F.2d at 134, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2459, quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, supra note 3, at 311-12.
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gality does not control." 8
 The court went on to say that it was reasonable
here "to infer that the Company might have acted (1) to reduce expenses;
(2) to encourage longer tenure among present employees; or (3) to dis-
courage early leaves immediately before vacation periods." 9
It is submitted that this case is distinguishable from the two leading
cases which have permitted a company to take action that incidentally tends
to discourage union activity. In the first of these cases, NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co.,'° the Supreme Court held that a company could perma-
nently replace striking employees during an economic strike, although such
action might incidentally discourage union activity, where such action was
necessary to continue the company's operations. In the second case, American
Ship Bldg Co. v. NLRB, 11
 the Supreme Court held that an employer, in order
to put economic pressure on the union, could lock out his employees after an
impasse in bargaining had been reached. In this case, the employer had acted
out of fear that he would be struck when he was busiest and when the
strike would have a severe economic effect on him. Thus, in both cases, the
employer was allowed to take action which incidentally tended to discourage
union activity when he acted in order to avert economic harm of the most
severe nature.
However, in Great Dane, the company could not claim that its refusal
to pay vacation benefits was motivated by economic necessity or extraordinary
financial hardship, as was the case in the two leading decisions. As the Fifth
Circuit pointed out, the company may have been motivated by a desire to
reduce expenses. Yet the company had done so only by treating strikers dif-
ferently from other employees, in a situation devoid of the compelling eco-
nomic circumstances which prompted the decisions in Mackay Radio and
American Ship Bldg. Moreover, in order to encourage longer tenure and dis-
courage early leaves immediately before vacation periods—if these were in
fact the company's aims—the company could easily have denied benefits only
to nonstrikers who were not working immediately before July 1. For these
reasons, it is submitted that the holding in Great Dane is incorrect.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari,12
 and the decision of the Court
should clarify the area of per se violations and antiunion animus. However,
under the law as articulated by the Fifth Circuit, an employer may take
action which incidentally tends to discourage union activity, unless there is
specific evidence of illegal intent, or an inference thereof; such an inference
may not be made from the mere act itslf, unless there is no possible inference
of a legal motive.
In Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. NLRB, 13 the second case which ex-
amines employer activity for a per se violation, the union had engaged
in an unsuccessful economic strike against the company. After the strike
8




 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
11 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
12
 385 U.S. 1000 (1967).
13 360 F.2d 19, 62 L.R.R.M. 2088 (4th Cir. 1966), enforcing 152 N.L,12.11. 988,
59 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1965).
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ended, the company and the union entered into a collective-bargaining
contract in July 1959. The contract granted to the permanent replacements
hired during the strike and to the employees who abandoned the strike prior
to its termination absolute preferential standing on the seniority lists with
respect to future layoffs, preferred shifts, open jobs, and vacation times. When
the contract expired in 1962, a new contract was entered into which retained
these superseniority provisions.
In 1964, three employees filed unfair-labor-practice charges, alleging that
the company had discriminated against them by awarding promotions to other
employees who were junior according to the ordinary seniority provisions of
the contract, but who were treated as senior solely by virtue of the super-
seniority clause. Relying on Erie Resistor, the Fourth Circuit found that the
employer had violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3) by giving effect to agree-
ments which, as the court found, were unlawful on their face. 14 The court
gave no weight to the employer's contention that Erie Resistor was distin-
guishable from this case; this contention was based on the fact that in the
earlier case the employer had granted superseniority during the strike, while
here the superseniority was granted after the strike. The employer argued
in effect that Erie Resistor was not applicable, because the harmful effects
of superseniority on the effectiveness of the strike weapon are much greater
when superseniority is initiated during a strike—presumptively to break the
strike—rather than after the strike has ended.
The court, however, concluded that Erie Resistor was controlling, relying
on the following language from that case:
[Superseniority creates] ... a cleavage in the plant continuing long
after the strike is ended. Employees are henceforth divided into two
camps: those who stayed with the union and those who returned
before the end of the strike and thereby gained extra seniority. This
breach is reemphasized with each subsequent layoff and stands as
an ever-present reminder of the dangers connected with striking and
with union activities in general.' 5
The court in Great Lakes also noted that the superseniority provision in Erie
Resistor was limited to layoffs, whereas the superseniority provision presently
before the court was more extensive, covering layoffs, vacation times, pre-
ferred shifts, and open jobs. Thus, the court's application of Erie Resistor to
the facts of this case seems entirely proper, since the superseniority provision
in Great Lakes obviously had effects over a wider range of subjects, and, per-
sisting long after the strike is ended, would intimidate employees from exer-
cising their statutory rights.
14 It was necessary that the court find that the superseniority plan was invalid on
its face, because otherwise the violation would not have been a continuing one, and the
proceedings would have been barred by the'six-month statute of limitations applicable
to unfair labor practices under LMRA § 10(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1964). See Local Lodge 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960);
Bowen Prods. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 731, 36 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1955).
15 360 F.2d at 21, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2090, quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
supra note 2, at 231.
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In his concurring opinion in Erie Resistor,'" Mr. Justice Harlan, al-
though agreeing with the result reached by the majority, stated that he was
"unsure whether the Court intends to hold that the Board has power to out-
law all such [superseniority] . . . plans . . . or only to sustain its action in
the particular circumstances of this case .. .."17 Since the superseniority
plan in Great Lakes was more far-reaching than that in Erie Resistor, the
Fourth Circuit's decision does not shed any light on this question, which must
still be considered open.
D. Economic Strikers
Under established law, an employer may not discharge an economic
striker or a striker protesting an unfair labor practice committed by the
employer.' However, he may temporarily or permanently replace strikers
during an economic strike,2 and he may discharge a striker who is engaging
in a strike for an unlawful purpose.3 After an economic strike, the employer
must reinstate strikers if jobs are still available at the time of the ap-
plication for reinstatement? If no jobs are available at that time, the
employer is not required to reinstate the strikers; nor is the employer re-
quired to seek out the employees or put them on a preferential hiring list
for future openings.!
These rules work successfully if the employer resumes full operations
immediately after the termination of the strike, or if he permanently reduces
the size of his operation. However, a recent case has presented the question
whether these rules should be applied when the employer does not resume
full-scale operations until some time after the end of the strike, although at
all times planning to resume full operations.
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.," the company hired replacements
and operated with a skeleton crew during an economic strike. Two days after
the strike ended, six employees offered to return to work, but the employer
denied them reinstatement on the ground that there were no openings. Only
after two months did the employer hire additional workers, and only after
five months did the company return to full operation. However, officers of
the company testified that at all times the company intended to resume
normal operations as soon as possible. For failure to give these six employees
preference in hiring, the Board found violations of sections 8(a) (1) and (3),
and ordered the company to reinstate these employees.
16 373 U.S. at 237.
17
 Ibid.
1 NLRB v. Delsea Iron Works, Inc., 316 F.2d 231, 53 L.R.R.M. 2029 (3d Cir. 1963);
Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 184, 46 L.R.R.M. 2077 (1st Cir. 1960).
2 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 305 U.S. 333 (1938).
3
 NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 59 L.R.R.M. 2210 (8th Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661, 53 L.R.R.M. 2367 (7th Cir. 1963).
Local 200, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 233 F.2d 233, 38 L.R.R.M. 2095 (7th
Cir. 1956); Brown & Root, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486, 48 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961); Atlas
Storage Div., 112 N.L.R.B. 1175, 36 L.R.R.M. 1171 (1955).
5 See cases cited note 4 supra.
6 366 F.2d 126, 63 L.R.R.M. 2155 (9th Cir. 1966).
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In denying enforcement, the Ninth Circuit held that the strikers' jobs
had been abolished or absorbed, since the determination of whether a striker's
job has been abolished is made "at the time the strikers apply for work after
the strike."' Thus, since no jobs were available at the time of application
two days after the strike, the strikers' status as employees and their con-
comitant preferential hiring rights ceased at that time. Both the majority
and the concurring opinion relied upon Brown & Root, Inc.8 and Atlas Storage
Div.9 as controlling authority; these cases established the rule that a striker
whose job has been absorbed is to be treated in the same manner as a striker
who has been permanently replaced. 1°
The court gave credence to the self-serving testimony of the employer's
administrative vice-president that it would take only a month to secure sup-
plies and resume full operations, and therefore concluded that the employer
did not intend to resume prestrike production after the strike. The court
rejected as not supported by substantial evidence the Board's contrary find-
ing, based on the testimony of several officers, that the employer intended
to resume full-scale operations as soon as possible. However, the court re-
versed the Board even while assuming arguendo that the Board's fact findings
were correct?'
The dissent, on the other hand, concluded that Brown & Root and Atlas
were distinguishable from the facts of Fleetwood and were thus not con-
trolling. The dissent stated that in Atlas the distinguishing factors were that
there was no evidence of the employer's intent to rebuild its labor force and
that the striker's job had been filled by a permanent replacement. The dissent
stated further that in Brown & Root the number of permanent replacements
exceeded the prestrike number of employees, and therefore the strikers had
definitely been replaced and were not entitled to preferential hiring rights.
In order to safeguard the right to strike, the dissent would have substituted
the rule that the applications for reemployment continue to be binding until
the employer has completed his planned increase in production.
It is submitted that the majority opinion is incorrect, and that the dis-
senting opinion is sound. A job is not abolished or absorbed when it is the
employer's intendment to resume prestrike operations as soon as possible,
since these italicized terms connote permanency. The situation seems closer
to that of temporary replacements than to permanent replacements. In Fleet-
wood, while there were not temporary replacements taking the place of the
employees, there was a temporary displacement of employees from their jobs,
also occasioned by the strike. Since the employer had neither hired permanent
replacements nor decided permanently to reduce its operations, the cases
relied on by the court seem inapposite. The Supreme Court has granted
7 Id. at 129, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2157.
8 132 N.L.R.B. 486, 48 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961).
9 112 N.L.R.B. 1175, 36 L.R.R.M. 1171 (1955).
19 As part of a strike settlement, the union and employer agreed that strikers would
not be rehired on a preferential basis, and that if hired at all they would be hired as
new employees with a consequent loss of status. Because of the way it decided the case,
the court did not have to decide whether the union could effectively bargain away
these rights. The dissent also refrained from considering this question.
11 366 F.2d at 129-30, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2158.
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certiorariP and may well reverse the appellate decision for reasons expressed
in that court's dissenting opinion.
E. Jurisdictional Disputes
Under the provisions of section 8(b)(4) (D),' it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union to picket an employer in order to force him to assign
particular work to the employees represented by that union. Under section
10(k),2 the Board, when confronted with such a dispute, is required to decide
which of the two or more competing groups of employees should do the
work The typical work-assignment dispute covered by section 8(h) (4) (D)
involves two unions whose members work for the same employer. 4 However,
in the construction industry, another typical work-assignment dispute covered
by the section involves two unions whose members work for different sub-
contractors.°
In order for the section to become operative, two or more groups of
employees must actually claim the work.° If only one group of employees
claims the work, then there is a dispute merely between the employer and
the union, and there is not the requisite dispute between two groups of em-
ployees."' If work has been assigned to one group of employees for a con-
siderable length of time, another group may not picket in order to force the
assignment of the work. 8 Also, if neither contending group of employees has
been assigned the work in the past, neither may picket .°
However, in a recent case, International Longshoremen's Ass 'n, 1 ° the
12 87 Sup. Ct. 1305 (1967).
1 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)(D) (1964). This section provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . (4) , 	 •
to induce .
	 . any individual .	 . not to perform any services . . . where
. . . an object thereof is: . (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign
particular work to employees in a particular labor organization . . . rather
than to employees in another labor organization . • . .
2
 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964). This section provides that when-
ever a violation of § 8(b) (4) (D) is charged, "the Board is empowered and directed
to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practices shall have
arisen . . . ."
3
 NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
4
 See, e.g., McLeod v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 209 F. Supp. 434, 51
L.R.R.M. 2292 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); McLeod v. New York Mailers Union, 205 F. Supp.
479, 50 L.R.R.M. 2001 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
5 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Carpenters v. C. J. Montag & Sons, 335 F.2d 216,
56 L.R.R.M. 2755 (9th Cir. 1964); Vincent v. Steamfitters Local 395, 288 F.2d 276,
47 L.R.R.M. 2808 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 137
N.L.R.B. 1425, 50 L.R.R.M. 1419 (1962).
6
 Penello v. Local 59, Int'l Sheet Metal Workers, 195 F. Supp. 458, 48 L.R.R.M.
2495 (D. Del. 1961); Local 272, Sheet Metal Workers, 136 N.L.R.B. 1402, 50 L.R.R.M.
1017 (1962); National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees, 127 N.L.R.B. 1070, 46 L.R.R.M.
1153 (1960).
7 See cases cited note 6 supra.
8
 NLRB v. Local 1291, Longshoremen's Union, 345 F.2d 4, 59 L.R.R.M. 2012 (3d
Cir. 1965),
9
 International Bhd. of Carpenters v. C. J. Montag & Sons, supra note 5; Vincent
v. Steamfitters Local 395, supra note 5.
10 158 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 62 L.R.R.M. 1239 (1966).
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Board, in a two-to-one decision, held that even a group of employees who
have done particular work for a number of years may not picket to regain
the work, when the work is assigned to members of another group of em-
ployees. The Board held that the fact that the union was attempting to regain
the work for its members was immaterial, and that there was a jurisdictional
dispute within the scope of section 8(b) (4) (D).
In this case, a shipping terminal, owned by the Erie, Pennsylvania, Port
Authority, was operated by the Western Stevedoring Company under a Port
Authority franchise from 1959 until April 1, 1965. Western's employees were
represented by the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). In
October 1964, the Lawrence Erie Company, a stevedoring and construction
company operating one nearby dock and several construction enterprises,
submitted a bid for the terminal franchise. In the same month, Lawrence
Erie renewed its collective-bargaining contract with the United Mine Workers
(UMW), and job classifications were added to the contract which would have
been necessary only if Lawrence Erie was the successful bidder for the ter-
minal franchise. In December 1964, Lawrence Erie was awarded the franchise.
In anticipation of operating the terminal, the company hired six new em-
ployees, including two former Western employees.
A few days before it was to commence operating the terminal in April
1965, Lawrence Erie received a letter from the ILA, demanding that it hire
the employees of Western to operate the franchise. Lawrence Erie refused
to do so on the grounds that it did not intend to replace its employees, repre-
sented by the UMW, with the employees of Western. Lawrence Erie sug-
gested that the employees of Western apply for any future job openings; this
offer was refused. When the first ships arrived at the terminal after Erie
began to operate it, the ILA picketed the terminal in order to force Lawrence
Erie to hire the former Western employees to work there.
In a proceeding following the filing of an unfair-labor-practice charge,
the Board ruled that the ILA had violated section 8(b) (4) (D). The majority
found that this was a jurisdictional dispute, because an object of the ILA
activity was to force Lawrence Erie to assign the terminal work to the former
Western employees, represented by the ILA. Pursuant to section 10(k), the
Board also found that the disputed work should be awarded to the employees
of Lawrence Erie, rather than to the former employees of Western. The rea-
sons assigned by the Board for this decision were: (I) Lawrence Erie's past
history of recognizing the UMW as the representative of its dock workers;
(2) the interchange of employees from one dock to another which allowed
Lawrence Erie to operate more efficiently and to provide steady work for its
employees; (3) the existing collective-bargaining contract between Lawrence
Erie and the UMW, rather than the ILA; and (4) the fact that the members
of both the UMW and the ILA possessed the requisite skills to perform the
duties incident to the operation of the terminal."
The dissent contended that there was no jurisdictional dispute, because
an object of the ILA's picketing was to protest the hiring practices of Law-
11 The Board used these factors cumulatively and did not give particular stress
to any one of them.
868
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
rence Erie. It was argued that the object of forcing an assignment of work
could not realistically be distinguished from this lawful object of the ILA's
protest picketing. The dissent further stated that even if there were a juris-
dictional dispute, the work should have been assigned to the Western em-
ployees, represented by the ILA, because they had worked at the terminal
longer than the employees of Lawrence Erie and had acquired important
seniority and other rights from their work there. In addition, the dissent
pointed out that only the Western employees had experience with nonself-
unloading, nonbulk cargoes prior to the dispute, which was important be-
cause of the majority's view that both groups possessed the requisite skills.
Although the dissent is not without merit, it is submitted that the
majority is correct. If this dispute had not been held to be a jurisdictional
dispute, then the picketing by the ILA, and the work stoppage caused there-
by, might have continued indefinitely. Even if the ILA picketing were to be
successful and the employer were to replace the employees represented by
the UMW with employees represented by the ILA to perform the work at
the terminal, undoubtedly the UMW would then picket in protest. This is
just the kind of vicious circle which led Congress to enact sections 8(b) (4)-
(D) and 10(k). 12 By interpreting these facts as a jurisdictional dispute, a
solution can be achieved in what otherwise might be an insoluble contro-
versy.
At first glance, it seems proper to award the work at the terminal to
the Lawrence Erie employees, because only in the most unusual circum-
stances should an employer be ordered to take work from his own employees
and assign it to those of another employer. 13 However, as the dissent points
out, Lawrence Erie was continuing in the same place and using the same
facilities as the operations previously conducted by Western, and therefore
Lawrence Erie stood in the position of a successor to Western. It is sub-
mitted that, because of this functional continuity, the Board should have
ordered that the employees of Western were entitled to preferential hiring
rights at Lawrence Erie." Thus, the employees hired by Erie preparatory
to operating the terminal should have been replaced by former Western em-
ployees in accordance with Western's normal seniority procedures.
F. Contract Clauses and Section 8(e)
1. "Hot Cargo" and "Work Preservation" Clauses
Section 8(e) prohibits "hot cargo" agreements between employers and
unions, but the proviso to that section permits agreements banning the sub-
contracting of construction work to be done at the jobsite. 1 The present state
12 See NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, supra note 3.
13
 Local 1266, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 137 N.L.R.B. 68, 50 L.R.R.M. 1054
(1962); District 50, UMW, 136 N.L.R.B. 1068, 49 L.R.R.M. 1936 (1962).
14 Sec Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 58 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1965); Maintenance,
Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299, 57 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1964).
1
 LMRA § 8(e), 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964), provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
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of the law is that primary subcontracting clauses are not within the ambit of
section 8(e), and such clauses may be obtained and enforced by strikes and
picketing.2 On the other hand, entry into secondary subcontracting clauses
is prohibited by section 8(e), except in the construction and garment indus-
tries,3 and, even in these industries, while valid secondary subcontracting
clauses may be obtained by picketing, they may not be enforced by picketing
or other forms of economic pressure
In Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB,s the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals defined primary subcontracting clauses as
those which are "germane to the economic integrity of the principal work
unit" and which seek "to protect and preserve the work and standards [the
union] has bargained for . . . ." 4 Primary clauses have also been described
as those which will directly benefit employees covered thereby, and which
seek to protect the wages and job opportunities of the employees covered
by the contract. 7 On the other hand, secondary clauses have been described
as those which "extend beyond the [contracting] . . . employer and are
aimed really at the union's difference with another employer." 8 In two very
important recent decisions, 2 the Supreme Court, by 5 to 4 decisions, has held
that section 8(e) does not prohibit subcontracting agreements between an
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from • • . doing
business with any other person ...
"Hot cargo" agreements are generally considered agreements not to handle goods which
are produced under nonunion standards or not to handle the goods of an employer whom
the union for other reasons declares "unfair." However, the section prohibits not only
"hot cargo" agreements, but any agreement whereby the employer agrees to cease or
refrain from doing business with any other person.
The construction-site proviso states:
[Nlothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the con-
tracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction,
alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work . ..
Section 8(e) also provides an exemption for "hot cargo" clauses in the garment industry
when the goods are worked on by another person or are a part of an integrated production
process.
2
 NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 38, 338 F.2d 23, 57 L.R.R.M. 2422
(9th Cir. 1964); Teamsters Local 710 v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709, 56 L.R.R.M. 2570 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 55
L.R.R.M. 2293 (D.C. Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
326 F.2d 213, 55 L.R.R.M. 2112 (3d Cir. 1964).
3 See cases cited note 2 supra.
4 NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra note 2; Orange Belt
Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, supra note 2; NLRB v. Local 12, Operating
Eng'rs, 293 F.2d 319, 48 L.R.R.M. 2776 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Lebus v. Local 406, Operating
Eng'rs, 188 F. Supp. 392, 47 L.R.R.M. 2050 (E.D. La. 1960); Northeastern Ind. Bldg.
Trades Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854, 57 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1964).
5 328 F.2d 534, 55 L.R.R.M. 2293 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
6
 Id. at 538, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2296.
7
 Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1086, 1119 (1960).
Local 636, United Ass'n of Plumbers v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 858, 864, 45 L.R.R.M.
3023, 3027 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
sl National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 87 Sup. Ct. 1250 (1967); Houston
Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 87 Sup. Ct. 1278 (1967).
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employer and union designed to preserve work customarily done by members
of the union, and that picketing to enforce such agreements is primary activ-
ity, not prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (B), and therefore outside the pro-
hibition of section 8(e).
In the first of these cases, National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB,"
the employer was subject to a subcontracting provision which stated that
"no member of the District Council will handle . . . any doors ... which
have been fitted prior to being furnished on the job. . . ."" Carpenters in
the locality had customarily cut and fitted doors at the jobsite, although
it was possible to purchase from door manufacturers precut and prefitted
doors ready to be hung. At the direction of the union, the carpenters refused
to handle premachined doors which the employer had purchased, and the
employer withdrew these doors, substituting "blank doors" which were fitted
and cut by carpenters on the jobsite. The contractual provision and the
union's enforcement thereof were subsequently challenged by the Woodwork
Manufacturers Association.
Reversing the Seventh Circuit,'" the Supreme Court held that the union
had violated neither section 8(b) (4) (B) nor section 8(e), since these sections
do not prohibit primary activity and agreements, including subcontracting
clauses designed to preserve work customarily performed by union members.
The Court said that, even assuming arguendo that the subcontracting clause
fits within the literal language of section 8(e), this should not end the in-
quiry into Congress' purpose in enacting the statute, because the Court must
give effect to the intent of Congress.' 3 The Court's examination of the legis-
lative history of labor enactments from the time of the Clayton Act in 1914
revealed a desire on the part of Congress to protect neutral employers from
contending parties and at same time to allow unions to engage in primary
labor disputes with their employers. Finally, analyzing the provisions of
section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA,' 4 the Supreme Court stated:
The prohibition of subsection (B) against a noncertified union's
forcing recognition from an employer was designed to protect the
employer trapped between the union and his employees, a majority
of whom may not desire to choose the union as their representative.
The prohibition of subsection (C) against a demand for recognition
when another union has been certified protects the employer
trapped between the noncertified and the certified unions. The
prohibition of subsection (D) against coercion to force an employer
to assign certain work to one of two unions contesting for it protects
10
 87 Sup. Ct. 1250 (1967).
11
 Id. at 1253.
12 354 F.2d 594, 60 L.R.R.M. 2458 (7th Cir. 1966). The Seventh Circuit, reversing
a Board finding that the clause was not proscribed, held that the will not handle"
clause violated § 8(e) without regard to any "primary" or "secondary" objective. The
court concluded that § 8(e) was designed to prohibit product boycotts, and that the
Supreme Court's decision in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945),
was controlling.
13
 87 Sup. Ct. at 1255.
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the employer trapped between the two claims. The central theme
pervading these provisions of protection for the neutral employer
confirms the assurances of those sponsoring the section that in
subsection (A) Congress likewise meant to protect the employer
only from union pressures designed to involve him in disputes
not his own."
Thus, the crucial criterion is whether the employer is involved in his own
dispute with the union or whether the union is enmeshing the employer in
a dispute which the union has with another employer, i.e., is the union con-
duct addressed to the labor relations of the employer vis-a-vis his own em-
ployees.' 6
Considering the facts in National Woodwork, the Court sustained the
Board's finding that the objective of the clause and of the union conduct to
enforce it was the preservation of work customarily done by the carpenters. 17
The Court concluded that the clause and the conduct were in fact primary,
because they were intended to regulate the relations between the employer
and his carpenters and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the em-
ployees by preserving the unit work. On the other hand, under the Court's
reasoning, refusals to handle nonunion products would doubtless be secondary
and prohibited, because the union's dispute would then be with the nonunion
employer."
Turning to the question whether section 8(e) prohibits even primary
agreements against subcontracting, the Court stated that the 1959 Landrum-
Griffin Act amendments to the LMRA' 5 were intended solely to close several
loopholes, 2° and that "section 8(e) simply closed still another loophole. 721
The loophole to which this section was addressed was the fact that, while
a union could not picket an employer because he handled nonunion goods,
the union and the employer could enter into contract provisions whereby
the employer agreed not to handle such goods. 22 With such a provision, the
union could achieve its goal by applying pressure against the employer to
comply with the agreement, by threat of an action for damages. The Court
concluded that in enacting section 8(e) Congress meant only to remedy this
particular evil and not to prohibit primary agreements. In addition, the Court
expressed the belief that Congress would not prohibit agreements designed
to protect the jobs of employees against the inroads of automation—the
15 87 Sup. Ct. at 1258.
16 Id. at 1258-59. See also Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB,
supra note 5.
17 87 Sup. Ct. at 1269.
18
 This comports well with the existing state of the law. See NLRB v. Joint Council
of Teamsters No. 38, 338 F.2d 23, 57 L.R.R.M. 2422 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Teamsters Local
413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 55 L.R.R.M. 2878 (D.C. Cir. 1964); District 9, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 33, 51 L.R.R.M. 2496 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
18
 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
20 For a detailed treatment of the loopholes which had developed and which
prompted the amendments, see NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51-54 (1964).
21 87 Sup. Ct. at 1263.
22 Ibid.
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"most vital problem created by advanced technology" 23—without first having
extended debates on the subject. 24
In the legislative debates concerning the 1959 amendments, it was clearly
expressed that the intent of the section was to prohibit product boycotts, 25
such as the one in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW. 26 In that case the
New York City local of the IBEW and New York City electrical contractors
and manufacturers had agreed that no electrical equipment would be pur-
chased from outside the city; the manufacturers had also agreed to confine
their New York City sales to contractors who employed members of the local.
The Supreme Court held that the union and the employers had violated the
antitrust laws.
Answering the contention of the Woodwork Manufacturers Association
that Congress meant by sections 8(b) (4) (B) and 8(e) to outlaw all product
boycotts, the Court stated that in Allen Bradley the electrical workers em-
ployed by the contractors were not trying to preserve their own work, but
were preserving the work of the employees of the manufacturers. The Court
further felt that Allen Bradley was distinguishable from National Woodwork
because the boycott in Allen Bradley was not carried on as a "shield" to
preserve the jobs of the local's members, but was intended to create a
monopoly of present and future jobs. 27 The Court expressly stated that it
was not deciding what result would obtain in a case where a union attempts
to gain new jobs, when its own jobs are not threatened. 28
The dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart, in which Justices Black, Douglas,
and Clark joined, concluded that the agreement and the union activity
to enforce it violated both sections 8(b) (4) (B) and 8(e). 2° The dis-
sent cited the Senate Report on the then section 8(b) (4) (A)—the pre-
cursor of section 8(b) (4) (B)—which stated that the section prohibited the
type of secondary boycott conducted by the union in Allen Bradley.3° In
this connection the dissent differed from the majority's interpretation of
Allen Bradley in two aspects: first, in the factual determination of the major-
ity that the Allen Bradley boycott was intended to create new job oppor-
tunities, because, on the contrary, the record indicated that "the boycott was
undertaken for the defensive purpose of restoring job opportunities lost in
the depression"; 31 and, second, in the distinction between work preservation
and work aggrandizement, which the dissent said the Court had created
23 Id. at 1267.
24 Id. at 1266-67. The Court also stated that its decision in Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), holding that subcontracting was a mandatory bar-
gaining subject, implicitly recognized the legitimacy of work-preservation clauses. The
reason assigned for this conclusion was that the mandatory bargaining would be rendered
meaningless if subcontracting agreements secured as a result of such bargaining were
in violation of §.§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4).
25 See, e.g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4132 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ellender) ; id. at 4198-99
(remarks of Senator Taft); id. at 5011 (remarks of Senator Ball).
26 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
27 87 Sup. Ct. at 1260.
28 Id. at 1261.
29 Id. at 1271,
3° Id. at 1274, citing S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947).
51 Id. at 1275.
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"out of thin air,"32
 there being nothing in the language or in the legislative
history of the section to sustain the distinction. Agreeing with the Court
that section 8(e) was intended to prevent the circumvention of section
8(b) (4), the dissent concluded that the activity proscribed by section
8(b) (4) was also proscribed by section 8(e), with the exception of the
activity excluded by the latter's provisos. Consequently, the dissent found
that the agreement in National Woodwork violated section 8(e).
While there is merit to the position of the dissent, it is submitted that
the majority is correct. For one thing, the references in the legislative history
to Allen Bradley are addressed to its egregious character: the fact that it
created a monopoly for the local's members in New York City. 33
 Thus, Sen-
ator Ball, criticizing the measures suggested by the President as an alternative
to section 8(b)(4) (A), stated that the President's measure "would not touch
at all one of the worst situations which has arisen, such as that in New York
where a local of the IBEW is using the secondary boycott to maintain a tight
little monopoly for its own employees, its own members, and a few employers
in that area."34 Secondly, as Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in a concurring
memorandum opinion," Congress was not squarely faced with the precise
problems of this case; therefore, "in view of Congress' . . . recognition of
the boycott as a legitimate weapon,"30 and in view of the legitimate interests
of a labor union in protecting employees against adverse effects resulting
from changing technology, the Court should not presume that Congress out-
lawed such activity where the legislative record is so ambiguous.
In the second important Supreme Court case, Houston Insulation Con-
tractors Ass'n v. NLRB," the collective-bargaining agreement between the
contractors association and Local 22 of the International Association of Heat
& Frost Insulators provided that the employer would not contract out work
relating to "the preparation, distribution and application of pipe and boiler
coverings." 3B When Johns-Manville Company subcontracted such work, em-
ployees of Johns-Manville, at the direction of the union, refused to handle
the subcontracted goods. Expressly relying on its holding in National Wood-
work, the Court affirmed the Board's" and Fifth Circuit's° dismissals of
section 8(b) (4) (B) charges against the union, because the union's activity
was designed to preserve work customarily performed by the employees of
Johns-Manville.
The NLRB has also had occasion to consider the work-preservation
problem during the current Survey year. In one recent decision, Highway
32 Ibid.
33 See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 4132 (1947)
(remarks of Senator Ellender).
34 93 Cong. Rec. 5011 (1947).
35 87 Sup. Ct. at 1270.
36
 Id. at 1271.
27 87 Sup. Ct. 1278 (1967). This case is discussed more fully pp. 878-80 infra.
38
 Id. at 1279.
30 International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators, 148 N.L.R.B. 866, 57 L.R.R.M.
1065 (1964).
40 357 F.2d 182, 61 L.R.R.M. 2529 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Truck Drivers, Local 107,41 a local of the Teamsters Union sought to obtain
two subcontracting clauses which were substantially similar to those con-
tained in many Teamsters' contracts throughout the country. The first sub-
contracting clause required the employer to pay union wages to all drivers,
even if they were the employees of independent contractors, and required
any employee of independent contractors to be an "employee" of the sig-
natory employer while performing work for him. The second subcontracting
clause required the employer not to subcontract to anyone not observing
union wages, hours, and conditions of employment. When the employer re-
fused to accept these clauses, the union struck and picketed in an effort to
compel acceptance.
The General Counsel issued a complaint, which charged that both clauses
violated section 8(e) and that the picketing to obtain them violated section
8(b) (4). The Board, however, found the clauses and the picketing lawful,
on the basis that the clauses were designed to preserve unit work for unit
members. Quoting with approval the language of Meat & Highway Drivers,
Local 710 v. NLRB,42
 the Board stated that a subcontracting clause was
valid if it applied "to jobs fairly claimable by the bargaining unit,"" and
if the purpose of the clause was "preservation of those jobs for the bargain-
ing unit."'"
Applying this test, the Board found that the jobs covered by the clauses,
which constituted all the driving jobs of the employer, were fairly claimable
by the union because, although the employer customarily utilized independent
contractors to perform substantial parts of its driving, the nature of the work
performed by the unit employees was identical to that performed by the
independent contractors." The Board felt that the union had a "legitimate
primary interest" in protecting all the work of the employer for the unit
employees. The Board also found a legitimate intent to protect work for
unit employees by the maintenance of wage standards, because such protec-
tion had been especially difficult in the trucking field and could be effectively
policed only by such clauses."
If the clauses had prohibited subcontracting rather than having specified
conditions for it, the aim of the clauses would clearly have been to gain
additional jobs for unit members. Such clauses would therefore be intended
as "swords" rather than "shields," and the question which the Supreme
Court expressly reserved in National Woodwork would have been directly
raised. It should be noted that the Court might well have held such clauses
invalid, since it distinguished the valid clause in National Woodwork from
the unlawful clause in Allen Bradley in part on the basis that the clause in
Allen Bradley was used to increase the work performed by unit members. 47
However, the clauses in Highway Truck Drivers merely limited sub-
41 159 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 62 L.R.R.M. 1224 (1966).
42 335 F.2d 709, 56 L.R.R.M. 2570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
43 Id. at 713, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2573.
44 Ibid.
45 159 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1225.
46 Id., 62 L.R.R.M. at 1227 n.22.
47 87 Sup. Ct. at 1260.
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contracting to employers who maintained union standards. For this reason,
it is submitted that they were primary clauses. The employer was free to
continue to subcontract all or part of his work. The clauses seem designed
for defensive purposes in that they simply took away from the employer the
incentive to subcontract based on securing cheaper labor.48
2. Picket-Line Clauses
In another recent case involving section 8(e), the District of Columbia
Circuit Court held that a picket-line clause was in violation of that section
insofar as it applied to secondary picket lines. 4° In Teamsters Local 695 v.
NLRB, 5° the contract clause read: "No employee shall be subject to discipline
by the Employer for refusal to cross a picket line or enter upon the premises
of another employer if the employees of such other employer are engaged
in an authorized strike." In an action alleging violation of 8 (b) (4) (B), the
Board stated that a clause protecting employees from crossing primary picket
lines was valid under section 8(e). 5 ' However, the Board interpreted the
instant clause as extending to secondary picket lines as well as to primary
picket lines, and held that the clause thereby violated section 8(e) "insofar
as, and to the extent that, it applies to secondary activity." 52
The court of appeals sustained the Board's holdings, relying upon the
legislative history of the 1959 amendments and on the House Labor Com-
mittee report, which stated: "It is settled law that the National Labor
Relations Act does not require a truckdriver to cross a primary picket line.
. . . The employer could agree that he would not require the driver to enter
the strike-bound plant."'" (Emphasis added.) In addition, the court referred
to the fact that Professor Archibald Cox, who had been one of the principal
draftsmen of the legislation, stated that section 8(e) would not prohibit
agreements sanctioning refusal to cross a lawful primary picket line. 54
In the 1953 case of NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 5 the
Supreme Court referred to the proviso to section 8(b) (4) which states:
[N]othing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to
make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises
of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees
of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by
48 Cf. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 328 F.2d 534, 55 L.R.R.M.
2293 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Truck Drivers, Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 55 L.R.R.M.
2878 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
40 A primary picket line is one formed by employees of the primary employer against
that employer. A secondary picket line is generally one formed by employees of a
primary employer against a secondary employer.
50 361 F.2d 547, 62 L.R.R.M. 2135 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
51
 152 N.L.R.B. 577, 59 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1965).
112
 Id. at 582, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1132.
53
 I Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, at 779.
51
 Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 Minn. L. Rev. 257, 272 (1959).
55
 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
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a representative of such employees whom such employer is required
to recognize under this Act . . . 56
The Court found that this proviso "clearly enables contracting parties to
embody in their contract a provision against requiring an employee to cross
a picket line if they so agree. And nothing in the Act prevents their agreeing
upon contrary provisions if they consider them appropriate to the particular
kind of business involved." 57
 The difficulty created by the Rockaway opinion
arises because it is possible to interpret this language as validating agreements
protecting employees from discipline for refusals to cross secondary as well
as primary picket lines.
However, in Teamsters Local 695 the circuit court relied on the fact
that the picket line involved in Rockaway was primary, and also relied on the
legislative history of the 1959 amendments to narrow the interpretation of
Rockaway. The court's decision seems correct because of the wording of the
section and its legislative history, discussed above. An additional reason
comes from the dissent in Rockaway, which emphasized that the act did
not intend to deprive unions of the advantage achieved by the habitual
practice of unionmen to respect union picket lines. 58 The dissent stated that
the proviso to section 8 (b) (4) made it clear that the section should not "be
construed to make it unlawful for a man to refuse to cross a picket line
thrown up to support a lawful strike." 59 (Emphasis added.) By the term
"lawful strike," the dissent no doubt meant a strike which did not constitute
an unfair labor practice. Thus, since the dissent was arguing for an inter-
pretation of the proviso more favorable to unions than the majority inter-
pretation, and since the majority spoke in terms of lawful picket lines, it
seems clear that the Supreme Court would limit picket-line clauses to primary
picket lines.
In addition,,in Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons," the Eighth
Circuit held that the act permits a picket-line clause which states that it will
not be a cause for discharge of an employee to refuse to cross a picket line
that has been "legally authorized."°' The Eighth Circuit thus also interpreted
Rockaway to require that the picket line be legally established. Again, the
references to legality doubtless mean activity which does not constitute an
unfair labor practice.
Thus, under the rule of Teamsters Local 695 and Meier & Pohlmann,
picket-line clauses must be restricted to legal picket lines, that is to say,
primary picket lines. However, such clauses, if broad enough to include
secondary picket lines, will not be declared totally invalid under section 8(e),
but invalid only insofar as they apply to secondary picket lines.
no LMRA § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
57 345 U.S. at 80. The Court went on to hold that the collective-bargaining agree-
ment required employees to cross picket lines around the premises of other employers, and
therefore that the discharge of an employee for refusal to cross a picket line did not
constitute an unfair labor practice.
58 Id. at 81 (Black, J., dissenting).
'' Ibid.
43° 233 F.2d 296, 38 L.R.R.M. 2533 (8th Cir. 1956).
81 Id. at 301, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2536.
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G. Secondary Boycotts
1. Activity in Aid of a Sister Local
Section 8(b) (4) (B), 1 the so-called secondary boycott provision of the
LMRA, prohibits a union from forcing an employer to cease dealing with
any other person, but the proviso to that section exempts from the prohibi-
tion any primary strike or primary picketing. In National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 2
 the Supreme Court held, five to four, that "primary pick-
eting" means picketing of the primary employer, with the intention of af-
fecting the labor policies of that employer. In Houston Insulation
Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB,3
 decided the same day as National Woodwork,
the Supreme Court, in another five-to-four decision, 4 held that a local union,
even though having no economic interest in a dispute between the primary
employer and a sister local, may exert economic pressure against the employer
in support of the sister local.
In Houston Insulation, the Armstrong Contracting & Supply Corpora-
tion was a signatory to a contract with Local 22 of the Heat & Frost In-
sulators which provided that all its "mitering," i.e., cutting straight lengths
of asbestos at angles to cover pipe curves, was to be performed at its shop
by members of Local 22; this provision also applied to jobs situated outside
the jurisdiction of Local 22. In August 1963, Armstrong employees who were
members of Local 113 of the Heat & Frost Insulators refused to apply
mitered fittings purchased by Armstrong from a company which did not
employ members of Local 22.
The contractors' association charged Local 113 with an unlawful secon-
dary boycott, and the General Counsel issued a complaint.5 The Board rejected
the contention of the General Counsel that the local had boycotted nonunion
goods in violation of section 8 (b)(4) (B). 5 The Board concluded that the
activity was intended to preserve work and was not directed against the use
of nonunion goods, noting that although the supplier was nonunion, the
local had never refused to apply nonunion, nonprefabricated products, and
that the purchase of prefabricated products deprived Armstrong employees
of work they had customarily performed. Since the local's conduct was de-
signed to protest a deprivation of work and to preserve work for Armstrong's
1 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(1964).
2 87 Sup. Ct. 1250 (1967). This case is discussed more fully pp. 871-74 supra.
3 87 Sup. Ct. 1278 (1967).
4 The composition of the majority and of the dissent in Houston Insulation was the
same as in National Woodwork.
5 Two complaints were before the Board in this case. One concerned activity by
members of Local 22 who were employed by Johns-Manville Company, and the other
concerned activity by members of Local 113 who were employed by Armstrong. The
activity of Local 113 was centered around work preservation for members of Local 22
who were employed by Armstrong. Thus, while Local 22 was involved in both disputes,
the disputes were completely distinct, and Local 22 was not charged with an unfair
labor practice in the Armstrong dispute which is here discussed. The dispute between
Local 22 and Johns-Manville is discussed p. 874 supra.
6
 International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators, 148 N.L.R.B. 866, 57 L.R,R.M.
1065 (1964).
878
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
employees, the Board held that such conduct constituted primary activity
and was protected by the LMRA.
The dissent, however was of the opinion that the conduct of Local 113
violated section 8 (b) (4) (B). 7
 It stated that since members of Local 113 had
not previously performed the mitering work, Local I13's conduct was directed
not at protecting work of its members but at preserving only the work of
Local 22 in its relation to Armstrong. The dissent contended that the activity
was not protected, because Local 113 lacked a direct interest in the work it
was attempting to preserve.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Boards and found that Local
113 had violated section 8(b) (4) (B), agreeing with the dissent below. The
court concluded that the activity was secondary because, since Local 113
would not do the mitering in any event, it was acting solely to benefit Local
22. The court stated that a direct economic interest of Local 113's own mem-
bers was essential for its conduct to be primary activity, and that an emo-
tional interest in aiding a sister local was insufficient. It interpreted section
8(b) (4) as requiring unions to restrict their economic coercion to their own
labor disputes, and not to use economic pressure in aid of another union, even
though it represented employees of the same employer.
The court also rejected the position of the Board that Local 113 was the
third-party beneficiary of Local 22's contract with Armstrong or, alterna-
tively, that it was the agent of Local 22. It rejected the former on the ground
that Local 113 would receive no benefit from its own activity, and the latter
on the ground that there was no evidence in the record of an agency rela-
tionship. Moreover, the court felt that contract and agency principles of law,
having "developed in other contexts for other purposes," 9 had no relevance to
the question whether economic coercion by a union is valid.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fifth Circuit with regard to the
charges against Local 113, ruling that the LMRA protects the right of primary
employees to take concerted action against the primary employer even though
they have no direct interest at stake. The Court quoted with approval the
language of a 1954 Board decision: "Congress was not concerned to protect
primary employers against pressures by disinterested unions, but rather to
protect disinterested employers against direct pressures by any union."1° The
dissent incorporated by reference the dissent expressed in National Wood-
work, and thus was based on the contention that sections 8(b) (4) and 8(e)
prohibit all work-preservation clauses and economic pressure to enforce them. 11
The holding of the Court that unions, although not directly interested in
a dispute, may take concerted action against the primary employer, seems a
not unwarranted application of the section 7 right of employees to engage in
activities for their mutual aid and protection. This right has long been held
to permit employees having no direct interest in a dispute to engage in con-
7
 Id, at 870, S7 L.R.R.M. at 1066 (Member Leedom, dissenting).
8
 357 F.2d 182, 61 L.R.R.M. 2529 (5th Cir. 1966).
a Id, at 189, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2534.
10
 87 Sup. Ct. at 1281, quoting United Ass'n of Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local
106, 110 N.L.R.B. 206, 209, 34 L.R.R.M. 1624, 1626 (1954).
11 Id. at 1281.
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certed activities to protect a fellow employee. 12 The reason for the rule is that
in this way the employees assure themselves of the support of the one they
are helping."
However, the disturbing aspect of the case is that it permits an essen-
tially local dispute to become enlarged by permitting activity against the pri-
mary employer, wherever he operates. Instead of reducing the number and
extent of strikes, this decision may incite their extension. Yet, since the ac-
tivity, if it is to be permitted, must be directed to the labor disputes of the
primary employer, the decision of the majority seems to be the correct inter-
pretation of the statute.
2. Ambulatory Worksites
Under the LMRA, there may be lawful picketing of a primary employer
even though the work situs of the employer is ambulatory.'' Thus, picketing
of a ship operated by the primary employer may follow the ship. 15 A recent
decision has raised the question of when an ambulatory work situs of the
primary employer becomes the work situs solely of the secondary employer.
In National Maritime Union v. NLRB," the Mid-America Transporta-
tion Company (MAT) was engaged in the transportation of bulk commodi-
ties by barge on the Mississippi River between docks at East St. Louis,
Illinois and the fleeting or mooring area at Inver Grove, Minnesota. The
National Maritime Union represented MAT's unlicensed maritime employ-
ees. Twin City Barge & Towing Company (Towing) provided towing and
cleaning services for MAT in the Inver Grove area. Minnesota Harbor
Service, Inc. (Harbor) supplied similar services in the St. Paul area. Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Association (Farmers) was engaged in the storage
and merchandizing of grain. It owned a terminal in downtown St. Paul,
from which it shipped grain by barge. Farmers had a contract with AIAT
which required MAT to furnish and Farmers to use at least 100 barges
during the 1964 navigation season, and provided that Farmers must clean
the barges prior to the loading of grain and must load and unload the
cargo. Most of Farmers' shipments were destined for the Gulf of Mexico,
and MAT transported the cargo only as far as St. Louis.
On August 1, 1964, the Maritime Union commenced an economic strike
against MAT, and picketed on several occasions at Farmers' dock in St.
Paul. At all these times, MAT barges were at Farmers' dock. The picket
signs stated that the union was on strike against MAT, and that "we have
no dispute with any other employer." Employees of Farmers refused to
load MAT barges so long as the union picketed. Farmers attempted to ob-
tain barges from other sources with only partial success, but rejected a MAT
12
 NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 10 L.R.R.M.
852 (2d Cir. 1942).
13 Ibid.
14
 Local 28, Masters, Mates & Pilots, 135 N.L.R.B. 1175, 49 L.R.R.M. 1943 (1962);
Local 861, IBEW, 135 N.L.R.B. 250, 49 L.R.R.M. 1446 (1962); Local 662, Radio &
Television Eng'rs, 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1961).
15 Seafarers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 43 L.R.R.M. 2465 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
16 367 F.2d 171, 63 L.R.R.M. 2268 (8th Cir. 1966).
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offer to supply barges. Work on barges other than those operated by MAT
proceeded as usual during the picketing.
On three occasions, employees of Towing refused to move MAT barges
when they saw union pickets with signs identical to those carried at Farm-
ers' dock. The towing of the barges of other companies was not interrupted
by the picketing. The union also picketed at Harbor's property in St.
Paul with a sign reading "NMU on strike," but this picketing induced no
Harbor employee to cease work.
The Eighth Circuit, affirming the Board decision," found that NMU
had violated section 8(b) (4)(B) by staging secondary boycotts against
Farmers, Towing, and Harbor. The court stated that the union's activity
fell within the strict language of clauses (i) and (ii) of section 8(b)(4). It
also found that the union's activity was within the language of subsection
(B), exclusive of that subsection's proviso. The court concluded that the
question whether the activity was proscribed by section 8(b) (4) would
turn on whether it was held to be primary picketing—protected by that
proviso—or proscribed secondary picketing. The court ruled that the picket-
ing was secondary, because:
The barges' status as an employment situs, if it was such on the
trip upriver, ceased when MAT's transportation ended at Inver
Grove. . . . [T]he barges had ceased to be the jobsite before
[the] . . . picketing took place. They had then become, instead,
the normal jobsites of secondary employees alone and the picketing
was directed to and affected their normal work at such normal
sites without the accompaniment of even proximateness of primary
status. 18
This case comports well with the requirement of Sailors' Union,19 that
the employees of the primary employer be present at the ambulatory situs
in order that the picketing be primary and legal. The case does not fit
within the exception which permits picketing even though employees of the
primary employer are temporarily absent during a small part of the picket-
ing,2° because here the employees of MAT were, of course, absent from the
situs throughout the picketing. Thus, the court correctly ruled that the
picketing was secondary and, consequently, unprotected.
H. Union's Duty of Fair Representation
In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,' the Supreme Court declared that a union
subject to the NLRA is under a duty to represent the unit employees fairly.
17
 National Maritime Union, 152 N.L.R,B. 1447, 59 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
18
 367 F.2d at 178.
10 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950). This case is commonly known as the
Moore Dry Dock case.
20 New Power Wire & Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 71, 58 L.R.R.M. 2123 (2d
Cir. 1965); Seafarers Intl Union v. NLRB, supra note 15; Teamsters, Local 618 v.
NLRB, 249 F.2d 332, 41 L.R.R.M. 2106 (8th Cir. 1957).
1
 323 U.S. 248 (1944). Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944),
decided on the same day as Wallace, held that a duty of fair representation was imposed
upon unions subject to the Railway Labor Act.
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This duty was said to be implicit in section 9(a) as a corollary to the union's
right to be the exclusive representative of the employees. 2 A Tong line of
subsequent Supreme Court cases has firmly established this doctrine. 3 Under
the LAMA, however, there is no requirement that a union accept an individual
into membership, even if the union refusal is based on arbitrary grounds. 4
This is so despite the fact that sections 7 and 8(b) (1) (A) can be read
together so as to state that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization .. . to restrain employees [in their right] . . . to join labor
organizations."
Since its decision in Miranda Fuel Co.,5
 the Board has consistently held
that a breach of the duty of fair representation violates sections 8(b) (1) (A),
(2), and (3).6 Violations of section 8(b) (1) (A) have been found on the
theory that the section 7 right of employees to bargain through representatives
of their own choosing gives to employees a right to be free from invidious or
unfair treatment by their bargaining representative in matters affecting their
employment .' Violations of section 8(b) (2) have been based on union
attempts to cause discrimination against the employment status of employees
for irrelevant or unfair reasons. The Board has found the requisite intent to
encourage union activities when (1) such encouragement is a foreseeable
result of the union activity, and (2) there is no legitimate purpose for the
union's acts. 8 Section 8(b) (3) 9
 has been found violated on the ground that
the union's duty to bargain extends not only to the employer, but also to the
unit employees. 19
2 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § •59(a) (1964). This section states:
Representatives designated or selected • .. by the majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment . . . .
3
 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964);
Syres v. Oil Workers, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953).
4 Moynahan v. Pari-Mutual Employees Guild, 317 F.2d 209, 53 L.R.R.M. 2154
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 911 (1963). For a similar decision under the Railway
Labor Act, see Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359, 43
L.R.R.M. 2159 (6th Cir. 1958). If, in addition to the arbitrary denial of union member-
ship, the union causes the employer to discriminate against an employee in the terms
or conditions of employment, with an intent to encourage union activity, the union
would violate § 8(h) (2).
5 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962).
Decisions in which the Board has followed its Miranda holding include: Local 12,
United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964); United Auto
Workers, 149 N.L.R.B. 482, 57 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1964) ; Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, .57 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1964); Local 1, Metal Workers, 147
N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1284 (1964). See also International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
158 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 62 L.R.R.M. 1239 (1966).
7 See cases cited note 6 supra.
8
 Ibid.
9 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3). This section provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . .
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the
representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a) . . . •
10 See Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 5.
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In NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.," however, the Second Circuit reversed
the Board's finding of unfair labor practices. In this case, each member of
the three-judge panel offered a separate opinion. The opinions of two judges
agreed that the result reached by the Board should be reversed, but only the
opinion of Judge Medina reached the question whether the failure of the
union to fairly represent the employees constitutes an unfair labor practice.
He concluded that it was not the intention of Congress to make a breach
of the duty of fair representation, which duty arises out of section 9(a), an
unfair labor practice under section 8. He considered that only discrimination
which was subjectively intended to encourage union activity could be the
basis of an unfair labor practice by the union. In sum, he rejected the Board's
position that section 7 gives employees a right to fair representation which
is protected by section 8(b) (1) (A).
In Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 12 the Fifth Circuit
became the first circuit court to expressly sustain the Board's view that a
failure by a union to fairly represent employees violates section 8(b) (1) (A)
because such failure interferes with the employees' section 7 rights." Thus,
the Second and Fifth Circuits are in conflict as to whether the breach of the
duty of fair representation by a union constitutes an unfair labor practice.
In expressly disagreeing with the Second Circuit's decision in Miranda,
the Fifth Circuit emphasized that, under the court's Miranda rule, many
acts of discrimination against employees by unions would not be unfair labor
practices, because of Miranda's requirement that the union intend thereby
to encourage union membership. The court noted the established principle
that section 9(a) implicitly imposes upon unions a duty of fair representa-
tion," and voiced doubt that Congress intended to require of unions a duty
of fair representation without providing an effective means of enforcement
of that duty. It also felt that court actions by employees for breach of the
duty would be an inadequate method of enforcement. 15 The court reasoned
11
 326 F.2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963).
12
 368 F.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395 (5th Cir. 1966).
13 In a per curiam decision, NLRB v. Local 4367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
368 F.2d 1010, 63 L.R.R.M. 2.559 (5th Cir. 1966), three Fifth Circuit judges who
had not participated in Local 12 found that the union had committed a violation of
§ 8(b) (1) in failing fairly to represent employees. However, one judge dissented from
Local 1367 and another judge, concurring in the result, found a violation only because
there was a clear failure to represent fairly and the decision would expedite the remedy.
He felt that Local 12 set a dangerous precedent, which would be destructive of unions
if carried forward to any extent, and that it would be better to allow individual
employees to file suit. Thus, it is highly questionable, even in the Fifth Circuit, whether
breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice.
14 See cases cited note 3 supra.
15 The court was cognizant of the fact that breach of the union's duty was also
in violation of Section 703(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255,
52 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c). However, the court did not feel that it was the intent
of Congress in passing that statute to supplant Board jurisdiction. Moreover, the court
noted that the Civil Rights Act prohibited disciimination by unions only on, grounds
of race, religion, color, sex, and national origin, and that consequently there would be
many instances of discrimination which only the LMRA would reach.
The court did not mention, as a possible alternative to unfair-labor-practice proceed-
ings, the power of the Board to decertify the union as the bargaining representative of
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that this remedy was unsatisfactory because of the prohibitive expense in-
volved, and because the courts might find that the Board has exclusive juris-
diction under the Garmon preemption rule since the union's action arguably
constitutes an unfair labor practice." In addition, the court pointed out
that, under the Second Circuit's decision in Miranda, the duty of fair repre-
sentation is in the unique position of being the only duty imposed by the
LMRA the violation of which does not constitute an unfair labor practice. 17
In view of this clear split between the Second and Fifth Circuits, it is
apparent that the question of whether breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation is a violation of sections 7 and 8 will be resolved only by the Supreme
Court.
In Vaca v. Sipes, 18 the Supreme Court bypassed an opportunity to resolve
this dispute. In this case an employee sued his union in a Missouri state
court under section 301 for damages for breach of the collective-bargaining
agreement arising out of the union's alleged arbitrary refusal to process his
grievance. A divided Court held that the Missouri Supreme Court was correct
in finding that the Garmon doctrine of Board preemption did not apply to
suits against unions based upon such allegations, at least where there is a
concurrent breach-of-contract suit against the employer under section 301,
and that the state and federal courts had jurisdiction over the dispute even
though the action arguably constituted an unfair labor practice. 18 •However,
in reversing the Missouri court, the Supreme Court held that federal, and
not state, substantive law applied. 20
The majority opinion took no position on whether the violation of the
duty of fair representation constituted an unfair labor practice. Instead the
Court stated that "we may assume for present purposes that such a breach
of duty by the union is an unfair labor practice, as the NLRB and the Fifth
Circuit have held."2 ' However, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas,
in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan joined, agreed only with
the result of the majority, and contended that the preemption doctrine should
apply even to suits for breach of contract in state and federal courts where
the breach also constitutes an unfair labor practice.22 Relying on the Board's
decision in Miranda and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Local 12, the con-
curring opinion held that "a complaint by an employee that the union has
breached its duty of fair representation is subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
the employees. Doubtless the court would have rejected this as an insufficient remedy,
because it does nothing to compensate the individual employees who have been the
victims of misrepresentation.
10 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Supreme
Court held that state and federal court jurisdiction is preempted whenever a controversy
involves activity which "is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act." Id. at 245. Of
course, if the union activity is also a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement, the
suit could be brought in a federal or state court under § 301. See Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335 (1964).
17 368 F.2d at 21, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2401.
18 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
19 For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the case, see pp. 841-43 supra.
20 386 U.S. at 174.
21- Id. at 186.
22 Id. at 198.
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tion of the NLRB. It is a charge of unfair labor practice." 23 Thus, it is clear
that the Board's position has substantial support in the Supreme Court.
However, it is still impossible to predict what decision the full Supreme
Court would reach upon direct confrontation with this important question.
Although the legislative history and the wording of sections 7 and
8(b) (1) do not clearly make the breach of the duty of fair representation
an unfair labor practice, it is submitted that such a breach does constitute
a violation of section 8(b) (1). First, it should be remembered that section 9
does not expressly impose the duty of fair representation upon unions, and
yet such a duty has been consistently imposed. Second, in section 7 Congress
did expressly grant employees a right to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and it is not lightly to be assumed that
Congress would permit that right to be rendered virtually meaningless by
union abuses.
I. Union Discipline of Members
Section 8(b) (1) (A) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a
union to restrain employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 1 However,
under the proviso to that section, a union has the "right to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership" in the union.
The present state of the law is that the threat of sanction by a union against
an employee for any reason other than failure to pay periodic union dues is in
violation of sections 8(b) (1) and (2) when such sanction will affect his
employment status. 2 Further, a union may not fine a member for exceeding
production quotas unilaterally established by the union, since such rules are
considered to go beyond the confines of purely internal union matters. 3
The imposition of a fine by a union upon a member for filing unfair-
labor-practice charges against the union constitutes "restraint" or "coercion"
in violation of section 8(b) (1) (A). 4 A union which imposes fines upon its
23 Ibid.
1 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (A) (1964).
2 NLRB v. Local 450, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 281 F.2d 313, 46 L.R.R.M.
2611 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Food Fair Stores, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 756, 48 L.R.R.M. 1128
(1961), enforced as modified, 307 F.2d 3, 50 L.R.R.M. 2913 (3d Cir. 1962); United
Auto Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 1035, 47 L.R.R.M. 1449, enforced, 297 F.2d 272, 49
L.R.R.M. 2310 (1st Cir. 1961).
LMRA § 8(b)(2), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964), provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . .
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an em-
ployee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership . 	 . .
3
 Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745, 60 L.R.R.M. 2345 (9th
Cir. 1965).
4 Ryan v. International Bhd, of Elec. Workers, 361 F,2d 942, 62 L.R.R.M. 2339
(7th Cir. 1966) ; Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427, 59 L.R.R.M. 2801 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Local 138, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964);
Peerless Tool & Eng'r Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 853, 35 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1955).
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members for crossing picket lines and attempts to secure payment by suit
or by threat of suit has been held to violate section 8 (h) (1). 5 However, a
union may lawfully expel a member from the union for filing a decertification
petition against the union.° This result is reached on the reasoning that a
union should not have to keep within its ranks an "enemy," that is to say, a
person who desires to remove the union as the bargaining agent.
In a recent decision, Cannery Workers,? the Board further restricted
the sanctions that a union may impose when it held that the union violated
the act by expelling an employee from union membership for filing unfair-
Iabor-practice charges against the union. As mentioned above, a union violates
the act by fining an employee for filing unfair-labor-practice charges; the
Board extended this rule to include expulsion because it found that mere loss
of union membership was "coercive," even without loss of employment or fine,
since, by being expelled, the employee loses his share in strike funds, pension
funds, and the like to which he has contributed. Also, the Board noted that the
employee loses the means to affect the way in which the union represents him.
The Board further concluded that the union rule which required the
exhaustion of internal union remedies before a member brings an unfair-labor-
practice charge against the union could not be enforced by coercive means,
which included suit or threat of suit by the union. The basis for this decision
was the overriding public interest in preventing restrictions on access to Board
processes.
In deciding this case, the Board was faced with a previous decision,
Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 8
 in which it had held that a union did not violate
section 8 (b) (1) (A) when it expelled a member for filing a decertification
petition against the union. The Board distinguished Cannery Workers from
Tawas because of the different nature of the member's act in each case.
Unfair-labor-practice charges relate to fixed past events, whereas in repre-
sentation disputes the circumstances are fluid and relate to the future event
of an election; also, the filing of unfair-labor-practice charges does not con-
stitute an attack on the union's existence, unlike the filing of a decertification
petition.
The Board is undoubtedly correct in allowing a union to expel a member
who files a decertification petition, because "to tolerate an active opponent
within their ranks would undermine their collective action [to achieve or
maintain majority status] . . . and thereby tend to distort the results of the
election." The Board properly considered that unity among union members
on the issue whether the union should be the bargaining representative is
essential to effective union efforts to win the support of a majority of the
employees. It would be very difficult for a union ever to win a representation
election if there were divisions within its own ranks. But the Board is also
5 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 61 L.R.R.M. 2498 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 385 U.S. 810 (1966) (No. 216).
6 Local 4028, United Steelworkers, 154 N.L.R.B. 692, 60 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1965);
Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
7 159 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 62 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1966).
8
 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
9 159 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1301.
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correct in not extending this principle to activity such as was before it in
Cannery Workers, because such activity cannot cause the future problems
which justify expulsion.
J. Remedies
The National Labor Relations Board is vested with broad discretionary
power to remedy unfair labor practices. Section 10(c) provides that the
Board may "take such affirmative action including reinstatement of em-
ployees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies" of the act.'
The Board adapts its remedy to fit the circumstances of the particular case
in order to dissipate the effects of the unfair labor practices. 2 The aim of
the statute is to return the parties to the status which existed before the
unfair labor practices were committed. 2
1. Subcontracting and Termination Cases
The cases discussed in Section VI B (1) above, requiring bargaining
over subcontracting and partial terminations, have posed especially difficult
remedial problems.
In Ozark Trailers, Inc.,4 the trial examiner had ordered back pay for
the employees from the date of his decision until one of the following condi-
tions occurred:
(1) Reaching mutual agreement with the Union relating to the
subjects which the Respondents are hereby required to bargain
about; (2) bargaining to a genuine impasse; (3) the failure of the
Union to commence negotiations within 5 days of the receipt of the
Respondents' notice of their desire to bargain with the Union; or
(4) the failure of the Union to bargain thereafter in good faith.'
The Board, however, modified the remedy on the basis that the trial examin-
er's order was "too speculative," 5 and ordered back pay for any loss of pay
from the date the company decided to close the plant at the end of January
1964 to the date the Ozark plant was closed on March 1, 1964.
In its second supplemental order in Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,7
1 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). The Board's remedy will be
upset only if it patently fails to effectuate the policies of the act. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964); Phelps Dodge Corp, v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
194 (1941).
2 See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 216; NLRB
v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953).
3 In Fibreboard, the Supreme Court said: "There has been no showing that the
Board's order restoring the status quo ante to insure meaningful bargaining is not well
designed to promote the policies of the Act." Supra note 1, at 216.
4 161 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
5 Id., 63 L.R.R.M. at 1269-70.
6 Id., 63 L.R.R.M. at 1270. The Board did not state in what respect the trial
examiner's remedy was too speculative. Apparently, the Board objected to the fact
that this remedy would have no readily ascertainable time limit.
7 160 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 63 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1966). In its original order, 148
N.L.R.B. 545, 57 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1964), the Board required back pay for lost wages
from the date of termination of each employee's employment to the date he secured
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the Board ordered back pay for lost wages from the date of termination of
each employee's employment until one of the four conditions of the trial
examiner's order in Ozark occurred. However, an employee's recovery could
not exceed the amount of wages lost from the closing of the first plant
to the time that the employee secured equivalent employment elsewhere,
and could not exceed the lost wages from the closing of the first plant to
the closing of the second plant.
The Board's remedies, typified by Ozark and Royal Plating, often
produce unsatisfactory results. Under the Board's Ozark remedy, which
created employer liability for lost wages between the time of the decision
to close the plant and the actual closing, an employer could limit his liabil-
ity by accelerating the date of the plant closing or by terminating all jobs
on the day of closing. Given the delay and uncertainty of a back-pay award,
employees in areas of high prosperity would quickly find equivalent employ-
ment, and Iost wages would be minimal. In such cases, this remedy does not
deter employers from violating the act, and fails to provide more than token
compensation to employees for violations of their bargaining rights. Only
in areas of depressed economic conditions, where new employment is difficult
to find, would employees receive adequate relief for deprivation of their
statutory bargaining rights. Thus, the efficacy of such a remedy frequently
depends upon the economy of the area in which the violation occurred. The
remedy in Royal Plating produces the same results because, inter alia, it
also limits liability to lost wages from the date of closing to the date new
employment is secured.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Board is unsure as to what the
proper back-pay remedy should be where there is failure to bargain over
subcontracting or partial liquidation of a business. It is submitted that the
trial examiner in Ozark formulated a better remedy than that of the Board
in many similar cases. His remedy would roughly recreate the balance of
power that would have existed if there had been no refusal to bargain. Since
the company's back-pay liability was connected to its good faith in further
negotiations, the union's bargaining power would be at least partially restored,
and the employer would be under pressure to reach agreement in order to
reduce his back-pay liability. Moreover, the bargaining would be carried on
in much the same manner that it would have been under ordinary circum-
stances.
The basic difficulty probably derives from the fact that the back-pay
remedy is traditionally a remedy for discriminatory discharge and not for
refusal to bargain. The trial examiner's remedy in Ozark seems itself
capable of improvement. Imposing a time limit, as was done in the final
order in Royal Plating, would also serve as a stimulus to meaningful bar-
equivalent employment elsewhere. However, the obligation was limited to December 4,
1963, the date the company was required to vacate the premises under its agreement of
sale with the Newark Housing Authority. In the first supplemental order, 152 N.L.R.I3.
619, 59 L.R.R M. 1141 (1965), the original order was amended to limit the back-pay
obligation to August 31, 1963, the date the employer completely went out of business by
closing his second plant.
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gaining and, additionally, prevent an undue liability from being imposed
upon the employer.
2. The Runaway Shop
The "runaway" shop—the company which relocates in order to rid
itself of a union—has also presented remedial difficulties. In Garwin Corp.,8
the Board found that the employer had transferred operations from New York
to Florida in order to avoid bargaining with the union, a violation of sections
8(a) (I), (3), and (5) of the act. The Board also found that the company
violated sections 8(a) (1) and (5) in failing to consult with the union con-
cerning its decision to move to Florida.
Modifying the trial examiner's award of the traditional remedy, 9 the
Board set precedent by ordering the employer to bargain with the New York
local union for one year as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Miami employees, even though the Board was aware that the union might
not represent a majority of the employees in the Miami plant. The Board
further ruled that if the union could establish a majority at the Miami plant,
any contract it signed with the employer would bar any representation
petitions for the full contract-bar period of up to three years, according to the
length of the contract signed. However, if the union remained a minority
union, a contract with the employer purporting to last more than one year
from the date of the Board's decision would be effective for only the one
year during which the employer was under a duty to bargain with the New
York local. Even if no contract was entered into between the employer and
the union, the employer was required to bargain with the union for one year
from the time of the Board's decision.
In Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB, 1° the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded that part of the order in Garwin
which compelled the Florida company to bargain with the New York local.
Although recognizing that the Board must be granted broad discretionary
authority to formulate remedies, the court rejected the order on the ground
that it was unrelated to the redressing of the harm done to the New York
employees, who the Board assumed would not migrate to Florida, and further,
that it infringed upon the fundamental right of free choice of the workers at
the new location.
The case raises the problem of devising an effective remedy in cases
where the employer moves the plant a considerable distance. In cases of
"runaways" of short distance, an order requiring the employer to make an
8 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1965).
9 The traditional remedy in the runaway-plant situation consists of requiring an
offer of reinstatement to all discriminated employees or of preferential hiring in the
event that jobs are not then available. The employer is given an option to return to
the old location or to remain in the new location; the employer electing the latter
must pay relocation expenses of employees who accept the offer of reemployment. Em-
ployees are also made whole for any loss of pay from the time of the termination of their
employment to the time of an unconditional offer of reemployment. See id. at 680-82.
The Board's remedy in Garwin was in addition to the traditional remedy.
10 374 F.2d 295, 64 L.R.R.M. 2159 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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offer of reinstatement can be an effective remedy. In NLRB v. Lewis,t 1 for
example, the Ninth Circuit enforced a Board order requiring an employer to
bargain with a minority union after a twelve-mile move, on the assumption
that absent the employer's antiunion animus, employees probably would have
followed the employer to the new site. However, in NLRB v. Rapid Bindery,
Inc.,i 2
 the Second Circuit refused to enforce a similar remedy, because there
was no showing that the union represented a majority of employees in the
new plant.
In the short-distance situation, this remedy is effective because the em-
ployees can be expected to follow the employer, and the union will, there-
fore, have real bargaining power. The effectiveness of the Board's order in
Garwin in deterring employers is to be doubted, however, because "runaways"
of considerable distance usually relocate in areas of minimal union strength,
where the union will be unable to exert much pressure upon the employer.
Moreover, required bargaining in this type of situation does not benefit the
former employees and conflicts with the LMRA's policy of employee free
choice.'3 Nevertheless, the Board's decision does point out the inadequacy of
the old remedy and the need for a stronger one."
Perhaps the remedy of the trial examiner in Ozark" would be an
appropriate supplement to the traditional remedy, serving to better protect
the rights of the former employees and to deter employers from moving
their plants because of antiunion animus. Such a remedy obviously would
not lead to the employer's return to the old location, but the Board has
considered an affirmative order to return to be too severe a sanction."
However, the trial examiner's proposal would at least partially restore the
bargaining power of the union and put the employer under pressure to
reach an equitable settlement with the union concerning the severance pay
and pension rights of the New York employees in order to limit his liability.
3. Interference with Organizational Activities
In two separate unfair-labor-practice proceedings, one decided in 1966 1- 7
and the other in 1967,' 8 the NLRB found that J. P. Stevens & Company
had discriminatorily discharged a total of eighty-eight employees in viola-
tion of sections 8(a) (1) and (3), and had discharged seven employees in
violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (4) for participating in Board proceedings.
The Board also found that the employer had engaged in at least thirty
threats of reprisal or promises of benefit in its successful attempts to prevent
organization.
33 246 F,2d 886, 40 L.R.R.M, 2371 (9th Cir. 1957).
12 293 F.2d 170, 48 L.R.R.M. 2658 (2d Cir. 1961).
13 LMRA § 7, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), provides that employees have
the right to join or not to join a union and to be represented by the representative of
their choice.
14 The circuit court in Garment Workers, while conceding that the conventional
Board remedy was inadequate, did not suggest an appropriate remedy.
35 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
10 Garwin Corp., supra note 8, at 665-66, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1408.
17 J. P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No, 90, 61 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1966).
18 J.
 P. Stevens & Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 64 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1967).
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Because of the massive nature of the unfair labor practices, the Board,
in the first J. P. Stevens & Co. case, in addition to the usual cease-and-desist,
reinstatement, back-pay, and posting requirements, ordered the company, to
convene the employees during working hours in each department and have
their department supervisors read to them a copy of the Board's notice to
employees.i° The Board also required the employer to mail copies of the
notice to all employees 2° and to give the union reasonable access to the
plant bulletin boards for one year.24
In the second case, the Board again found that the employer had com-
mitted a great number of unfair labor practices. In order to undo the effects
of these activities, the Board found it necessary for the first time in an
unfair-labor-practice proceeding to require the employer to supply the union,
upon its request, with the names and addresses of all employees in its
plants.22 This remedy was supplementary to the ordering of remedies similar
to those ordered in the first case. In addition to the flagrant nature of
the employer's conduct, the Board relied on the fact that the union had no
access to the plants. 23 The Board concluded that the numerous unfair labor
practices necessitated its remedy, because ( 1) all union spokesmen among
the employees had been either discharged or intimidated into silence, 24 and
(2) by its remedy the union would be able to reach employees outside the
plant and make known its views in an atmosphere relatively free of coercion. 25
In view of Supreme Court decisions stating that the Board must be
granted broad discretion in formulating remedies, 2° a decision on appeal will
probably hold that the Board has acted within its authority.27 However,
the order requiring the employer to furnish a list containing the names and
addresses of its employees is subject to the same "property-rights" arguments
that were used to attack the Board rule requiring an employer to deposit with
the regional director, within seven days after the ordering of an election, a
similar list. 25
in The Board concluded that such a remedy was necessary to dispel the effects of the
illegal interrogations, promises, and threats by the employer's supervisors.
20 The purpose of this remedy was to inform any employees who may have been
absent when the notices were read.
21 The employer had used the bulletin boards to commit unfair labor practices. The
Board felt that requiring the employer to permit union access to the bulletin boards
would reduce the effects of the employer's wrongful acts.
22 See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966),
wherein the Board adopted a "name and address" rule applicable in representation
proceedings.
23 163 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
24 Ibid .
25 Id
., 64 L.R.R.M. at 1291-92.
26 May Dept Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 391-92 (1945); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
27 LMRA § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964), provides that the
Board may order any person to cease and desist from committing unfair labor practices
and to take any other affirmative action which will effectuate the purposes of the act.
28 See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., supra note 22. For a discussion of the current case
activity.conccrning this rule, see pp. 794-97 supra.
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4. Section 10( j) Injunctions
In 1932, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
 which deprived
the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant injunctions in labor disputes ex-
cept under particular specified conditions.29 Certain exceptions to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act were carved out by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Section
10(h) of that ace" provides that injunctive relief, sought by the NLRB
under section 10 generally, shall not be restricted by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Specifically, sections 10(e) 22
 and 10(j) 22 provide the Board with
authority to seek injunctions from the federal district courts. Section 10(e)
requires that the regional director seek injunctive relief pending a formal
Board decision when the regional director finds that there is good reason
to believe that a union is acting, picketing, or boycotting in violation of sec-
tions 8(b)(4)(A), (B), or (C), 8(b)(7), or 8(e).
Section 10(j) is dissimilar to section 10(e) in that injunctions under
the former are discretionary with the Board and are not required by the
finding of certain facts as with the latter. The only formal prerequisite for
seeking an injunction under section 10(j) is that there be before the Board
an unfair-labor-practice charge involving the enjoinee. Beyond that, the
court to which the Board petitions is free to grant such temporary relief or
restraining order as it "deems just and proper."'A In McLeod v. General Elec.
Co.," the Board exercised its section 10(j) discretion and successfully
petitioned a district court to enjoin General Electric from refusing to bargain
with a committee representing its electrical workers.
General Electric had refused to bargain with the committee because there
were, sitting on it, members of other independent unions who represented
other employees of General Electric. The company maintained that the
use of such a committee was an attempt by the unions to impose multi-union
bargaining upon it, and that each union was "locked" in its bargaining
position, i.e., no union would come to terms with the employer unless each of
the others did. The district court, agreeing with the Board, found that
General Electric's objections to bargaining with the committee were without
merit. The court first noted that the Electrical Workers Union had testified
that it did not intend to engage in or attempt to impose multi-union bar-
gaining upon the company. Moreover, the court added that the company
could not hypothesize these reasons as a justification for refusing to bargain,
but rather must enter the bargaining and let the Electrical Workers prove
29 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 11 101-15 (1964).
39 Before any injunction may be issued in a labor dispute, it must be shown that:
(1) unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will be continued unless re-
strained; (2) substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant's property will result
or has resulted; (3) there will be greater injury to complainant if the injunction is denied
than there will be to the defendant if the injunction is issued; and (4) the complainant
has no adequate remedy at law.
31 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160(h) (1964).
az 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
33 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964).
34 Ibid.
35 257 F. Supp. 690, 62 L.R.R.M. 2809 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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that they were willing to negotiate as an independent union without a
"locked" bargaining position.
In granting the injunction, the district court essentially took the position
that Congress, in passing section 10(j), had entrusted the NLRB with the
discretion to determine the propriety of the injunction. It was, therefore,
the duty of the court to determine whether the Board had properly exercised
that discretion, which, in effect, left the court to determine no more than
"whether the Board has 'reasonable cause to believe' that the accused party
has been guilty of unfair labor practices.""
On appeal, less than a month later, the Second Circuit reversed, and
vacated the injunction. 37
 At the outset, the court made it clear that its
opinion dealt only with the propriety of the injunction and not with the
substance of the unfair labor practice. The crux of the court's opinion was
its emphasis on the extraordinary nature of the injunction as a remedy in
labor disputes. After stating that section 10(j) was but a meager exception
to the general prohibition of Norris-LaGuardia against federal court injunc-
tions, the court held that the Board must establish that the injunction is
necessary either to preserve the status quo between the parties while the
Board resolves the dispute or to prevent "irreparable harm." Unfortunately,
however, this latter requirement comes perilously close to the Norris-
LaGuardia requirement for injunctive relief—a requirement that does not ap-
ply to section 10(j) injunctions.38
Furthermore, the court of appeals noted that the basic scheme of the
LMRA was to have the NLRB apply, in the first instance, its knowledge
and expertise to the facts of a labor dispute. Only after this is the federal
judiciary to review, under sections 10(g) and 10(f), the Board's decisions in
unfair labor practices. In a rather piqued opinion, the court stated that it
did not consider the length of time which would be required for a Board
resolution of this dispute to be a valid ground for issuing a temporary
injunction pending that resolution, even though the labor dispute "involved
important issues of labor law, many unions, and hundreds of thousands
of workers engaged in the nation's defense effort.s' Such a case should be
resolved by the Board, not the district court, and certainly not the court
of appeals "on its summer recess." 4° In rather obtuse fashion, the court of
appeals could not fathom the Board's failure to utilize its adjudication
machinery "with dispatch" to settle this dispute, in spite of the court's
previous acknowledgement of the Board's lack of celerity in the resolution of
cases before it.
Mr. Justice Harlan, hearing a petition for a stay pending Supreme Court
action on a petition for certiorari, found for the regional director and
stayed enforcement of the order of the court of appeals; 41 in other words,
80 Id. at 709, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2824, citing Douds v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 281, 39 L.R.R.M. 2388, 2390 (2d Cir. 1957).
37 366 F.2d 847, 63 L.R.R.M. 2065 (2d Cir. 1966).
88 LMRA § 10(h), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1964).
39 366 F.2d at 850, 63 L.R.R.M. at 2066.
40 Ibid.
41 87 Sup, Ct. 5 (1966).
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he reinstated the temporary injunction. Harlan agreed with the federal
district court below as to the standards by which a federal court should
evaluate a board petition for injunction under section 10(j). At the same
time, Harlan felt that this issue was of such "continuing importance to the
proper administration of the Labor Act" 42 that the full court should make
the final disposition of the case. 43
 Thus, one must still await a ruling by
the Supreme Court on the proper standards which should be applied by the
lower federal courts in determining the propriety of a section 10(j) injunc-
tion.
VII. LABOR UNIONS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
An accommodation of the antitrust laws and the labor laws is still being
sought by the courts and the legislatures. During the current Survey year,
there were two cases decided which shed new light on the direction that
this accommodation is taking:' Lewis v. Pennington2 and Carroll v. American
Fed'n of Musicians. 3
Lewis v. Pennington represents the latest chapter in an overflow of
litigation 4
 between coal operators in Tennessee and the United Mine Workers
of America (UMW) resulting from labor disputes that arose in 1955 and
continued intermittently through 1959. The antitrust aspects of the case
centered around a protective wage clause, of the kind commonly known as
a "most favored nation" clause, which the UMW and the larger coal pro-
ducers had agreed upon. By its terms, the union obligated itself not to enter
into or be party to any agreement covering wages and working condi-
tions that would be applicable to employees covered by the contract on any
bases other than those specified in the contract between the UMW and
the large producers. The union further obligated itself to perform and en-
force the conditions of the clause, without discrimination or favor, and to
use its best efforts to obtain full compliance with the contract terms by
each party signatory thereto. Using this "most favored nation" contract
clause as the mainstay of their charge, the small coal producers of the
42 Ibid.
43
 General Electric has since reached agreement on a three-year contract with the
Electrical Workers. 63 L.R.R.M. 163 (1966). At press-time for this Survey, the case was
still pending before the NLRB and the Supreme Court, but, in light of the agreement,
both bodies may drop the case.
1
 For a concise statement of the law as it stood prior to these decisions, see 1965-
1966 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 909, 954-61
(1966)
2
 257 F. Supp. 815, 62 L.R.R.M. 2604 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
3
 372 F.2d 155, 64 L.R.R.M. 2276 (2d Cir. 1967).
4 The case was first reported as Pennington v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804,
54 L.R.R.M. 2761 (6th Cir. 1963), on an appeal from the trial court. The circuit court
affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the coal operators which sustained their
contention that, inter alia, the UMW had violated the antitrust laws. On appeal from the
circuit court, the Supreme Court reversed, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and the case as reported
here is the trial court decision on remand from the Supreme Court. For a detailed analysis
of the Supreme Court decision, see 1965-1966 Annual Survey, supra note 1, at 954. See
also Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 823 (1965).
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area alleged that the UMW and the large coal producers5 bad conspired
to impose a wage and fringe-benefit standard upon the small producers which
would be impossible for them to maintain, except by operating unprofitably.
This conspiracy, they alleged, was in violation of the Sherman Act.°
When the case was originally before the Supreme Court, 7 it was held that,
although a union may seek a standard wage agreement on a multi-employer
basis, if the union should agree with one set of employers to impose a certain
wage scale on another bargaining unit, this would be grounds for union
forfeiture of its exemption from the antitrust laws.8 Two particular state-
ments by Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, caused grave con-
cern to industries engaged in pattern bargaining, 8 an activity very similar
to that cited as grounds for forfeiture of the antitrust exemption. He con-
sidered two fact situations: (1) a union-employer agreement to set a wage
scale which marginal producers could not meet, and (2) an agreement be-
tween an employer and a union to impose a higher wage scale on a second
employer. To Mr. Justice White, the latter situation was a clear violation
of the antitrust laws. But he considered the former as even more malignant,
"without regard to predatory intention or effect in the particular case,'"
because the union has thereby surrendered its flexibility in negotiation,
contrary to the intent of federal labor policy.
On their face, these statements seemed to be a blanket condemnation
of the "most favored nation" clauses and of similar employer-union agree-
ments imposing specified labor standards, which were in wide use in certain
industries. But, on remand, the district court made two very important
rulings on the elements and proof requirements necessary to sustain the
antitrust charges against the UMW. The district court stated that it must
be demonstrated that the UMW and the major coal producers had entered
into an industrywide bargaining agreement with the predatory intent of
eliminating the small producers by means of the imposition of high wage
scales. In other words, the court said that the mere showing of an agreement
imposing high wage scales, accompanied by evidence that the effect of that
imposition is to drive small producers out of business, is not sufficient. The
district court found support for this proposition in a footnote to Mr. Justice
5
 The large coal producers were never joined as defendants.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964),
7
 Supra note 4.
8
 Under §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1964), 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § .52 (1964), and the policy declaration of the
NLRA, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co, v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), unions have the
right to eliminate all Iabor-market competition, regardless of its effect on the product
market, because such activity could not be considered the kind of curtailment of price
competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. It was further held, in United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), that no union engaged in a labor dispute would be
subjected to the antitrust laws.
9
 Pattern bargaining exists where a national union or a council of local unions
promulgates a "standard" or "model" contract, the purpose of which is to create a
pattern for like contracts between the participating locals and their employers.
10 381 U.S. at 668.
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White's opinion, 1 ' which indicated to the court "that the antitrust law is
not designed to protect marginal operators; that ill effects alone on the
marginal operators is not enough to show intent."' 2
Mr. Justice White's footnote was careful to Iimit the scope of its
condonation of union action to that which is without even tacit agreement
or influence of employers.'" Therefore, it became important for the district
court to construe the actual meaning of the "most favored nation" clause.
The court first noted that a contract, subject to two reasonable construc-
tions, should be given that construction which does not violate the law."
The court, applying this rule of construction, found that the "most favored
nation" clause involved in this litigation did not obligate the UMW to
embody the same terms and conditions in contracts to be made with other
parties not signatory to the present contract.' 5 That is to say, the clause did
not contain the UMW's promise to enter into collective-bargaining agree-
ments with other coal producers only if these agreements contained the same
wage standard that the UMW had with the contracting larger coal producers.
It is submitted that the court was straining, at the least, in finding the
above to be a reasonable construction of the contract clause. In fact, the
court seems to be saying that the clause does not mean what it says, because,
if it. did so mean, the clause would be illegal. Despite the lack of clarity in
construing such a clause, the court did condone it, and thus the case represents
court approval of the "most favored nation" clause.
The second significant ruling which the district court made was that
"the standard of proof necessary to show predatory intent is governed by
. . . United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)." 16
11 381 U.S. at 665 n.2. In this footnote, Mr. Justice White stated:
Unilaterally, and without agreement with any employer group to do so,
a union may adopt a uniform wage policy and seek vigorously to implement
it even though it may suspect that some employers cannot effectively com-
pete if they are required to pay the wage scale demanded by the union. The
union need not gear its wage demands to wages which the weakest units in
the industry can afford to pay. Such union conduct is not alone sufficient
evidence to maintain a union-employer conspiracy charge under the Sherman
Act. There must be additional direct or indirect evidence of the conspiracy.
There was, of course, other evidence in this case, but we indicate no opinion
as to its sufficiency.
12 257 F. Supp. at 829, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2616.
13 Supra note 11.
14 257 F. Supp. at 862, 62 L.R.R.M, at 2644, citing Great No. Ry. v. Delmar Co.,
283 U.S. 686, 691 (1931)
15 As quoted by the court, section A of the Protective Wage Agreement read:
During the period of this Contract, the United Mine Workers of America will
not enter into, be a party to, nor will it permit any agreement or understanding
covering any wages, hours or other conditions of work applicable to employees
covered by this Contract on any basis other than those specified in this
Contract or any applicable District Contract. The United Mine Workers of
America will diligently perform without discrimination or favor the conditions
of this paragraph and all other terms and conditions of this Contract and will
use and exercise its continuing best efforts to obtain full compliance therewith
by each and all the parties signatory thereto.
Id. at 859 n.2., 62 L.R.R.M. at 2642 n.2.
16 Id. at 829, 62 L.R.R.M, at 2616.
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In Gibbs, the Supreme Court had rendered an interpretation of Section 6
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 17 It had been necessary for the Court to
decide what standard of proof was needed in a damage suit to hold the UMW
responsible for the acts of members of its local. The plaintiff in that case
charged the UMW with violation of the Tennessee common-law tort of con-
spiracy to "maliciously, wantonly and willfully interfere with [plaintiff's]
... contract of employment and with his contract of haulage." 18 Speaking
of the standard which the Court thought appropriate under section 6 for
the type of case before it, the Court stated:
The plaintiff in a civil case is not required to satisfy the criminal
standard of reasonable doubt on the issue of participation, autho-
rization or ratification; neither may he prevail by meeting the
ordinary civil burden of persuasion. He is required to persuade
by a substantial margin, to come forward with "more than a bare
preponderance of the evidence to prevail." 19 (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted here, as it was by the Gibbs Court, that the section 6
standard of proof, outlined above, is not applicable under the LMRA, "which
expressly provides that for the purposes of that statute, including section 303,
the responsibility of a union for the acts of its members and officers is to
be measured by reference to ordinary doctrines of agency . . . . 7720
But, as in Gibbs, Lewis v. Pennington does not involve damages arising
under the LMRA. It is, rather, one of those "labor disputes" not within the
ambit of the LMRA, and therefore one which falls within the mandate
of "clear proof" expressed in Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The
Pennington court emphasized the weight of this burden of "clear proof" in
its discussion of the federal antitrust charge much more than it did in its
discussion of the state tort claim, which charged tortious interference with
plaintiff's business. Whereas the former was dismissed for lack of sufficient
proof, the latter was sustained, and the plaintiff was awarded actual and
punitive damages totalling S311,787.41.
Although the court carefully reviewed the evidence in support of the
state claim, the entire discussion is void of an express reference to Section 6
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In the discussion of the union's liability for its
members' activities, the court did cite cases which applied the section 6
standard of proof; 21 one may infer that this standard was applied to the
17 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1964). This section provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no associa-
tion or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held
responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of
individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual partici-
pation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, • . . after actual knowledge
thereof. (Emphasis added.)
18 Plaintiff's complaint, as quoted by the Court. 383 U.S. at 733.
10 Id. at 737.
20 Ibid.
21 257 F. Sum). at 869, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2650, citing United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947), and Garmeada Coal Co. v. International Union,
230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956).
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state claim. But it is submitted that the opinion would have benefited from
a clearer and more candid statement of the law, one expressly applying the
section 6 standard of proof to the state claim.
On balance, the Supreme Court's remand and the district court's inter-
pretation, taken together, do not seem to be the condemnation of "most
favored nation" clauses that Justice White's majority opinion had indicated.
The district court, by construing the clause as it did, and by requiring a
showing of "predatory intent" on the part of the union and the employers
together with the higher standard of proof as demanded by Gibbs, has
mollified the severity of what was thought to be the Supreme Court's con-
demnation of the widely used "most favored nation" clause.
As the district court's opinion in Pennington is important for its con-
struction of the Supreme Court's remanding decision, so also, Carroll v.
American Fed'n of Musicians 22 is noteworthy for its interpretation of the
principles expressed by the Supreme Court in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea 0).23 The Second Circuit held in Carroll that the
musicians union had committed a per se violation of the Sherman Act by
unilaterally fixing the prices of certain types of orchestral engagements.
The difficult issue about which both Jewel Tea and Carroll revolve is the rela-
tionship between the union antitrust exemption and the activities of a union
involving subject matter lying in the penumbra of the mandatory bargaining
requirements of the LMRA.24
In Carroll, the union had acquired a virtual closed shop in the New York
City area by means of agreements with booking agents, recording companies,
and the like. Consequently, the union's by-laws regulated substantially all
of the musicians' employment. One of these by-laws required that each
member orchestra leader follow a "Price List Booklet" which was a product
of the union. The court found that
these regulations, in fact, establish price floors because the orchestra
leader is required to charge the music purchaser [whoever hires the
orchestra] not less than the total of his "leader's fees," the side-
men's wages and other fees. The leader's fee is a specific percentage
above the union wage scale, graduated according to the number
of musicians performing.25
Looking to Jewel Tea, the Carroll court found the basic legal issue to
be "readily apparent." 2° First, would the activity involved be a violation
of the Sherman Act but for the union exemption from antitrust law? Price
fixing clearly would be. Next, the court found it necessary to determine
whether such union activity falls within the test for union exemption from
the antitrust laws. What is this test? The Carroll court found that, under
22 372 F.2d 155, 64 L.R.R.M. 2276 (2d Cir. 1967).
23 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
24
 LMRA § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). This section has
been construed in a long line of cases. For an analytical synopsis of these cases, see gener-
ally Rubenstein, The Emerging Antitrust Implications of Mandatory Bargaining, 50
Marg. L. Rev. 51 (1966).
25
 372 F.2d at 160, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2280.
26 Id. at 164, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2283.
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Jewel Tea, this test should be whether the price of the orchestral arrange-
ments was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Applying this test, the court
concluded that "the price of orchestral engagements is not a subject of such
direct and overriding interest to the unions, as representatives of sidemen
and sub-leaders, that it is a mandatory subject of collective-bargaining!" 27
Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court to properly
enjoin those price-fixing activities cited and to assess what damages, if any,
the nonunion orchestra leaders who brought this action had suffered.
It should be noted how factually narrow this holding actually is. The
price-fixing was only to be enjoined for engagements in which the orchestra
leader was considered an employer of the other musicians. This distinction
between the leader as employer and the leader as employee was, according
to the court, "essential."28 It is based on the type of engagement involved.
A leader is the employer in engagements of one week or less which, by the
custom of the trade, are not covered by preexisting collective-bargaining
agreements negotiated by the union, but rather are governed by terms
negotiated between the individual parties involved. A leader is an employee
in the other class of engagements—those of one week or more—and thus
is governed by the preexisting collective-bargaining agreements. In these latter
instances, the "fixing of prices" is, according to the court, not an antitrust
violation, because it then becomes in reality the fixing of wages.
At this point, it must be asked whether the difference here considered
"essential"—leaders as employees and leaders as employers—goes to the
essence of whether the union's objective is "intimately related" to wages,
hours, and working conditions and of "immediate and direct" concern to
the unions. For "intimate relation" and "immediate and direct" concern
were the touchstones of Mr. Justice White's test of mandatory bargaining
subjects as expressed in his opinion for the Court in Jewel Tea. 29 And it was
this opinion upon which the Carroll court relied most heavily. The court's
response to this question was that
arguments that musicians are interested in the prices charged by
their employers [orchestra leaders], because they form the boundary
of the wages they can expect to receive is not presuasive because
it would justify an invasion of the proper function of management,
which, with few exceptions, would go beyond any balancing of the
labor and anti-trust laws and effect a complete paralyzation. . . .
The same principle would support union-instigated price-fixing in
any industry."
It is submitted, first, that, as the dissent and the trial judge would
have it, the orchestra business is sui generis; it can readily be distinguished
from almost any industry. Second, and more important, it is submitted that
Mr. Justice Goldberg's argument that
27 Id. at 165, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2284.
28 Id. at 158, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2278.
29 381 U.S. at 689, 691.
20 372 F.2d at 165, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2284.
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to believe that labor union interests may not properly extend be-
yond mere direct job and wage competition is to ignore not only
economic and social realities so obvious as not to need mention, but
also the graphic lessons of labor union history 3 i
is applicable in this case and would surely be the prevailing opinion should
this decision be appealed to the Supreme Court. 32
As a decision construing Jewel Tea, Carroll is important for two reasons:
(1) it considers the union antitrust exemption coextensive with the subjects
of mandatory bargaining; and (2) it points out that six of the justices in
Jewel Tea are in essential agreement on "(1)." 33 According to the Carroll
court, the apparent dichotomy of opinion among the six is due to their
differing interpretations of the breadth of the matters subject to mandatory
bargaining. 34 Whether or not the Carroll court has correctly construed the
concurring opinions in Jewel Tea as essentially agreeing on (1) above, the
correctness of (1) itself seems indubitable. As the court so convincingly put
it,
the national labor policy demands that the parties be permitted
freely to reach agreement on terms and conditions directly affect-
ing the working man. . . . Indeed, neither management nor labor
could refuse to bargain about such subjects. National Labor Rela-
tions Act §§ 8(a)(5), (b)(3), (d). . . . 35
While the Pennington Court ruminated on the legality of inter-bargaining-
unit agreements on wages, the Jewel Tea Court pondered the proper scope
of mandatory bargaining vis-a-vis the antitrust laws. Conceptually, these two
areas may be categorized under the heading of "the proper scope of labor-
oriented economic restraint," to wit, the legitimate self-interest of employees
according to the preamble of the LMRA. 36 And it is this area which is the
heart of the labor-antitrust conflict. To an extent, Jewel Tea and Pennington
did make conceptual clarifications of the proper legal approach a court
should take in a labor antitrust case, although the clarity was marred by
the number of opinions issuing in the two Supreme Court decisions.
It remained for the lower courts to demonstrate how concrete facts
would be fitted into the conceptual framework of these Supreme Court
opinions. For without such a demonstration, employers and unions cannot
sit at the bargaining table without the specter of Jewel Tea and Pennington
31 381 U.S. at 728.
a2 For an example of this type of reasoning in a different but related labor problem,
secondary activity of unions, see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 35 U.S.L.
Week 4349 (U.S. April 17, 1967).
33 These are Justices Brennan, Goldberg, Harlan, Stewart, Warren, and White.
:14
 For a discussion of the divergence of interpretations in Jewel Tea on the co-
extensiveness of the antitrust exemption and subjects of mandatory bargaining, see
Handler, supra note 4, at 831; Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the
Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 724 (1965); 1965-1966 Annual Survey, supra
note 1, at 960.
35
 372 F.2d at 165, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2284.
:111
 LMRA § I, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1964).
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lurking overhead. The lower courts in Pennington and Carroll did apply the
Supreme Court opinions to new and concrete facts—flesh was added to the
precedential skeleton. Yet each of these cases is unique by its facts, so that
they seem of dubious value to the employer or union in a different industry.
It is submitted, however, that labor-antitrust cases will always be unique in
their facts, and that what is to be garnered from these cases must be done
by analogy. Quite certainly, the Pennington district court opinion teaches
that there must be "clear proof" of "predatory intent" before an antitrust
violation will be sustained. Carroll does not result in as clear a rubric; yet
from the opinion can be distilled the precept that price fixing by a labor
union will be considered a per se antitrust violation. It still remains unclear,
however, precisely what distinguishes price fixing from wage fixing, and this
is the problem in the first instance.
STEVEN H. GRINDLE
STEVEN D. OSTROWSKY
DANIEL C. SACCO
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